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	 Effective altruism is a movement which aims to maximise 
good. Effective altruists are concerned with extreme poverty and 
many of them think that individuals have an obligation to donate to 
effective charities to alleviate extreme poverty. Their reasoning, 
which I will scrutinise, is as follows:





Premise 2. If it is in our power to prevent something 
very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to 
do it.

Premise 3. Individuals ought to choose the effective 




Premise 4. Donating to effective charities is one of the 
best ways to alleviate extreme poverty.

Conclusion. Individuals ought to donate to effective 
charities working towards extreme poverty alleviation 
where doing so does not require them to give up 
anything of moral significance.

	 I will scrutinise each of these premises in turn.	 

ix
	 For Premise 1, I focus on hedonistic utilitarianism and criticise 
its outlook on extreme poverty. I claim that hedonistic utilitarianism 
might be problematic for effective altruism.

	 Premise 2 is Peter Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. I 
introduce several possible interpretations of it, and press several 
objections to it by stressing overpermissiveness, luck, and rights. I 
defend strengthening the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice without 
making it overdemanding.

	 I claim that Premise 3 can be attractive to both 
consequentialists and non-consequentialists. Nevertheless, by 
showing that effectiveness sometimes violates fairness, I propose a 
method which avoids always helping the greater number and always 
giving everyone equal chances of being helped, which is compatible 
with effective altruism.

	 Against Premise 4, I assess the systemic change objection, 
which states that effective altruism unjustifiably distracts individuals 
from systemic change. By considering risk and the moral standing of 
the future extremely poor, I claim that the systemic change objection 
is partially successful, but cannot undermine effective altruism.

	 After analysing all of these, I argue that individuals have an 
obligation to donate to effective charities to alleviate extreme 




	 What is effective altruism?

	 Effective altruism is a philosophical approach which commits 
itself to find the effective ways to do the most good. It is also a 
social movement because many people promote and practice the 
tenets of effective altruism in their everyday lives.

	 Effective altruism has two components: effectiveness and 
altruism. Effectiveness is mostly linked to cost-effectiveness in the 
context of effective altruism. It reflects the idea that the success of 
interventions not only comes from their ability to solve problems but 
also their ability to solve problems with as few resources as 
possible. Altruism stands for the practice of being concerned with 
others' lives and improving them, as opposed to egoism which 
mainly emphasises self-interest. Effective altruism merges 
effectiveness and altruism, which makes it a distinct philosophical 
approach.

	 Effective altruism has different cause areas. One of its cause 
areas is the focus of this thesis, namely, extreme poverty. Effective 
altruists are concerned with the conditions that the hundreds of 
millions of extremely poor people across the globe are subject to, 
who have to live on just under US$1.90 per day.  According to the 1
most recent estimates, the number of extremely poor decreased 
from 1,895 billion in 1990 to 736 million by 2015.  Effective altruism 2
	 World Bank Group, "Piecing Together: The Poverty Puzzle," Poverty and 1
Shared Prosperity 2018, 1.
	 World Bank Group, 2.2
1
owes its emergence largely to Peter Singer's philosophy according 
to which donating to charities to improve the lives of the extremely 
poor is a moral obligation. In its early years, effective altruism 
exclusively focused on extreme poverty through Giving What We 
Can, co-founded by Toby Ord and William MacAskill, two 
philosophers of effective altruism who advocated donating a 
significant portion of one's income to alleviate extreme poverty. 
There are other cause areas of effective altruism which will not be 
analysed in this thesis. One of those cause areas is animal welfare. 
Many effective altruists defend the claims that animals have moral 
standing, and that preventing animal suffering is of utmost 
importance, given that trillions of animals suffer each year either due 
to animal farming or because of natural causes. Another cause area 
that has emerged over recent years is the long-term future. A 
significant portion of effective altruists has become more and more 
attracted to the idea that saving humanity from extinction risks is 
critical. Although I will not be covering the issues related to 
extinction risks, I will be focusing on providing better institutions for 
the future by looking at the systemic change objection. There are 
many organisations centred around the general principles of 
effective altruism apart from Giving What We Can: such as GiveWell, 
80,000 Hours, the Global Priorities Institute at the University of 
Oxford, the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, 
The Centre for Effective Altruism, and Forethought Foundation, to 
name a few.

	 Effective altruism has a welfarist orientation. By welfarist, I 
denote the inclination to evaluate interventions with respect to the 
increase in a person's welfare. Effective altruism attaches 
importance to increasing people's quality of life and preventing 
2
people from having bad lives. But, by having a welfarist orientation, 
effective altruism excludes non-welfarist views which attach inherent 
goodness to concepts like freedom, knowledge, diversity, art, etc. 
But, as MacAskill points out, it is merely a working assumption and 
may be liable to change. 
3
	 One of the other important features of effective altruism is 
that it is cause-neutral. Identifying the promising causes whose cost-
effective solutions bring about the greatest good is a difficult task. 
To find them, one has to be unbiased in selecting causes and 
impartially evaluate their importance, neglectedness and tractability.  4
While effective altruism currently tackles problems under its cause 
areas, these cause areas are apt to change whenever the 
opportunities and challenges change. In other words, these cause 
areas are not fixed and effective altruists compare them with other 
ever-changing problems to understand their respective weight.

	 Effective altruism is also eager to be fed by empirical 
evidence. Effective altruists extensively use empirical evidence in the 
case of extreme poverty. For instance, it appeals to the research 
done by GiveWell. GiveWell is a meta-charity which assesses the 
cost-effectiveness of different charities which improve the lives of 
the extremely poor. GiveWell uses field data, economic models, 
surveys, and forecasts to understand which charities bring about 
more benefit per unit of resources than other charities. Effective 
altruists usually consider the recommendations of GiveWell in order 
to decide where to donate to alleviate extreme poverty.

	 William MacAskill, "The Definition of Effective Altruism," in Effective Altruism: 3
Philosophical Issues, eds. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (New York: 
Oxford University, 2019), 18.
	 I will return to this criteria in Chapter 4.4
3
	 MacAskill also defines effective altruism as "maximising" and 
"science-aligned".  It is maximising because it does not merely aim 5
for the good but the most good with the resources available. It is 
science-aligned because effective altruists believe that "The best 
means to figuring out how to do the most good is the scientific 
method, broadly construed to include reliance on careful rigorous 
argument and theoretical models as well as data". 
6
	 From time to time, I will use the term "effective altruists" 
alongside "effective altruism". There are a variety of effective 
altruists, each of whom has different perspectives, ideologies, and 
beliefs. Whenever I use effective altruists, I either refer to leading 
philosophers and figures in the effective altruism community whose 
contributions made effective altruism "effective altruism", or to 
people who share the core positions of effective altruism and 




	 What are the premises of effective altruism?

	 In this thesis, I will scrutinise the premises of an effective 
altruist argument for why we have a moral obligation to alleviate 
extreme poverty.

Premise 1. Extreme poverty is very bad.

Premise 2. If it is in our power to prevent something 




anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to 
do it. 
7
Premise 3. Individuals ought to choose the effective 
option in preventing very bad things.

Premise 4. Donating to effective charities is one of the 
best ways to alleviate extreme poverty.

Conclusion. Individuals ought to donate to effective 
charities working towards extreme poverty alleviation 
where doing so does not require them to give up 




	 In scrutinising the premises of this effective altruist argument 
for why we have a moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty, I put 
to one side, as I have said, arguments surrounding other cause 
areas, such as animal suffering and the long-term future (concerning 
extinction risks). I also put aside arguments which focus on effective 
giving but do not claim that we are obligated to give. For example, 
Theron Pummer suggests that we may not be obligated to give, but 
if we choose to give, we are obligated to give effectively.  We may 8
also think that giving effectively is not a moral requirement at all, but 
rather a rational requirement. If we choose to give, and in doing so 
we want to do the most good, we rationally should give effectively. 
Therefore, not every effective altruist necessarily accepts these 
premises, but these premises altogether constitute the commonly 
accepted argument of effective altruism with regards to extreme 
poverty.

	 This is Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. Refer to Peter Singer, "Famine, 7
Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 231.
	 Theron Pummer, "Whether and Where to Give," Philosophy & Public Affairs 44, 8
no. 1 (2016): 87.
5
	 The above argument is based on Peter Singer's famous 
argument for obligations to help the extremely poor, first articulated 
in the seminal article "Famine, Affluence, and Morality".  In this 9
article, which has been very important in the development of the 
effective altruism movement, Singer asks whether we would be 
obligated to save a drowning child when we are walking past a 
pond, if we do not sacrifice something of comparable moral 
significance (or, in the weaker version, something of moral 
significance). Singer argues that we would. Singer also argues that 
responding to this positively entails that we ought to alleviate the 
plight of the extremely poor, because people in distant regions who 
immensely suffer under extreme poverty are no different than the 
drowning child.  This is the general reasoning inherited by effective 10
altruists from Singer. 

	 Singer's weaker argument from "Famine, Affluence and 
Morality" can be summarised as follows:

1. Suffering and death from famine are bad.

2. If we can prevent something very bad from happening without 
thereby sacrificing anything of moral significance, we should 
do so.

3. We would not be sacrificing anything of moral significance if 
we sent our money to famine relief instead of buying luxuries.

	 The conclusion is that we ought to send the money to famine 
relief and it is wrong not to do so.

	 Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9
1, no. 3 (1972): 229-243.
	 Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", 231-232.10
6
The argument I have laid out is very similar, but importantly 
different. This is because, as I will argue in Chapter 3, Singer's 
argument does not lead us to effective altruism. Although this 
argument has been an inspiration for effective altruism, it does not 
lead us all the way to it. Part of my argument in this thesis is that 
Singer's argument must be supplemented by an effectiveness 
principle in order to deliver effective altruism.

	 Taking us back to the argument, I have constructed, I will 
examine each premise in turn, taking a chapter on each (with the 
exception of Premise 4, which I examine over the course of two 
chapters). I argue that the conclusion of effective altruism is true, but 
I will develop many critiques and objections to effective altruism, as 
presented in this argument. I aim to resolve the problems arising 
from those critiques and objections, which will help to reorientate 
effective altruism in a better direction.

	 In Chapter 1, while I assume that deeming extreme poverty 
very bad is uncontroversial, I argue that approaching this 
assumption through the lens of hedonistic utilitarianism results in 
two repugnant conclusions. The first repugnant conclusion is that 
hedonistic utilitarianism may morally justify extreme poverty if it 
does not produce suffering. I use a thought experiment, Zero 
Suffering Operation, to show that. The second repugnant conclusion 
is that hedonistic utilitarianism could morally justify the secret killing 
of the extremely poor. I conclude that any plausible account of 
effective altruism should leave behind hedonistic utilitarianism in 
approaching the badness of extreme poverty to avoid these 
repugnant conclusions. This is of utmost importance to effective 
altruism because many effective altruists are utilitarians, some are 
hedonistic utilitarians, and a version of effective altruism aligning 
7
with hedonistic utilitarianism could bring about a moral problem. 
Moreover, while it is uncontroversial that extreme poverty is bad, 
misdiagnosing why it is bad will lead us to the wrong solutions and 
charities. In other words, if we have a faulty account of the problem, 
we will be led, at least sometimes, to the wrong solutions.

	 In Chapter 2, I delve into the territory of moral obligations. 
Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, which I take to be the second 
premise of effective altruism, is different from Singer's Stronger 
Principle of Sacrifice. Singer's Stronger Principle of Sacrifice asks 
individuals to sacrifice everything except our necessities to alleviate 
extreme poverty, whereas Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
asks individuals to sacrifice things which are not morally significant. I 
disaggregate the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice and present four 
alternative readings of "moral significance" which is a concept that 
has wrongly been taken as self-evident and rarely studied with 
regards to Singer's work. These four alternative readings of moral 
significance are in conflict with each other and only one of them 
could be accepted by Singer—yet this reading has still its own 
problems. While Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is one of 
those premises which has been or could easily be accepted by 
effective altruists in determining the scope of one's moral obligation 
towards the extremely poor, this seemingly plausible principle is in 
fact overpermissive because it allows lavish pursuits. Moreover, it 
reduces responsibility to mere ability and neglects other potential 
sources of responsibility. Finally, it does not say anything about 
moral rights even if it establishes moral obligations. These are 
common problems of the effective altruist discourse which is 
reflected by Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. I discuss the 
lessons that effective altruists could take from these problems, and 
8
argue that by introducing additional moral principles which 
strengthen effective altruism, these problems could be avoided 
without undermining Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice.

	 In Chapter 3, I first show that Peter Singer's Weaker Principle 
of Sacrifice does not lead to effective altruism—it only leads to 
altruism. The inadequacy of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice calls 
for a new principle based on effectiveness. I then support two 
arguments for effectiveness through an outcome-based principle 
and an obligation-based principle. While I take effectiveness to be a 
valuable feature of effective altruism, I show that solely endorsing it 
could lead effective altruists to unjustly favour the well-off, prefer 
distributing tiny benefits to a large number of well-off as opposed to 
distributing large benefits to a small number of worst-off, and 
perpetuate the unequal luck distribution among the worst-off 
including the extremely poor. Since these problems inevitably show 
the importance of fairness, I support a method of assistance which 
does not base itself exclusively on effectiveness but also takes into 
account fairness. Such a method takes into account the difference 
between group sizes of potential beneficiaries and the relative 
importance of fairness to utility. I show that this not only overcomes 
the problems created by solely endorsing effectiveness but would 
also be attractive to many effective altruists.

	 In Chapter 4, I analyse whether donating to charities is one of 
the best ways to alleviate extreme poverty by focusing on the 
systemic change objection. The systemic change objection holds 
that effective altruism unjustifiably distracts individuals from 
allocating their spare resources to systemic change. Before 
analysing the systemic change objection, I examine how GiveWell 
works and its limitations, which is the organisation often consulted 
9
by effective altruists when they want to donate to alleviate extreme 
poverty. Next, by presenting empirical research on extreme poverty, I 
show that the systemic causes of extreme poverty (which are often a 
reflection of deep and chronic institutional problems) are so serious 
that merely donating may not be sufficient. Then, I scrutinise the 
systemic change objection with respect to risk, which leads me to 
argue that we should neither allocate all of our spare resources to 
effective charities nor to systemic change. Instead, we should find a 
balance.

	 In Chapter 5, I continue to analyse whether donating to 
charities is one of the best ways to alleviate extreme poverty by 
focusing on the systemic change objection. This time, I focus on the 
moral standing of the future extremely poor, and the non-identity 
problem which challenges the systemic change objection. The 
presence of the future extremely poor is important for our decision 
regarding how to allocate our spare resources, because they will be 
affected by the presence or the lack of systemic change. I claim that 
we should give equal moral weight to the existing extremely poor 
and the future extremely poor, which implies that we should not 
neglect systemic change. After showing several variables which help 
us to understand how to decide to allocate our spare resources 
between effective charities and systemic change, I introduce the 
non-identity problem as a potential objection to allocating our spare 
resources to systemic change. By introducing the case of local 
harms, I show that the non-identity problem is not a threat to 
allocating our spare resources to systemic change. Finally, I grant 
that we have reasons to accept that donating to effective charities is 
one of the ways to alleviate extreme poverty but we should also 
10
allocate our spare resources to systemic change—this conclusion is 
the same conclusion I reach in the previous chapter.

	 In the conclusion, I state that the conclusion of effective 
altruism is correct: individuals ought to donate to effective charities 
working towards extreme poverty alleviation where doing so does 
not require them to give up anything of moral significance. As shown 
through the analysis of premises, this conclusion is neither self-
evident nor immune to objections, but it could be granted and 
defended.

	 The aims of this thesis and effective altruism 

	 as a field of philosophical study

	 As effective altruism is a relatively young philosophical 
approach, it raises many different questions in different areas of 
moral and political philosophy, ranging from the definition of good, 
the optimal distribution of good, the nature of moral obligations, 
tensions between effectiveness and fairness, the desirability of 
systemic change, population ethics and the non-identity problem. 
This thesis, as one of the first theses written on effective altruism, 
aims to unravel these questions and respond to them.

	 Another aim of this thesis is to apply already existing or 
emerging discussions to effective altruism. For instance, it analyses 
the long-standing tradition of hedonistic utilitarianism with regards to 
the badness of extreme poverty, demonstrates the hardship of 
choosing charities when faced with the tension between 
effectiveness and fairness, and builds a bridge between systemic 
change and effective altruism.

11
	 Moreover, this thesis aims to visit the rarely visited areas of 
philosophy, some of which are the overpermissiveness of moral 
obligations (as opposed to the demandingness of moral obligations), 
different ways of understanding moral significance, the effect of 
changing group sizes on our decision regarding whom to help, and 
the relationship between systemic change and the future extremely 
poor who will be a subset of the future people.

	 Overall, this thesis supports effective altruism and recognises 
effective altruism as a field of philosophical study, but it argues for 




The Badness of Extreme Poverty 
and Hedonistic Utilitarianism 
Premise 1 




	 As it brings about immense suffering, leads to the violation of 
rights, and renders the extremely poor vulnerable to exploitation, 
discrimination and exclusion, extreme poverty is clearly very bad. 
Since its emergence, effective altruism has always preserved the 
alleviation of extreme poverty as one of its central cause areas, and 
the movement can be traced to Peter Singer's writings on our 
obligations regarding extreme poverty. However, effective altruists 
must explain and make clear how they understand the badness of 
extreme poverty, as different accounts of its badness will license 
different solutions and measures to combat it. This chapter 
concerns one way of explaining the badness of extreme poverty, 
that is, the hedonistic utilitarian account. I will argue that effective 
altruists should not align themselves with hedonistic utilitarianism, 
13
and that hedonistic utilitarianism provides a poor diagnosis of the 
badness of extreme poverty.

	 In a recent survey, more than half of effective altruists state 
that they lean towards utilitarianism and thus they comprise the 
largest group in the effective altruism community.  And, as we 11
might expect, some effective altruists are hedonistic utilitarians. For 
instance, one of the leading figures of effective altruism, Peter 
Singer has become a hedonistic utilitarian after devoting almost an 
entire life to being a preference utilitarian. 
12
	 I regard Premise 1 as uncontroversial. However, I think 
hedonistic utilitarianism offers an inadequate explanation for why 
extreme poverty is very bad. In the following, I argue that hedonistic 
utilitarianism leads to two repugnant conclusions. The first 
repugnant conclusion is that, since hedonistic utilitarianism solely 
appeals to suffering and thereby ignores other morally significant 
reasons, hedonistic utilitarianism would not find extreme poverty as 
very bad if one day extreme poverty no longer leads to suffering. To 
demonstrate how this might be possible, I utilise a thought 
experiment, Zero Suffering Operation. The second repugnant 
conclusion is that hedonistic utilitarianism can morally justify the 
secret killing of the extremely poor. After unfolding these repugnant 
conclusions, by referring to a rights-based theory and a version of 
	 William MacAskill, "The Definition of Effective Altruism", 18-19.11
	 Once a well-known preference utilitarian, Singer has switched to hedonistic 12
utilitarianism. Refer to Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point 
of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 263. Singer is close to the version of hedonistic 
utilitarianism formulated by Henry Sidgwick. According to Roger Crsip, 
Sidgwick's view is that "what is ultimately good for me is pleasurable 
experience, and that a life becomes better for me the greater the balance of 
pleasure over pain in that life" in Roger Crisp, "Pleasure and Hedonism in 
Sidgwick," in Underivative Duty, ed. Thomas Hurka (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 32.
14
global egalitarianism, I briefly show that appealing to morally 
significant reasons other than suffering brings advantages to 
effective altruism. I conclude that effective altruists should not 
approach the badness of extreme poverty only through the lens of 
hedonistic utilitarianism as the moral scope of hedonistic 
utilitarianism is too limited.

	 Since Premise 1, and the moral stance behind it, is so 
uncontroversial, it does not seem to have attracted much attention 
within the effective altruism movement, nor the philosophical 
writings surrounding it. For instance, there is no chapter in a recent 
collection of essays on effective altruism devoted to this question.  13
Therefore, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no extensive 
philosophical discussion among effective altruists regarding how 
different philosophical accounts approach extreme poverty, and 
which one these accounts should be preferred over others, or, at 
least, which of these accounts are undesirable for effective altruism. 
This chapter aims to start filling this gap in the literature.

1.2	 Suffering caused by extreme poverty

	 In general, effective altruists have a broad understanding of 
the suffering caused by extreme poverty. In what is called "The 
Basic Argument", Singer states that "Suffering and death from lack 
of food, shelter, and medical care are bad".  Evidently, lack of food, 14
shelter, and medical care are some of the elements of suffering 
caused by extreme poverty. Singer mentions other elements of 
	 Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer, eds., Effective Altruism: Philosophical 13
Issues (New York: Oxford University, 2019).
	 Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save (New York: Random House, 2009), 15.14
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suffering caused by extreme poverty such as being unable to save 
money and being entrapped under debt bondage due to high-
interest rates, inaccessibility to adequate education, and living in a 
very low-quality house.  Just like Singer, William MacAskill 15
recognises that the extremely poor who have managed to survive 
consume "about half of what is recommended for a physically active 
man or a very physically active woman" and thus most of them are 
"underweight and anaemic".  Their houses often lack "electricity, 16
toilets or tap water". 
17
	 Although these elements of suffering caused by extreme 
poverty are related to material needs, Singer and MacAskill are 
aware that the suffering caused by extreme poverty is not only 
related to material needs. For instance, Singer writes that extreme 
poverty produces suffering through "a degrading state of 
powerlessness", which forces the extremely poor to "accept 
humiliation without protest", and the law does not "necessarily 
protect [the extremely poor] from rape or sexual harassment".  18
Singer also maintains that the extremely poor have a "pervading 
sense of shame and failure" and they "lose hope of ever escaping 
from a life of hard work".  MacAskill notes that the extremely poor 19
spend most of their income to buy food which restricts their freedom 
to spend what they gain more gratifyingly. 
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	 Singer, 6.15
	 William MacAskill, Doing Good Better (London: Guardian Faber, 2016), 24.16
	 MacAskill, 24.17
	 Singer, The Life You Can Save, 6.18
	 Singer, 6.19
	 MacAskill, Doing Good Better, 24.20
16
	 Some have pointed out other elements of suffering caused by 
extreme poverty. They include bureaucratic barriers in financial 
services , inability to rest , and threats to friendship. 
21 22 23




	 While we can all agree that extreme poverty is bad for a 
person, especially when compared with a life of material comfort, 
philosophically we must explain why it is bad. Hedonistic 
utilitarianism is one way to do this. Hedonistic utilitarianism has two 
central claims: an account of personal well-being and an account of 
right action. Firstly, it claims that what makes a life go well or badly 
can be reduced to two components of life: pleasure and suffering. 
According to hedonistic utilitarianism, only what produces pleasure 
is good for a person and only what produces suffering is bad for a 
person. In that respect, hedonistic utilitarianism is a welfarist moral 
approach. Recall that effective altruism is also a welfarist moral 
approach, although it does not need to be based on hedonistic 
utilitarianism. But it can be based on hedonistic utilitarianism, and if 
	 Jahel Queralt, "A Human Right to Financial Inclusion," in Ethical Issues in 21
Poverty Alleviation, ed. Helmut P. Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger and Clemens 
Sedmak (Springer, 2016), 80.
	 Helmut P. Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger and Clemens Sedmak, "Ethical Is22 -
sues in Poverty Alleviation: Agents, Institutions and Policies" in Ethical Issues 
in Poverty Alleviation, ed. Helmut P. Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger and Clem-
ens Sedmak (Springer, 2016), 2.
	 John Tasioulas, "The Moral Reality of Human Rights" in Freedom from Poverty 23
as a Human Right, ed. Thomas Pogge (Paris and Oxford: United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Oxford University, 2007), 78.
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it is to be based on hedonistic utilitarianism, then it will produce the 
same repugnant conclusions which will be discussed below.

	 Secondly, just like effective altruism which aims to maximise 
the good in the world, hedonistic utilitarianism is also maximising: it 
aims to maximise net pleasure. Hedonistic utilitarianism is indifferent 
to how pleasure should be distributed and thus is indifferent to 
comparative notions like fairness. Effective altruism does not value 
fairness for its own sake either. While hedonistic utilitarianism has 
similarities with effective altruism, effective altruism does not entail 
hedonistic utilitarianism, and vice versa. But their similarities mean 
that effective altruists could easily become hedonistic utilitarians.

	 It is impossible to deny that extreme poverty leads to a lot of 
suffering. But it is possible to link the badness of extreme poverty 
exclusively to suffering. This is what hedonistic utilitarianism does: 
since it claims that happiness and suffering are the only things of 
ultimate moral importance, it finds extreme poverty bad only 
because it brings about suffering. Likewise, the degree of the 
badness of extreme poverty would depend entirely on the extent of 
net suffering it yields.

	 Since hedonistic utilitarianism does not appeal to morally 
significant reasons other than suffering in explaining the badness of 
extreme poverty, there are two repugnant conclusions of hedonistic 
utilitarianism. The first is that hedonistic utilitarianism can morally 
justify extreme poverty if it is without suffering, which is discussed in 
§1.3.1. The second is that hedonistic utilitarianism can morally justify 
the secret killing of the extremely poor, which is discussed in §1.3.2. 
Because of these repugnant conclusions, I argue that effective 
altruism has to distance itself from hedonistic utilitarianism.
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1.3.1	Hedonistic utilitarianism can morally justify extreme 

	 poverty if it is without suffering

	 The first repugnant conclusion of hedonistic utilitarianism is 
that it can morally justify extreme poverty if it is without suffering. It 
is rather inconceivable that extreme poverty can ever be without 
suffering. Nonetheless, technically, it is possible. Consider Zero 
Suffering Operation.

Zero Suffering Operation. Subsidised if the patient is 
extremely poor, a very low-cost operation known as 
Zero Suffering Operation is invented. Granting people 
immunity to any type of suffering, doctors manipulate a 
specific area of the brain so that people perceive their 
conditions as positive. It also amplifies the 
pleasantness of already positive experiences. 
Motivated by the advantages of the operation and 
encouraged by the doctors, Hope, as an extremely 
poor person, decides to undergo it. After the operation, 
Hope is provided regular medical care by the doctors 
to avoid death because Zero Suffering Operation also 
wipes suffering from health issues away. Nevertheless, 
Hope is still stuck in extreme poverty.

	 Hope now lacks the elements of suffering that the extremely 
poor are normally subject to: Hope does not feel pain from hunger 
and dehydration, delights in the hard work while paying debt with 
high-interest rates, repairs shattered houses after severe weather 
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with joy, and Hope's self-image is not miserable and vulnerable.  24
Hope is being exploited through high-interest rates, being 
overworked and not being able to receive what is deserved: but 
Hope does not have any complaints against these because of the 
Zero Suffering Operation.

	 Hope's conditions are physically and mentally better than 
those of other extremely poor people. If we had solely appealed to 
suffering when regarding extreme poverty as very bad like 
hedonistic utilitarians, then we would conclude that the Zero 
Suffering Operation ends the badness of extreme poverty.  Without 25
producing mental suffering, extreme poverty would become morally 
unproblematic. 
26
	 For instance, in Zero Suffering Operation, the forms of 
exploitation that the extremely poor are subject to are not morally 
significant as long as they do not change the hedonistic calculation. 
Certainly, forms of exploitation like being overworked, debt 
bondage, social exclusion and denial of political participation lead to 
the suffering of the extremely poor. Nonetheless, the extremely poor 
	 Hope's case is currently hypothetical. Yet, there is an ongoing research on 24
"the forgetting pill" which erases bad memories and wipe out some suffering. 
The forgetting pill is comparable to anti-depressants which are massively used 
to stimulate positive emotions, and it can be regarded as an inferior model of a 
Zero Suffering Operation.
	 The result would be the same in a similar case, namely, organ trafficking: think 25
of solitary, desperate and very old homeless people being kidnapped and 
killed. They are anaesthetised right in the middle of their sleep, do not 
understand that they are kidnapped or killed, and thus do not feel any physical 
and mental pain as a result. There is no one around to mourn for their loss. No 
suffering generated in total. If homeless people currently have net negative 
lives and will have net negative lives, a hedonistic utilitarian would not find this 
case problematic either.
	 This thought experiment is to some degree similar to Robert Nozick's 26
experience machine because both thought experiments show that hedonism 
backs delusion as a way out of suffering. Refer to Robert Nozick, Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 42-43.
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who have chosen to undergo the Zero Suffering Operation would not 
suffer from those forms of exploitation. In that case, hedonistic 
utilitarianism would not submit that those forms of exploitation are 
morally wrong. In the absence of suffering, the forms of exploitation 
that the extremely poor are subject to should still be wrong. There 
are three reasons for this. Firstly, wronging is not necessarily 
indexed to harm. Those who exploit Hope are acting wrongly 
because they fail to respect Hope as a person and treat Hope as a 
mere means. Secondly, because of the Zero Suffering Operation, the 
extremely poor are confined to receive pleasure from whatever is 
done to them and thus those who are exploiting them are unjustly 
benefiting from the confinement of the extremely poor. In this case, 
the benefit that the exploiters receive is impermissible. Thirdly, it is 
not clear how one's pleasure or absence of a complaint from being 
wronged offsets the moral wrongness of that action. If there are 
happy slaves, should we keep them enslaved? It is not clear how 
this might be plausible.

	 Worse still, as imposing these operations would increase the 
overall welfare of the extremely poor by decreasing or eradicating 
their suffering, hedonistic utilitarianism can morally justify the 
imposition of medical operations like Zero Suffering Operation on 
the extremely poor. Even more repugnant, hedonistic utilitarianism 
can morally justify the enslavement of the extremely poor if the 
extremely poor enslaved have undergone the Zero Suffering 
operation. For instance, in a highly technological world where a 
bunch of powerful people have the ability to impose the Zero 
Suffering Operation on the extremely poor or drive them to choose 
it, they could enslave the extremely poor without committing any 
moral wrong. Alarmingly, hedonistic utilitarianism possesses a 
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totalitarian and paternalistic tendency which not only reduces the 
badness of extreme poverty to suffering but also disregards the 
moral agency of the extremely poor. Their agency is disregarded 
because hedonistic utilitarianism permits a few powerful people to 
treat the extremely poor as mere objects whose only function is 
thought to be cash-generating. Effective altruism founded on 
hedonistic utilitarianism would not recommend donating or 
reforming institutions to alleviate or end this slavery, instead it would 
recommend to maintain, increase, and subsidise these interventions 
on the extremely poor. In that case, effective altruism would 
problematise neither this slavery nor extreme poverty. The version of 
the world that effective altruism founded on hedonistic utilitarianism 
asks of us could be plainly despotic and dystopic.

	 Such implications of hedonistic utilitarianism are not only 
dangerous in and of themselves but also pose a great threat to the 
health of effective altruism as a movement. If effective altruism does 
not distance itself from hedonistic utilitarianism, it is likely that 
effective altruists will find themselves defending this repugnant 
conclusion of hedonistic utilitarianism. Hedonistic utilitarianism 
presents a very limited account of why extreme poverty is very bad 
and hence is not sufficient to comprehensively explain the badness 
of extreme poverty.

1.3.2	Hedonistic utilitarianism can morally justify the 

	 secret killing of the extremely poor

	 The second repugnant conclusion of hedonistic utilitarianism 
is that it can morally justify the secret killing of the extremely poor.
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	 Take Singer's position on terminally ill patients. If the suffering 
that they are to experience would outweigh the happiness that they 
are to experience, Singer argues that the secret killing of patients in 
their sleep who suffer from terminal illnesses is morally justified even 
if it is against their will. Singer has two scenarios to establish this 
position.

	 In the first scenario, we have a friend who is a cancer patient, 
who agrees that "his life as it is now is not worth living" due to the 
pain, although our friend wants to continue living.  Hoping that it 27
will be a cure, our friend requests juice from a cactus. Nonetheless, 
doctors unanimously agree that there is nothing to be done to 
prolong our friend's life. Our friend will live for another month or two, 
and the condition will keep deteriorating throughout. We have the 
opportunity to cease the pain altogether by a painless injection 
which can kill our friend during sleep. Since our friend is so weak, 
people will think that our friend had a natural death. Singer 
concludes that "the hedonistic utilitarian must say that, despite his 
desire to go on living, it would be better for him if he died now, and 
so killing him would be justified". 
28
	 In the second scenario which is the modification of the first, 
we have another friend. Just like in the first scenario, our friend is in 
discomfort and the days are numbered. Our friend lives in the 
Netherlands where euthanasia is legal. We discuss with our friend 
the option of being euthanised but our friend expresses a 
willingness to see Halley's comet next month. Our friend 
acknowledges that the happiness to be received from seeing it will 
	 Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the 27
Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics, 263.
	 Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, 263.28
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not outweigh the suffering that has to be borne while waiting to see 
Halley's comet. However, our friend still has a desire to see it. Here, 
Singer raises the possibility that our friend may have a distinction 
between "higher" and "lower" pleasures, and thus commits himself 
to see Halley's comet. However, by believing that it is the totality of 
happiness and suffering that counts and that there cannot be a 
pleasure higher in quality when it is less pleasant, Singer rejects this 
distinction as Henry Sidgwick does. Then, Singer asserts that our 
friend is mistaken and concludes that "it is difficult to see how 
hedonism can avoid saying that it would be best if he died now, and 
killing him would, in the absence of indirect reasons against doing 
so, be justified". 
29
	 Nevertheless, as it is likely to incite fear and the occasions 
where it is morally justified are rare, Singer thinks that we need 
"strong prohibitions against killing people against their will".  Even 30
so, the prohibitions that Singer proposes are only intended for public 
policy, and Singer indeed believes that it is morally justified to 
secretly kill those terminally ill patients. 
31
	 One objection may be that the extremely poor are not 
comparable to terminally ill patients who suffer, because many of the 
extremely poor are not going to die soon like terminally ill patients. 
	 Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the 29
Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics, 264.
	 Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, 264.30
	 Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, 264. The stance that hedonistic 31
utilitarianism would take in the homelesses example would be the same—that 
the secret killing of the solitary, desperate and very old homelesses who do 
not and will not have net positive lives is morally justified because there is no 
suffering generated in killing and net future suffering is prevented. Parallelly, 
Singer would agree that the secret killing of the extremely poor against their 
will in their sleep -who are alone living in the massive distress of extreme 
poverty and have no prospect of overcoming their net future suffering- is 
morally justified as well.
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So the idea may be that the leap from Singer's scenarios to the 
conclusion that hedonistic utilitarianism can morally justify the secret 
killing of the extremely poor does not work. In fact, there are 
extremely poor people living on the margins of survival either 
because of preventable diseases or because of malnutrition, 
deprivation and other forms of misery. But regardless of that fact, 
Singer's emphasis in the scenarios is not that our friends are going 
to die soon but that they are going to suffer a lot to the extent that 
their suffering will outweigh their happiness in their time ahead, 
however long that may be. In that respect, provided that more 
happiness-inducing alternatives are not available, and if we can find 
people who will have net future suffering and whose death will not 
create net future suffering, such as some of the extremely poor, then 
hedonistic utilitarianism can entail that the secret killing of them is 
morally justified.

	 But there will also be some extremely poor whose net 
suffering could be prevented. If it could be eliminated, and bring 
positive well-being into the world, the hedonistic utilitarianism would 
prefer that. But how it is prevented should be of utmost importance 
for us. For instance, if we can prevent their suffering by cash 
transfers and institutional support, then this is plausible. But there 
are other options. Suppose that we secretly kill a member of an 
extremely poor family to increase the collective well-being of other 
family members. There will be grief sometime because they would 
want that person alive. However, because of that person's death, 
the family needs to accumulate fewer resources to support 
themselves. As fewer resources are needed, in the long-term, the 
family will get out of extreme poverty and each and every member 
will lead much better lives. Killing one family member prevents the 
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net suffering of other family members. In this case, hedonistic 
utilitarianism again permits the secret killing of the extremely poor.

	 Moreover, there might be cases where hedonistic 
utilitarianism would permit the secret killing of the extremely poor, 
even if the net suffering of the extremely poor could be prevented. 
Suppose that A is an extremely poor person with a net balance of 
-10 (a life which is not worth living, because the net balance is below 
0) and B is quite a rich person with a net balance of +100 (a superb 
life, certainly worth living). We could spend our resources on 
benefiting A (up to +1), which could bring about a difference of +11, 
and avoid net suffering. Our other option is spending our resources 
on benefiting B (up to +120), which could bring about a difference of 
+20. +20 is larger than +11. Having spent our resources on B, 
hedonistic utilitarianism would permit the secret killing of A. In this 
case, hedonistic utilitarianism does not prefer avoiding the net 
suffering of the extremely poor person even if it is avoidable, 
because the net benefit we could lend to B is greater.

	 Plainly, hedonistic utilitarianism renders the extremely poor 
who are already very disadvantaged in the society even more 
disadvantaged by morally permitting others to secretly kill them in 
the cases where they do not possess a good chance of 
experiencing more happiness than suffering in their future lives. This 
not only punishes them because they are disadvantaged but it also 
violates the autonomy of the extremely poor who have a desire to 
continue their lives. One might think that we do not punish them if 
their lives are not worth living and cannot be made worth living. But 
we punish them because even though they are exposed to 
prolonged suffering through no fault of their own and have a desire 
to keep living, hedonistic utilitarianism acts against the will of the 
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extremely poor just to increase the overall well-being in the world. It 
also punishes the extremely poor whose net suffering could be 
avoided—in the cases where benefiting a vastly better off person 
brings about more benefit, hedonistic utilitarianism does not prefer 
avoiding the net suffering of the extremely poor and permits killing 
them.

	 Both of the repugnant conclusions which render hedonistic 
utilitarianism unacceptable bring us to my argument that solely 
appealing to suffering in explaining the badness of extreme poverty 
entails undesirable implications for effective altruism. As effective 
altruism is a movement which aims to improve the world as much as 
it can, a form of effective altruism combined with hedonistic 
utilitarianism can imply that one of the most desirable ways of 
increasing the overall welfare of the human population including the 
extremely poor consist of (1) forcing the extremely poor to undergo 
medical operations like Zero Suffering Operation, and (2) secretly 
killing the extremely poor in specific cases where doing so 
decreases present and future suffering. When combined with 
hedonistic utilitarianism, effective altruism evolves to be an absurd 
approach to addressing extreme poverty. Such a form of effective 
altruism would be morally unhealthy, quite unpopular and unrealistic 
in many ways.

	 Essentially, all of these repugnant conclusions are due to the 
two key claims of hedonistic utilitarianism. The first is that what 
morally matters is pleasure and suffering, and that we should 
maximise net pleasure (or minimise net suffering). This is important: 
we might all agree that extreme poverty is very bad, but different 
accounts of its badness require different solutions to address 
extreme poverty. When we follow hedonistic utilitarianism, and 
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merge it with effective altruism, we may end up with the Zero 
Suffering Operation and these repugnant conclusions.

	 The importance of the points I have made in §1.3.1 and 
§1.3.2 are twofold. Firstly, they show us how hedonistic utilitarianism 
puts a greater burden on those who are already greatly burdened. 
Hedonistic utilitarianism is often discussed either in relation to 
individual preferences (how we should act in our daily lives) or in 
relation to possible worlds (which possible worlds are preferable 
over others), but not in relation to the disadvantaged communities 
who live on the margins of society. Once the demands of hedonistic 
utilitarians are thought in relation to the lives of the extremely poor, 
who are among the worst-off, they become increasingly concerning
—this aspect of hedonistic utilitarianism is either not realised or 
widely discussed within effective altruism. Secondly, since there has 
been no evaluation of the philosophical accounts of explaining the 
badness of extreme poverty within effective altruism, the points 
made about hedonistic utilitarianism can potentially start this 
discussion. This is very important because different accounts of 
extreme poverty license different solutions to extreme poverty. That 
is, the account of explaining the badness of extreme poverty that 
effective altruism embraces inevitably determines what effective 
altruism offers as solutions.

	 Effective altruism is not a homogenous movement and has 
always tolerated a multitude of perspectives in any given issue. But, 
as shown, claiming that what makes extreme poverty very bad is 
only suffering and hence embracing hedonistic utilitarianism with 
respect to extreme poverty is a dangerous stance to take. If we are 
not satisfied with the outlook of hedonistic utilitarianism on extreme 
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poverty, we have to appeal to other morally significant reasons other 
than suffering to explain the badness of extreme poverty.

1.4	 Agency and dignity: morally significant 

	 reasons other than suffering

	 There are two leadings moral approaches regarding the 
question of "What is morally significant?": one being welfarism and 
the other being non-welfarism. Welfarism only considers the welfare 
of beings as morally significant, and attaches importance to the 
components of life that increases one's welfare. Plainly, "the things 
that advance an individual's welfare are the things that advance her 
best interests, or benefit her, or make her life go better, or make 
things better for her, or make her better off in the most fundamental 
sense".  In other words, welfare can be anything that renders the 32
lives of beings better, such as pleasure, happiness, utility, 
flourishing, and experiences that are positive.  According to Joseph 33
Raz's "humanistic principle" which represents the main tenet of 
welfarism, "[T]he explanation and justification of the goodness or 
badness of anything derives ultimately from its contribution, actual 
or possible, to human life and its quality".  There many versions of 34
welfarism one of which is hedonistic utilitarianism.

	 Simon Keller, "Welfarism," Philosophy Compass 4, no. 1 (2009): 82.32
	 Andrew Moore and Roger Crisp, "Welfarism in moral theory," Australasian 33
Journal of Philosophy 74, no. 4 (1996): 599.
	 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 194.34
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	 As a contrasting moral approach, non-welfarism appeals to 
morally significant reasons other than welfare.  Some of those 35
morally significant reasons include achieving equality, providing 
justice and satisfying freedom. They are not morally significant qua 
welfare but for their sake.

	 To make the disagreement between welfarists and non-
welfarists clear, consider an example of robbery. Non-welfarists can 
argue that stealing one's well-earned money from their pocket 
without being noticed is morally wrong, even though it does not 
decrease the welfare of the robbed at all. For non-welfarists, the 
robber did not deserve the money as the robbed deserved it in the 
first place, therefore stealing the money becomes morally 
unjustified. Welfarists can disagree, as it increases the welfare of the 
robber and harms no one. In this example, there is the concept of 
desert, but we do not always need to appeal to desert. We might 
have a right to something without deserving it, such as the right to 
education.

	 To briefly show what morally significant reasons we should 
appeal to other than suffering in explaining the badness of extreme 
poverty, I refer to the versions of non-welfarism presented by Alan 
Gewirth and Darrel Moellendorf who succeed in steering clear of the 
repugnant conclusions of hedonistic utilitarianism. Surely, there are 
many moral approaches which can keep away from the repugnant 
conclusions of hedonistic utilitarianism but the stances taken by 
Gewirth and Moellendorf are representative of deontic concerns 
related to the badness of extreme poverty, as well as being 
attractive in their own right.

	 Keller, "Welfarism," 91.35
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	 Gewirth subscribes to a rights-based theory. Gewirth argues 
that the extremely poor have a moral right to be assisted and this is 
a human right because getting out of extreme poverty enables the 
proper exercise of agency which is a necessary condition of human 
action. It is not to say that the extremely poor do not have any 
agency. It is merely to say that getting out of extreme poverty makes 
one freer, more likely to have a fulfilling life, and provide one with a 
greater set of options and opportunities which altogether lead to the 
proper exercise of agency. Gewirth attaches moral significance to 
agency by underscoring that it "must be fulfilled if [one] is to act in 
pursuit of any purposes".  Since extreme poverty "involves a 36
humanly generated lack of the necessary goods of action, with 
severe constrictions of the abilities of agency", extreme poverty has 
to be addressed by reversing the violations of the economic and 
political system.  In that vein, assisting the extremely poor which 37
allows them to live above the threshold of a minimally decent life is 
needed to satisfy minimal conditions through which they can have 
their agency protected. By presenting the case for agency, Gewirth 
provides us with a morally significant reason to regard extreme 
poverty as very bad without appealing to suffering.

	 Moellendorf subscribes to another version of non-welfarism, 
that is, global egalitarianism. Global egalitarianism states that 
equality has an intrinsic value, and merely aiming at improving the 
lives of the extremely poor is not ultimately desirable, equality has to 
	 Alan Gewirth, "Duties to Fulfill the Human Rights of the extreme poor," in 36
Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right, ed. Thomas Pogge (Paris and 
Oxford: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 224.
	 Gewirth, 228.37
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be aimed as well as improving the lives of the extremely poor.  As a 38
global egalitarian, Moellendorf attaches importance to recognising 
the inherent dignity of humans in achieving equality while alleviating 
extreme poverty.  According to Moellendorf, dignity requires "equal 39
respect" in which "any rule must receive hypothetical consent from 
all of those to whom it applies, and rules that assign benefits and 
burdens differentially will tend to be rejected, depending on the 
criteria of assignment and the constraints on consent".  In that 40
manner, Moellendorf maintains that institutions have to abide by the 
norms which reflect respect, that is, "justificatory respect".  41
Justificatory respect implies that the principles governing the 
institutions have to be "reasonably endorsed by the persons" which 
would protect their dignity.  Establishment and supervision of 42
justificatory respect preclude unjust conditions that may be 
accepted by the extremely poor who have no other chance, such as 
in the case of accepting a job offer from a sweatshop. Even though 
one assumes that sweatshops have the potential to diminish 
suffering by keeping the extremely poor away from malnutrition, 
health issues and debt, sweatshops are not morally permissible with 
regards to justificatory respect. Therefore, it is important to alleviate 
extreme poverty as extreme poverty undermines the dignity of the 
	 Chris Armstrong, "Global Egalitarianism," Philosophy Compass 4, no. 1 (2009): 38
156.
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people by forcing them to abide by the conditions that they would 
not otherwise abide by. By calling for the recognition of dignity, 
Moellendorf's global egalitarianism emphasises a morally significant 
reason to regard extreme poverty as very bad without appealing to 
suffering.

	 For effective altruists, there are three advantages of appealing 
to agency and dignity in explaining the badness of extreme poverty.

	 Firstly, by introducing morally significant reasons other than 
suffering such as agency and dignity, both versions of non-welfarism 
avoid the grotesque conclusions that extreme poverty without 
suffering is morally acceptable and in some cases the secret killing 
of the extremely poor is morally justified. Agency and dignity carry 
such a weight that they cannot morally permit imposing death on 
others simply because one thinks that the amount of suffering in 
their lives provides a sufficient reason to kill them. They are rigorous 
in the sense that they prohibit us to decide or act on someone's 
behalf against their will, especially when they are under conditions of 
severe pressure such as extreme poverty. If effective altruists appeal 
to agency and dignity as both versions of non-welfarism do, then the 
underlying moral commitments of effective altruism which are set to 
improve the lives of the extremely poor would be stronger.

	 Secondly, both versions of non-welfarism do not deem 
extreme poverty as a technical problem where only the suffering is 
remedied. Appealing to morally significant reasons as laid out by 
both versions of non-welfarism would save effective altruists from 
treating extreme poverty as a technical problem in which calculation 
and eradication of suffering are perceived to be the solution to 
extreme poverty. Relatedly, focusing on equality also allows us to 
condemn relative poverty and not only extreme poverty. By pointing 
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out to the injustices and inequalities prevailing in extreme poverty, 
effective altruists would be able to recognise problems other than 
suffering caused by extreme poverty, and they can orient effective 
altruism towards addressing them.

	 Thirdly, appealing to morally significant reasons other than 
suffering can foster progressive solutions against extreme poverty.  43
As mentioned before, sweatshops may be permissible for hedonic 
utilitarianism because having sweatshops which decreases the 
suffering of the extremely poor is better than not having them. But 
both versions of non-welfarism could agree that sweatshops are not 
morally justified as their exploitative features would harm the agency 
and the dignity of the extremely poor in many ways. Rather than 
morally permitting sweatshops in the occasional cases where the 
welfare of the extremely poor may increase, it is better to seek and 
build alternatives which would increase their welfare more than 
sweatshops and at the same time respect their agency and dignity. 
In that respect, by appealing to morally significant reasons other 
than the presence of suffering, both versions of non-welfarism have 
the potential to be much more progressive than hedonistic 
utilitarianism to alleviate extreme poverty.  Surely, effective altruists 44
can benefit from the progressiveness of non-welfarism.

	 Such as encouraging to implement or improve labour laws, unions, working-43
led corporations, and to combat with tax evasions, and so on.
	 One objection may be that hedonistic utilitarianism can still encourage to 44
develop new and better economic and social opportunities for the extremely 
poor as they would increase their welfare, regardless of the fact that it deems 
sweatshops morally justified. It is true that hedonistic utilitarianism can still 
encourage to develop new and better economic and social opportunities for 
the extremely poor, but it would tend to be slow compared to both versions of 
non-welfarism since it is already pleased with the status quo in the cases 




	 Positing that extreme poverty is very bad is indisputable. 
Effective altruists are right to highlight the harms arising from 
extreme poverty and focus their attention on eliminating them. 
Nonetheless, in explaining why extreme poverty is very bad, this 
chapter has aimed to show that hedonistic utilitarianism brings 
about two repugnant conclusions. These repugnant conclusions 
include justifying extreme poverty if it is without suffering and the 
secret killing of the extremely poor. This is the negative part of my 
argument against effective altruists relying only on suffering to 
explain the badness of extreme poverty. On the positive side, I have 
also pinpointed morally significant reasons other than suffering, such 
as agency and dignity. They reveal that the badness of extreme 
poverty cannot be reduced to suffering as extreme poverty causes 
constraining, degrading and unfair conditions. In other words, 
suffering cannot be a "blanket concept" to explain why extreme 
poverty is very bad because conditions that extreme poverty 
imposes are not always related to suffering. In that respect, to 
comprehensively understand and progressively address the 
problems caused by extreme poverty, effective altruists have to 
recognise morally significant reasons other than suffering when 
regarding extreme poverty as very bad and leave hedonistic 
utilitarianism aside when explaining the badness of extreme poverty. 
Effective altruists have not spent a lot of time reflecting on why 
extreme poverty is bad. I suggest that this is a mistake and that I 
have tried to show why appeal to hedonistic utilitarianism should be 
undesirable for effective altruists in the context of extreme poverty.
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	 Now that the first premise has been examined, I move to the 
second premise which aims to single out the moral obligations of 





The Moral Obligation to 
Alleviate Extreme Poverty 
Premise 2 
If it is in our power to prevent something very 
bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything else morally significant, 
we ought, morally, to do it. 
2.1	 Introduction

	 Effective altruism has been inspired and reinforced by Peter 
Singer who has devoted almost an entire career to exploring and 
identifying the moral obligations of individuals concerning extreme 
poverty. Especially in the early stages of effective altruism when 
organisations like Giving What We Can were founded, effective 
altruists were largely following the philosophy of Singer. Although the 
moral commitments of Singer are not identical to the moral 




	 In "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", which is a seminal 
article on our obligations regarding extreme poverty, Singer outlines 
two distinct moral principles regarding extreme poverty, which I call 
the Stronger Principle of Sacrifice and the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice, respectively. 
45
The Stronger Principle of Sacrifice. If it is in our power 
to prevent something bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral 




	 According to the Stronger Principle of Sacrifice, individuals 
ought to sacrifice everything except their necessities to alleviate 
extreme poverty. One of the prevalent objections to the Stronger 
Principle of Sacrifice is demandingness. The demandingness 
objection initially attacks act consequentialism. Critics claim that act 
consequentialism is implausible since it requires unrealistically high 
sacrifices from individuals.  Some think that act consequentialism 47
carries the risk of being seriously detrimental to individuals by 
leading to alienation and the violation of integrity, and by ruling out 
the pursuit of self-interest and personal projects. Subsequently, the 
Stronger Principle of Sacrifice is also prone to the demandingness 
objection against act consequentialism. Singer has submitted a 
	 Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 229-243.45
	 Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 231.46
	 Liam Murphy, "The Demands of Beneficence," Philosophy & Public Affairs 22, 47
no. 4 (1993): 268-269; Tim Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), 16; J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, 
Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1973), 
115-116; Stan van Hooft, Cosmopolitanism: A Philosophy for Global Ethics 
(Stocksfield: Acumen, 2009), 88-90.
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general response to the demandingness objection in which it is 
stated that individuals can still first take care of their interests 
because some degree of partiality is granted under a moral theory 
based on impartiality.  Regardless of the success or failure of the 48
demandingness objection, in "Famine, Affluence and Morality", 
Singer pre-emptively articulated another principle to by-pass the 
demandingness objection, namely, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice.

The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. If it is in our power to 
prevent something very bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we 
ought, morally, to do it. 
49
	 The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice has not been studied as 
much as the Stronger Principle of Sacrifice mostly because Singer 
embraces the Stronger Principle of Sacrifice.  In the following, I 50
focus on the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice because I regard it as one 
of the premises of effective altruism, and explain why I do so. I first 
show that, since it invokes the otherwise undefined notion of "moral 
significance", the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is open to 
interpretation, and I develop four interpretations of it. By doing this, I 
disaggregate the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice and show that it can 
be read in alternative ways. These different interpretations of moral 
significance are very important because they can radically change 
how we approach the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. I focus in on 
	 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 48
210-215.
	 Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 231.49
	 Singer, 241.50
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one specific interpretation of moral significance, and I argue that 
while the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice successfully assigns a moral 
obligation, its ambitions are minimal.

	 Showing that the ambitions of the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice are minimal, I introduce three objections to the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice: (1) the permissiveness objection, (2) the source 
of responsibility objection, and (3) the lack of rights objection.

	 The permissiveness objection shows that the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice is an example of a moral principle which is 
overpermissive. An overpermissive moral principle asks individuals 
to do less than what they are actually morally required to do. In that 
sense, overpermissive moral principles are the opposites of 
overdemanding moral principles. I formulate the permissiveness 
objection by showing that Weaker Principle of Sacrifice justifies 
deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits.

	 The source of responsibility objection demonstrates that the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice assigns the same degree of 
responsibility to those who have the same degree of ability to 
alleviate extreme poverty. But this neglects the other sources of 
responsibility other than mere ability: for instance, if individuals 
engage in morally wrong practices which exacerbate extreme 
poverty or unjustly benefit from worsening the lives of the extremely 
poor, then they should be liable for the wrongdoing and the harm 
brought about, which may take the form of compensation and 
restitution. In that case, those who owe compensation and 
restitution should be asked to redistribute more of their wealth, even 
if they have the same degree of ability to alleviate extreme poverty 
with those who have not engaged with morally wrong practices. Or, 
if the resources of those who deepen extreme poverty by 
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wrongdoing are sufficient enough to alleviate and eradicate extreme 
poverty, then perhaps only those who are responsible for their 
wrongdoings owe anything at all. These show that the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice might be misleading in some cases.

	 The lack of rights objection stresses that the Weaker Principle 
of Sacrifice does not assign moral rights to the extremely poor 
whereas it assigns a moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty to 
individuals. Assigning moral rights to the extremely poor may have 
benefits such as recognising the agency of the extremely poor and 
empowering their collective consciousness, and failing to do so may 
weaken the stringency of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice itself. 

	 Towards the end, I discuss what effective altruists could learn 
from these objections. I conclude that these objections are powerful 
enough to challenge the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice and thus 
effective altruism. Nevertheless, without abandoning the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice, the complications of the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice can be avoided by introducing additional moral principles 
which strengthen effective altruism.

	 All of the objections which are going to be discussed are 
comprised of relatively new and rarely discussed objections to the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice and effective altruism. These 
objections (or ideas which are closely related to them) might have 
been touched upon in the past by scholars but they have never been 
discussed in this length that I am going to discuss in the following in 
ways that directly implicate the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. For 
instance, philosophers tend to focus on the demandingness of 
moral obligations but not to the permissiveness of moral obligations. 
The literature is full of discussions around overdemandingness, but 
overpermissiveness is relatively unnoticed. For another example, the 
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defences of effective altruism often fail to recognise the distinction 
between the responsibilities emerging from mere ability and the 
responsibilities emerging from other sources like wrongdoing, unjust 
benefiting, etc. That is why the differences are rarely discussed, 
even though they are philosophically rich. Moreover, these 
objections and their constitutive concepts are not often discussed in 
relation to effective altruism. For instance, the concept of rights 
(which I will discuss through the lack of rights objection) is usually 
tied to the correlativity literature where the correlativity of the 
obligations of individuals and the rights of the extremely poor are 
discussed, but I try to tie the lack of rights objection to the agency of 
the extremely poor, and to the victimisation of the extremely poor, to 
which effective altruism is prone.

2.2	 How should we interpret moral significance?

The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice says that we must prevent 
very bad things from happening unless this involves giving up 
something of "moral significance". This immediately raises the 
question of what counts as "morally significant". Singer never 
explicitly discusses what is meant by moral significance in the article 
in which the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is formulated, and I aim to 
unfold the term. There could be varying interpretations of moral 
significance. Nevertheless, we have to find the interpretation which 
would be suitable for the context of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
and effective altruism. I will not consider any non-welfarist 
interpretations of moral significance, as both Singer and other 
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effective altruists adopt a largely welfarist approach.  Here are four 51
possible interpretations of moral significance:

1. Anything that increases or decreases one's welfare is morally 
significant, regardless of how tiny or large the amount of 
welfare is.

2. Anything that puts one's welfare above or below a critical 
level is morally significant.

3. Anything that considerably increases or decreases one's 
welfare is morally significant.

4. Anything whose welfare loss when sacrificed is sufficiently 
small relative to the welfare gain created is morally significant.

	 The first interpretation demonstrates that we could explain 
moral significance with respect to the mere existence of utility, 
regardless of the amount of it. This is a very broad interpretation of 
moral significance, which practically entails that things which create 
huge differences in one's welfare (such as getting the dream job) as 
well as infinitesimal differences (such as touching the water with a 
pleasant texture for a moment) could count as morally significant. 
Away from the context of effective altruism and the Weaker Principle 
of Sacrifice, it seems plausible that human welfare is morally 
significant. If, without sacrificing anything (say, by clicking our 
fingers), we could make a person slightly better off, we at least seem 
to have some moral reason to do it. This suggests that utility, no 
	 One might wonder whether a thing can be morally significant without having a 51
considerable impact on one's welfare, and parallelly, whether moral 
significance can emerge from a qualitative source. For instance, can a 
childhood diary which is regarded as special be of moral significance even if 
its loss does not decrease one's welfare considerably? As I focus on a 
particular interpretation of moral significance which could be shared by many 
effective altruists, which is welfarist, I do not respond to that question.
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matter how slight, is morally significant, for how could it ground a 
moral reason if it had no moral significance?

	 One may rightly expect that some utilitarians could be 
attracted to this interpretation because they think that all that 
matters spring from changes in welfare. In that respect, infinitesimal 
changes are always factored in as they are always morally significant
—after all, they are changes in one's welfare, and they morally 
matter. If we think that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice considers 
any amount of utility to be morally significant, then it would be very 
hard to assign a moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty 
because virtually any sacrifice could somewhat decrease individuals' 
actual or potential welfare. In that respect, taken to its extreme, the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice would hardly demand anything of us, in 
terms of alleviating extreme poverty. As long as donating money 
would mean foregoing spending on anything that could produce any 
utility, we would be permitted not to donate. Having a room for 
justifying almost any spending means that individuals can exclude 
peculiar things from the domain of sacrifice even though it is 
implausible to exclude them. For instance, Carl Knight states that 
"Many adults have their own consumerist sources of happiness 
(however short-lived), and these sources also take on moral 
significance. And once this is accepted, one who endorses [the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice] can simply observe that aiding the 
global poor will almost always have some morally significant 
opportunity cost".  To illustrate Knight's point, since smelling 52
perfumes' alluring scent relieves the tiredness of an enervating day, 
and since the appreciation of the scent gives one an increased 
	 Carl Knight, "A Pluralistic Approach to Global Poverty," Review of International 52
Studies 34, no. 4 (2008): 716.
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motivation to continue the week, spending money on dozens of 
perfumes may be morally significant if a white-collar worker 
becomes increasingly dependent on perfumes. In that case, the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice would not require the money spent on 
perfumes to be donated to a charity. This example shows that, if 
"moral significance" is tied to any amount of utility, even the moral 
significance attached to short-lived consumerist choices can 
outweigh the moral principle that individuals have a moral obligation 
to donate to alleviating extreme poverty. In that respect, despite the 
fact that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is formulated to provide 
individuals with a less demanding principle, it would cause another 
complication, that is, being overpermissive. In other words, if 
individuals can justify almost any spending that is morally significant 
thanks to the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, then the Weaker 
Principle becomes futile because it is almost unable to assign any 
moral obligation whatsoever.

	 Although, aside from the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, it is 
plausible to say that any amount of utility has moral significance, this 
interpretation is implausible as an interpretation of what Singer 
intends when including the notion of moral significance in the 
principle, or what effective altruists who endorse the principle take 
themselves to be endorsing.

	 This interpretation of moral significance is too broad and 
encourages people to overwhelmingly prioritise their own interests, 
and so Singer could not accept such an interpretation of moral 
significance. Moreover, if such an interpretation of moral significance 
is the correct one, then there is no point in formulating such a 
principle, because it is self-defeating.
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	 In the second interpretation, moral significance becomes a 
threshold concept, one which is sensitive to a certain level of 
welfare, that is, surpassing a critical-level of welfare or being under a 
critical-level of welfare could be of moral significance. In that case, 
anything which helps one to surpass a critical-level of welfare or 
forces one to be under a critical-level of welfare could take on moral 
significance.

	 In the third interpretation, moral significance could be 
understood with respect to the amount of welfare gained or lost. 
Under this interpretation, the moral significance of a thing is 
correlated to that thing's impact on one's welfare.

	 To illustrate the difference, suppose that, under the second 
interpretation, anything that pushes our welfare above or below X is 
morally significant. We have a welfare of X-1. We do something and 
our welfare is now X+1. We gain 2 units of welfare. According to the 
second interpretation of moral significance, that thing is morally 
significant. Further suppose that we have a welfare of X-10. We do 
something, and our welfare increases to X-2. We gain 8 units of 
welfare, which can be regarded as considerable. According to the 
same interpretation of moral significance, this thing is not morally 
significant. However, according to the third interpretation, it is, 
because 8 units of welfare can be regarded as considerable. In this 
example, assessing the moral significance of things with respect to 
a critical level does not take into account the importance of the 
amount of welfare gained or lost, something with which Singer is not 
likely to agree.

	 The second and third possibilities are both compatible with 
what Singer might have had in mind, but arguably the third 
interpretation is closer to what is meant by moral significance in the 
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Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. This is because Singer does not 
mention any type of critical level and the standard connotation of 
moral significance for a utilitarian is likely to be associated with the 
amount of welfare and not with a critical threshold.

	 In the fourth interpretation, moral significance is "relativised" 
to what is at stake. If the welfare gap between what is to be 
sacrificed and what is to be gained is sufficiently small, then the 
thing to be sacrificed is morally significant. Hence, the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice does not require that thing to be sacrificed. 
Likewise, if the welfare gap between what is to be sacrificed and 
what is to be gained is sufficiently large, then the thing to be 
sacrificed is not morally significant. Hence, the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice requires that thing to be sacrificed. For instance, if we can 
massively improve the lives of an extremely poor person by only 
spending £10, and if that sacrifice infinitesimally decrease our 
welfare, then it is not morally significant and we should forgo it.

	 Nonetheless, this interpretation has its own problem in our 
context. Consider two cases where we receive a gift which is 
relatively cheap. In the first case, selling this gift and buying a gift 
with the money we gain for a friend of ours would increase the 
welfare of our friend by +2, and decrease our welfare by -1. In the 
second case, selling this gift would make us extremely sad (we value 
it so much, suppose that it is a gift from a loved one who is about to 
die) and decrease our welfare by -100 over years. We would think 
that we betray the memory of our loved one. But if we had sold it 
and donated it to charity, it would greatly benefit to some extremely 
poor person by +300. If we had sold our gift, we would not have 
been at the point of marginal utility and it would not have had a 
comparable importance. But this gift is still very valuable. This 
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relativised reading of moral significance would state that in the first 
case keeping that gift is morally significant whereas it is not morally 
significant in the second case, despite the fact that in the first case 
we only lose 1 unit of welfare and in the second case we lose 100 
units of welfare. This seems odd from the perspective of the agent: 
no one would say the gift is morally significant in the first case and it 
is not in the second case. An objector might say that it is not odd 
from an impartial perspective because the net benefit is huge in the 
second case. This time this relativised interpretation of moral 
significance becomes overdemanding again because the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice would require us to sacrifice the gift we 
enormously value whose absence would make us extremely sad in 
the second case. Singer would want to avoid overdemandingness 
and this interpretation is open to leading to overdemanding 
conclusions.

	 The relativised reading of moral significance could only make 
sense in the cases where we do not lose considerable amount of 
welfare while at the same time creating a huge benefit to another 
person. For instance, if selling this gift and donating the money we 
gain to a charity decreases our welfare by -3 and increases the 
quality of life of an extremely poor person by +300, then we can 
safely conclude that this thing is not morally significant. But, to 
conclude that, we do not really need this relativised interpretation. 
We just need to regard something as morally significant only if it 
considerably increases or decreases one's welfare. This brings us 
back to the third interpretation.

	 In addition, recall the way that Singer introduces the notion of 
moral significance—"without thereby sacrificing anything else 
morally significant". Invoking sacrifice appears to suggest that we 
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should focus on what the agent gives up in interpreting moral 
significance, and not on an impartial view where what is morally 
significant is relative to what is at stake for others.

	 Hence, I assume that moral significance meant by Singer is 
the third interpretation. Given the welfarist approach of effective 
altruism mentioned, I assume that many of the effective altruists 
could also agree that moral significance should be correlated to the 
amount of welfare and that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice could 
easily support such an interpretation of moral significance. Consider 
the following examples reflecting this interpretation of moral 
significance:

1. Joy receives a very high level of enjoyment from hiking. Not 
being able to hike would lead Joy to major depression. 
Therefore, hiking is morally significant for Joy.

2. Regarding painting as indispensable to the fulfilment of 
integrity, Ash has a passion for painting since their childhood. 
Losing the ability to paint would leave Ash in a hellish 
situation. Therefore, painting is morally significant for Ash.

3. Devon is aware that having a relationship with their significant 
other gives them an immense feeling of security because of 
the exclusivity of their relationship. The deprivation of that 
immense feeling of security would make Devon extremely 
sad. Therefore, maintaining their relationship in its current 
form is morally significant for Devon.

4. River likes their house a lot because of its precious memories. 
The house gives them a lot of happiness. Not living in the 
same house in the rest of their life would bring about an 
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unendurable melancholy. Therefore, River's house is morally 
significant for River.

	 All of these examples have something in common: if a loss of 
a thing brings about a loss of a considerable amount of welfare, then 
it means that that thing is morally significant. These examples are 
meant to show what moral significance might look like in the real 
world under the third interpretation.

	 Indubitably, as demonstrated by the examples of Joy, Ash, 
Devon and River, different people have different morally significant 
things. In that respect, the notion of morally significant things has 
certain features similar to the notion of "basic materials for a 
valuable life".  According to James Griffin,
53
The notion of 'basic materials for a valuable life' has 
changed substantially with time. At first, for instance, it 
did not include literacy, then it did, and now it includes 
far more. It also varies from person to person. How 
someone, here and now, interprets 'par' will so much 
depend upon his generosity of spirit. Ask a man where 
the minimum level is whose own life is deeply 
satisfying and who is passionately committed to 
improving the human condition. Then ask a man 
whose own life is crabbed and who believes that men 
deserve no better. Of course, each might, if sharp 
enough, refuse to answer such an unclear question, 
	 James Griffin, "Is Unhappiness Morally More Important Than Happiness?," 53
The Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 114 (1979): 49.
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but if they were willing to work with such a concept at 
all, then they might well give very different answers.  
54
	 Furthermore, both needs and desires can be morally 
significant. However, needs often have more moral significance than 
desires mostly because of their tremendous impact on welfare. 
Harry G. Frankfurt calls it "The Principle of Precedence".  55
According to the principle, needs have a "certain moral edge" in the 
competition between needs and desires.  It is not to say that there 56
cannot be exceptions: suppose we start a project due to "an 
unreflective whim" in which we need "whatever is indispensable for 
completing the project".  Frankfurt states that the need to finish the 57
project is not morally weightier than someone else's desire to finish 
it because we were initially unreflective. In short, morally significant 
things are not always needs—but if they are, then they are usually 
morally weightier than desires as they are likely to have more impact 
on one's welfare.

2.3	 How can the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice be 

	 one of the premises of effective altruism?

	 The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice requires individuals to 
prevent something very bad from happening unless they sacrifice 
	 Griffin, 49.54
	 Henry G. Frankfurt, "Necessity and Desire," Philosophy and Phenomenological 55




something of moral significance. Note that individuals are permitted 
to sacrifice something of moral significance, but they are simply not 
required to. Applied to extreme poverty, the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice could entail that we have a moral obligation to donate to 
charities to prevent the worsening of the living conditions of the 
extremely poor as long as we do not sacrifice anything of moral 
significance.

	 Certainly, not all defences of effective altruism rely on the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. For instance, as stated before, Singer 
as an effective altruist opts for the Stronger Principle of Sacrifice 
and proposes the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice to those who find the 
former overdemanding. As another effective altruist, Theron Pummer 
states that we may not have an obligation to donate, but if we ever 
decide to donate, then we have a moral obligation to donate 
effectively if it is no costlier to us. 
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	 Not all effective altruists share the same worldview either: 
according to a survey in 2017, 52.8% of effective altruists lean 
towards ut i l i ta r ian ism, 12 .6% towards non-ut i l i ta r ian 
consequentialism, 5.2% towards virtue ethics, 3.9% towards 
deontology, and 25.5% of effective altruists have "no opinion, or 
[are] not familiar with these terms".  While this survey may have had 59
limitations such as some respondents potentially did not understand 
the terms properly, it nonetheless gives clues about the moral 
inclinations of effective altruists.  Given the diversity of moral 60
	 Theron Pummer, "Whether and Where to Give," Philosophy & Public Affairs 44, 58
no. 1 (2016): 84.
	 William MacAskill, "The Definition of Effective Altruism," in Effective Altruism: 59
Philosophical Issues, eds. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (New York: 
Oxford University, 2019), 18-19.
	 MacAskill, 19.60
52
inclinations of effective altruists, effective altruists are very much 
likely to disagree on what should be counted as the premises of 
effective altruism.

	 This leaves us with competing versions of effective altruism. 
But the fact that there are competing versions of effective altruism 
does not mean that we cannot find a premise of effective altruism 
which could be appealing to many of the effective altruists. This is 
where the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice comes in: it strikes me as 
not wrong to state that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice could be 
one of the premises of effective altruism because it incorporates the 
widely shared moral inclinations of effective altruists. There are three 
reasons why the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice could be a commonly 
accepted premise of effective altruism.

	 Firstly, according to a 2017 survey, most of the effective 
altruists think of effective altruism as a moral obligation (56.5%) 
rather than an opportunity (37.7%).  The Weaker Principle of 61
Sacrifice assigns individuals a moral obligation, which is in line with 
how most of the effective altruists deem effective altruism. 

	 Secondly, MacAskill states that effective altruism is different 
from utilitarianism as it does not always require self-sacrifice: 

It is true that effective altruism has some similarities 
with utilitarianism: it is maximizing, it is primarily 
focused on improving wellbeing, many members of the 
community make significant sacrifices in order to do 





But this is very different from effective altruism being 
the same as utilitarianism. Unlike utilitarianism, 
effective altruism does not claim that one must always 
sacrifice one's own interests if one can benefit others 
to a greater extent. 
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	 Effective altruism is often promoted as an accessible and 
practicable approach which is not overdemanding. It is no 
coincidence that most of the donation campaigns initiated by 
effective altruists target 10% of individual income rather than much 
more.  For some of the effective altruists, promoting effective 63
altruism as an easy-to-commit moral approach may be a tactic to 
gain more followers, and for other effective altruists, it may be what 
effective altruism basically is. Likewise, the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice is formulated specifically to avoid any type of 
overdemandingness and individuals can follow the Weaker Principle 
of Sacrifice without sacrificing too much. It just asks individuals to 
sacrifice things that are not morally significant, and things which do 
not have any moral significance are likely to be sacrificed quite 
easily.

	 Thirdly, according to a 2015 survey, more than half of the 
prominent figures in effective altruism (52.5%) believe that effective 
altruism should be aligned with impartiality and welfarism.  The 64
impartiality component is already embedded within the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice because it asks individuals to prevent 
	 MacAskill., 19.62
	 Ordinarily, Giving What We Can asks its members to pledge 10% of their 63
income to donate, and their seasonal donation campaigns also call individuals 
to donate 10% of their income.
	 MacAskill, "The Definition of Effective Altruism," 18-19.64
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something very bad from happening, and that could easily allow 
prioritising others' interests whenever it is appropriate. Moreover, 
moral significance can be interpreted in welfarist terms as there is no 
restriction by the principle itself on how moral significance should be 
interpreted.

	 It is hard to find a moral principle which all effective altruists 
could identify as one of the premises of effective altruism.  65
Nevertheless, since the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice incorporates 
the moral inclinations of many of the effective altruists, it is probably 
as close as we will get to a widely endorsed principle.  In summary, 66
the Weaker of Principle could be one of the premises of effective 
altruism because (1) it carries an obligation component with which 
many of the effective altruists already agree, (2) just like effective 
altruism itself, it is not overdemanding as it does not always require 
individuals to sacrifice their interests even if they could immensely 
benefit others, and (3) similar to many of the effective altruists, it 
favours impartiality since it requires individuals to take others' 
interests into account when a very bad thing can be prevented from 
happening, and it is open to be construed with welfarist terms as we 
can easily link moral significance to welfarism.

	 Now that I have clarified what is meant by moral significance 
and why it is a premise of effective altruism, I introduce three 
objections against the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice.

	 If you are unlikely to accept the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice as one of the 65
premises of effective altruism, you can still regard it as one of the premises of 
a version of effective altruism. After all, the normative component of effective 
altruism is very much up for discussion. In that respect, you can consider this 
section as evaluating a version of effective altruism rather than evaluating all 
versions of effective altruism.
	 Note that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice lacks the effectiveness requirement 66
of effective altruism, which is why I have added another premise reflecting the 
effectiveness component of effective altruism to be discussed in Chapter 3.
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2.4	 The permissiveness objection

	 We have already seen that the first interpretation of the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice was overpermissive, and so had to be 
rejected. I will now object that the third version, which is clearly 
more demanding than the first, is also overpermissive. Put 
differently, the permissiveness objection entails that the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice is overpermissive—the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice is too weak because it asks too little. Relatedly, the 
permissiveness objection demonstrates that it incorrectly distributes 
moral burdens.

The Permissiveness Objection. The Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice is overpermissive because it unjustifiably 
exempts deliberately cultivated morally significant 
lavish pursuits from the domain of sacrifice, and puts a 
comparatively unjustifiable burden on those who have 
not deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish 
pursuits.

	 To analyse the permissiveness objection, we first need to 




	 Some rich individuals have lavish pursuits. Lavish pursuits are 
not necessities. They are high-end goods, experiences or actions 
often pursued for pleasure. They are extremely expensive. They do 
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not necessarily bring about considerable welfare to rich individuals 
and are not necessarily morally significant. But some of them may 
bring considerable welfare to rich individuals, and they might 
therefore be morally significant. However, if lavish pursuits had been 
sacrificed to benefit others like the worst-off, then their impact 
would be immense because the amount of resources reserved for 
lavish pursuits is tremendous. Regardless of the amount of welfare 
gains that rich individuals receive from lavish pursuits, I will argue, 
pursuing them is unjustifiable and they should be sacrificed for the 
benefit of others.

	 There can be a myriad of reasons why lavish pursuits are 
unjustifiable and should be sacrificed for the benefit of others. The 
first reason might be that whenever rich individuals have lavish 
pursuits, it means that they prioritise extreme self-interest where the 
principle of impartiality is severely violated. The second reason 
might be that having lavish pursuits is consequentially very bad, 
because the difference between the welfare gain that lavish pursuits 
bestows to rich individuals and the potential welfare loss of the 
worst-off who could have otherwise benefited from them being 
sacrificed for good is enormous.  The third reason might be that 67
lavish pursuits may evoke a false sense of self-entitlement: rich 
individuals may think that they have the right to have lavish pursuits, 
although the money required by lavish pursuits might have been 
earned by exploitation, undeserved disadvantages or harm. In many 
cases, as the cost of lavish pursuits are very high, it is almost 
	 Lavish pursuits could be condemned both by the third interpretation and the 67
fourth interpretation of moral significance. They could be condemned by the 
third interpretation of moral significance because in most of the cases lavish 
pursuits are not morally significant because they do not bring about 
considerable welfare. They could also be condemned by the fourth 
interpretation because the welfare gap is huge.
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unavoidable that the ability to have lavish pursuits have been gained 
through some sort of wrongdoing.

	 To better understand what lavish pursuits could be, consider 
the following:

Sacrifice A: prevent 1 person from contracting a 
moderate illness.

Sacrifice B: prevent 10 people from contracting a 
moderate illness.

Sacrifice C: prevent 100,000 people from contracting a 
moderate illness.

Sacrifice D: prevent 1,000,000 people from contracting 
a moderate illness.

	 Suppose that the welfare gain brought about by not 
sacrificing A, B, C or D each is a considerable amount for the rich 
individual. Moreover, the amount of welfare gain from each is the 
same. However, as we move from A to D, the cost of not sacrificing 
them also increases, because the number of people who could 
otherwise benefit from the sacrifice also increases from 1 to 
1,000,000. 

	 Essentially, this is a scale. I do not aim to spot the exact point 
where things become lavish pursuits. But as long as we agree that 
there is some point on this scale at which things become lavish 
pursuits, we would accept the existence of lavish pursuits.





1. Renovating home with the latest extortionate furnishings each 
year,

2. Collecting very expensive antiquarian books,

3. Spending money on a private art collection consisting of 
famous painters of astronomical value,

4. Buying an extravagant private island for one's own usage.

	 These are not required for the survival of individuals. 
Moreover, currently, the amount of resources required by them are 
so high that spending on them becomes eminently inconsiderate in 
the face of global misery because of the reasons explained above. 
Therefore, these can easily be identified as lavish pursuits. These 
possessions and the experiences produced by them may or may not 
be of moral significance. If they bring about a considerable amount 
of welfare where their loss would have a considerable negative 
impact on the welfare of individuals, then they are morally 
significant. If not, then they are not.

	 Essentially, we have three levels of spending. The first level is 
spending on necessities. The second level is modest comforts 
which are not necessities but not lavish pursuits either, because they 
are not expensive. Referring to the above scale, think of sacrificing 
A. Let A be a non-expensive bus ticket for the place where we will 
start our trekking experience. Perhaps if we had sacrificed our 
trekking experience (which could only be actualised through buying 
that non-expensive bus ticket), then we could have prevented one 
person from contracting a mild illness. A can be regarded as a 
modest comfort. The third level of spending is lavish pursuits.  Any 68
	 I only focus on the wrongness of the third level. Some consequentialists may 68
be rightly tempted to show the wrongness of the second level as well, but it is 
not in the scope of this chapter.
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plausible theory of morality which is against extreme self-
prioritisation can grant that there are lavish pursuits, and that they 
are unjustifiable, and that they have to be sacrificed for the benefit of 
others.

	 Demonstrably, not all lavish things are lavish pursuits. An 
expensive computer bought by a graphic designer is not a lavish 
pursuit if the graphic designer needs it to make ends meet in a 
competitive society. The minimally decent life of the graphic 
designer can be contingent on that expensive computer because of 
the ever-increasing aggressiveness of the graphic design industry 
which condemns graphic designers who do not have specific 
computers to low earning prospects and deprivation. Therefore, 
buying an expensive computer does not amount to pursuing a lavish 
pursuit in this example.

	 Note that lavish pursuits cannot be used as a synonym for 
expensive tastes. According to the generic explanation, those who 
possess expensive tastes "need more income simply to achieve the 
same level of welfare as those with less expensive tastes".  The 69
existence of expensive tastes poses a problem for finding the 
currency of equality. Philosophers have discussed to what extent we 
should be compensating for expensive tastes if their absence leads 
to a serious reduction in one's welfare, whether deliberately 
cultivating expensive tastes makes any moral difference, and they 
have pondered over the relationship between expensive tastes and 
	 Ronald Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy 69
and Public Affairs 10, no. 3 (1981): 228.
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non-expensive tastes.  The expensive tastes problem is often used 70
as a leverage to defend equality of resources rather than equality of 
welfare.

	 Lavish pursuits are different from expensive tastes in many 
ways. Firstly, in defining lavish pursuits, we do not have to compare 
the needs of people to understand the average amount of resources 
to reach a given level of welfare. Normally, to understand what 
expensive tastes are, we require a "resource benchmark" set by the 
majority.  But we do not need a resource benchmark to identify 71
lavish pursuits. Secondly, pursuing lavish pursuits is always morally 
wrong because it requires vast resources in a world where there is 
global misery. But the moral wrongness of pursuing expensive 
tastes (even pursued deliberately) is disputed. One may argue that 
pursuing expensive tastes is not always morally wrong because it 
may be the only option of individuals to not have a large welfare 
deficit: individuals who need to pursue expensive tastes to not have 
a large welfare deficit are comparatively unlucky in the sense that 
they cannot pursue their tastes with fewer resources.  Thirdly, the 72
amount of resources demanded by expensive tastes does not 
necessarily match with the resource demand of lavish pursuits. For 
instance, some may need to watch an additional movie each month 
	 For a neat discussion, refer to G. A. Cohen, "Expensive Taste Rides Again," in 70
On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political 
Philosophy, ed. Michael Otsuka (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University, 
2011), 81-115; Carl Knight, "Egalitarian Justice and Valuational Judgment," 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, no. 4 (2009): 482-498.
	 Louis Kaplow, "Choosing Expensive Tastes," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 71
36, no. 3 (2006): 418.
	 G. A. Cohen, "Expensive Taste Rides Again," 99. For a critical response, refer 72
to Rasmus Sommer Hansen and Søren Flinch Midtgaard, "Sinking Cohen's 
Flagship — or Why People with Expensive Tastes Should not be Com-
pensated," Journal of Applied Philosophy 28, no. 4 (2011): 341-354.
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to satisfy their cultural appetite and that additional movie can be 
classified as an expensive taste because more cultural exposure is 
needed than average. But the resources allocated to that additional 
cultural exposure may not be vast and thus expensive tastes may 
not be expensive in the sense that they are luxurious. Conversely, 
lavish pursuits are in each case luxurious.

	 One similarity of lavish pursuits with expensive tastes is that 
the inability to access lavish pursuits does not always correspond to 
a considerable reduction in welfare, and in some cases, individuals 
can even find non-lavish pursuits to compensate for their loss of 
welfare. Surely, the loss of lavish pursuits may also lead to a 
considerable reduction in welfare, if the welfare brought about by 
lavish pursuits is high enough. Likewise, there are expensive tastes 
which may lead to a considerable reduction in welfare if they are not 
pursued, as well as some other expensive tastes which do not.  73
Nevertheless, given their differences, this similarity is not sufficient 
to use lavish pursuits and expensive tastes interchangeably.





	 Now that the term lavish pursuits is clear, I can explain the 
permissiveness objection. Consider First Couple.

First Couple. Twice a year, the first couple is asked by 
a travel agency whether they want to go on a luxurious 
vacation which is specifically designed for them. 
	 Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political 73
Philosophy, 102.
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Luxurious vacations take place at the lovely coastal 
resort where they met years ago. Since they are quite a 
rich couple, they can easily afford luxurious vacations. 
This is the tenth year that they have been offered these 
luxurious vacations. Each time, they have accepted the 
offer. The first time they went on one of these luxurious 
vacations, they were only slightly happier. Nonetheless, 
over the years, they have deliberately cultivated a habit 
of going on these luxurious vacations, and the impact 
of them on their welfare dramatically increased. They 
have even started to regard going on these luxurious 
vacations as special, exclusive and incomparable. 
They have reached the point where not going on these 
luxurious vacations has become morally significant 
because the extent of the loss of welfare would be 
considerable. As expected, with the resources that 
they have used for their luxurious vacations, they do 
nothing for extreme poverty.

	 We can easily recognise their luxurious vacations as lavish 
pursuits, and they have been deliberately cultivated. Deliberate 
cultivation is a process where we accumulate certain patterns, 
habits and behaviour by repeating our actions. For instance, in 
explaining the aesthetic experience, Kevin Melchionne writes that 
"My repeated satisfaction (taste1) in, say, viewing the paintings of 
Cézanne means that I have an overall taste (taste2) for Cézanne. 
Liking the work of Cézanne is part of my biographical taste, my 
aesthetic personality. Accumulated aesthetic experiences compose 
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my sense of myself as an aesthetic person".  Just as we compose 74
our aesthetic personality through repeated satisfaction, we compose 
our moral personality through the actions we deliberately cultivate.

	 The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not assign a moral 
obligation to prevent something very bad like extreme poverty to the 
first couple with the resources reserved for their lavish pursuits. The 
reason is simple: these lavish pursuits are of moral significance (they 
bring about considerable amount of welfare to the first couple) and 
the first couple is not required to sacrifice them to benefit the lives of 
others——by deliberately cultivating the habit of going on luxurious 
vacations, they simply have raised the bar too high. Although it is 
true that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice would condemn the early 
trips, through which the cultivation took place, it cannot condemn 
the vacations they take now because going on these vacations has 
become morally significant over time. But this is odd—just because 
someone has deliberately cultivated a morally significant lavish 
pursuit, they are no longer bound by the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice. This is why the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is 
overpermissive.

	 This is also evident in the examples that Singer uses. Singer 
draws attention to ". . .the superrich, people who spend their money 
on palatial homes, ridiculously large and luxurious boats, and private 
planes".  Then, Singer states that "But for conspicuous waste of 75
money and resources it is hard to beat Anousheh Ansari, an Iranian-
American telecommunications entrepreneur who paid a reported 
	 Kevin Melchionne, "On the Old Saw 'I know nothing about art but I know what 74
I like'," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68, no. 2 (2010): 132.
	 Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save, 9.75
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$20 million for eleven days in space".  Clearly, the mentioned 76
luxuries and self-funded space travel are lavish pursuits. Given that 
pursuing lavish pursuits is morally wrong, Singer is right that 
spending on these is morally wrong. We can directly assume that 
spending on them is morally wrong with respect to the Stronger 
Principle of Sacrifice since it requires individuals to sacrifice 
everything to the level of marginal of utility. However, we cannot 
directly assume that spending on the mentioned luxuries and self-
funded space travel is morally wrong with respect to the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice because the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice can 
morally permit spending on them if they are morally significant. For 
instance, if self-funded space travel fulfils one's vehement desire of 
experiencing the space and brings about immense happiness, it can 
well be of moral significance. In that respect, the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice can permit self-funded space travel regardless of the 
amount of resources reserved for it.

	 Clearly, the extensive broadness of the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice is unjustifiable and weakens the stringency of the moral 
obligation to alleviate extreme poverty. The extensive broadness of 
the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice evokes what Henry Shue calls 
"yuppie ethics".  Yuppie ethics is buttressed by the claim that 77
individuals have a right to satisfy their desire to have extravagant 
and superfluous experiences such as having "gourmet dinners -as 
part of the 'good life'- which is taken to override even the right of 
helpless children to adequate nutrition".  As nicely explained by 78
Iason Gabriel, "[Yuppie ethics] holds that morality contains a set of 
	 Singer, 9.76
	 Henry Shue, "Mediating Duties," Ethics 98, no. 4 (1998): 697.77
	 Shue, 697.78
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radical permissions or entitlements that provide people with near 
total insulation against the positive moral claims of others, such that 
it would not be wrong to wrong to [sic] deny them life-saving 
resources when one could alternatively acquire high-end goods for 
oneself".  Indeed, the permissiveness objection exhibits that the 79
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice has the capacity to accommodate 
yuppie ethics. What is odd about the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
here is that it does not care how many people we could help. Once 
we hit the required amount of welfare which would affect us 
considerably, that thing becomes morally significant, and we are off 
the hook.

	 The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice causes another 
complication, which is linked to its overpermissive nature. The 
complication is that it brings about comparatively unjustifiable 
burdens. Consider Second Couple.

Second Couple. Twice a year, the second couple is 
asked by a travel agency whether they want to go on a 
luxurious vacation which is specifically designed for 
them. Luxurious vacations take place at the lovely 
coastal resort where they met years ago. Since they 
are quite a rich couple, they can easily afford luxurious 
vacations. Each time, they have rejected the offer, and 
they are aware that luxurious vacations could make 
them infinitesimally happier. Not going on these 
luxurious vacations does not mean that they have to 
sacrifice something morally significant since not going 
on them does not affect their welfare considerably. 
	 Iason Gabriel, "The Problem with Yuppie Ethics," Utilitas 30, no. 1 (2018): 32.79
66
They have always stressed the importance of using 
their resources more wisely and donated their money 
which they could have spent on these luxurious 
vacations. This is the tenth year that they have been 
offered these luxurious vacations and this is the tenth 
year that they have been donating their money to 
extreme poverty charities.

	 Think of the first couple in relation to the second couple. 
Surprisingly, neither the second couple nor the first couple violates 
the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. Violating the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice amounts to failing to fulfil the moral obligation to alleviate 
extreme poverty that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice assigns. 
Despite the fact that the second couple donate their money and the 
first couple go on a luxurious vacation, how is it possible that neither 
couple violates the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice?

	 The second couple meet the first condition of the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice, that is, having an ability to alleviate extreme 
poverty. Moreover, even though their money could have been spent 
for luxurious vacations, donating to a charity does not mean that 
they sacrifice something morally significant as their welfare is not 
considerably affected by their decision of not going on luxurious 
vacations. In that respect, they also meet the second criterion of the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice because they do not sacrifice 
something morally significant by not going on a luxurious vacation. 
Since both of the conditions of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice are 
met, they have a moral obligation to prevent something very bad, 
namely, extreme poverty. They fulfil their moral obligation by 
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donating to a charity, and thus they do not violate the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice.

	 Like the second couple, the first couple also meet the first 
condition of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice by having an ability to 
alleviate extreme poverty. Nevertheless, they do not satisfy the 
second condition which is necessary for them to be assigned with a 
moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty. Since they would have 
sacrificed something morally significant if they had not gone on 
luxurious vacations, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is not 
applicable to them. In that case, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
does not assign them a moral obligation to sacrifice their lavish 
pursuit and donate the amount of money that they would otherwise 
have kept from what they had sacrificed, even though they are only 
different than the second couple by virtue of deliberately cultivating 
a lavish pursuit which has become morally significant over time. As a 
result, the first couple who have a morally significant lavish pursuit 
do not violate the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice since the moral 
obligation drawn from it does not bind them in the first place.

	 Now, how should we understand the comparatively 
unjustifiable burden with regards to the first couple and the second 
couple? Although they have the same ability to alleviate extreme 
poverty by donating to extreme poverty charities, the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice assigns a moral obligation to the second 
couple but not to the first couple. The second couple is 
comparatively unjustifiably burdened not because that they are 
overburdened. In fact, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not 
overburden them as it requires the second couple to make a minimal 
sacrifice, that is, to avoid going on luxurious vacations. They would 
be required to make that minimal sacrifice anyway regardless of 
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what the first couple do. Parallelly, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
does not ask the second couple to sacrifice or risk sacrificing their 
lives, the majority of their pleasures, or their integrity. Nonetheless, 
the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice appeals to moral significance alone 
to decrease the burden of individuals to alleviate extreme poverty. It 
follows that the second couple is comparatively unjustifiably 
burdened because the first couple who have the same ability to 
alleviate extreme poverty are exempt from sacrificing their lavish 
pursuit solely on the basis of their possession of a morally significant 
lavish pursuit.

	 One may wonder that if both of the couples are initially able 
to deliberately cultivate their lavish pursuits, where does the 
comparatively unjustifiable burden lie? After all, both of the couples 
had an equal chance of deliberately cultivating morally significant 
lavish pursuits: the first couple have deliberately cultivated their 
lavish pursuits and the second couple have not. The comparative 
unjustifiable burden does not lie in the unequal distribution of initial 
chances as there is no unequal distribution of initial chances at all. It 
comes from the oddness of taking into account deliberately 
cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits to decrease one's 
burden to alleviate extreme poverty. Lavish pursuits should not have 
been pursued and should not have been made morally significant in 
the first place. But if these have been done, then they should not be 
used as a leverage to decrease one's burden to alleviate extreme 
poverty. Likewise, the first couple should not be left off the hook just 
because they have deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish 
pursuits. If we accept that they should be left off the hook, then they 
are permitted to spend on everything which is morally significant 
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despite the fact they have deliberately cultivated their lavish pursuits 
which have become morally significant over time.

	 A related complication which follows is that individuals who 
have deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits and do 
not attempt to stop doing that would not be required to reserve their 
resources which are used for lavish pursuits to alleviate extreme 
poverty. It means that those who are morally better (those who have 
not deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits) are 
required to do more whereas others who are morally worse (those 
who have deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits) 
are left unnoticed. The former is morally better because they have 
not chosen to deliberately cultivate morally significant lavish pursuits 
and they abide by the moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty. 
The problem here is not about expecting the promises made by 
those who are morally better to be delivered when they are bound 
by a moral obligation. We can rationally expect the promises made 
by those who are morally better to be delivered whenever they are 
bound by a moral obligation. The problem is that when we come 
across with those who are morally worse (such as the first couple) 
we do not bind them by a moral obligation and do not expect 
anything of them. Such a conclusion goes against the plausible idea 
that we have to prioritise those who are morally worse rather than 
those who are morally better in correcting behaviour. What we do is 
we are expecting more from those who are morally better and less or 
none from those who are morally worse, just because the scope of 
the moral obligation we have formulated does not cover those who 
are morally worse.

	 One may rightly wonder why those who are morally worse are 
not required to put an end to deliberately cultivating lavish pursuits. 
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While it is convincing that individuals who have stopped deliberately 
cultivating their morally significant lavish pursuits out of moral 
considerations have a moral obligation to sacrifice the resources 
that they once reserved for their morally significant lavish pursuits, it 
is implausible to think that individuals who have deliberately 
cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits but do not strive to 
eliminate them should pursue their morally significant lavish pursuits 
and be permitted to do nothing to get rid of them. Hence, a 
comparatively unjustifiable burden is imposed on those who are 
morally better when the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice excludes 
deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits from the 
domain of sacrifice.

	 The permissiveness objection is valid whenever there are 
morally significant lavish pursuits. But it does not mean that the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is overpermissive in general—it is 
overpermissive in specific cases where there are lavish pursuits. In 
that respect, the obligation that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
assigns should be deemed minimal rather than definitive. That is 
also why effective altruists should add another moral principle to 
avoid these complications and use it beside the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice. The Principle of Permissiveness may do the work.

The Principle of Permissiveness. Individuals ought not 
to follow their deliberately cultivated lavish pursuits, 
even if they are morally significant.

	 The Principle of Permissiveness does not let the moral value 
of pursuing lavish pursuits outweigh the moral value of alleviating 
extreme poverty. As opposed to the Principle of Permissiveness, the 
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Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does that. Therefore, if the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice is to be followed, it has to be supported by the 
Principle of Permissiveness.

2.5	 The source of responsibility objection

	 In the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, as it starts with the 
clause "If it is in our power", there is an emphasis on the mere ability 
to alleviate extreme poverty, while the source of responsibility of 
alleviating extreme poverty is ignored.

	 The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice has a narrow focus in 
assigning a moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty—it 
correlates the degree of mere ability with the degree of responsibility 
that one has towards alleviating extreme poverty. Nonetheless, this 
neglects the fact that responsibility could emerge separately from 
mere ability: surely, there could be many different sources of 
responsibility apart from mere ability. Consider the following 
questions: does one's responsibility to alleviate extreme poverty 
come from a wealth which has been gained justly or does it come 
from the exploitation of others? Does it come from taking advantage 
of the inequalities generated by the political and economic system? 
Does it come from bringing about harm or letting others harm? Does 
it come from negligence? Does it come from luck? All of these point 
to different sources of responsibility. The merit of asking these 
questions is to better understand the distribution of responsibility 
among individuals who ought to alleviate extreme poverty. After all, 
the ability to alleviate extreme poverty may have been gained 
through some wrongdoing which has favoured some individuals 
while exacerbating the conditions of the extremely poor where those 
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who have contributed to that would be more responsible than other 
individuals who have the same ability to alleviate extreme poverty. In 
the case of rich cronyists who spoil the material resources of the 
extremely poor, the ability to alleviate extreme poverty comes from 
unjustly benefiting from exploitation. In the case of political actors 
gaining enormous wealth from corruption, the ability to alleviate 
extreme poverty comes from the ambition of power which harms the 
extremely poor. In the case of the stakeholders of companies which 
devastate the global ecosystem, the ability to alleviate extreme 
poverty comes from letting the extremely poor under famine and 
drought. In the case of ordinary members of society with 
tremendous wealth which has been possessed out of luck, the 
ability to alleviate extreme poverty comes from not sharing the 
arbitrarily distributed advantages.

	 Being insensitive to these different sources of the 
responsibility to alleviate extreme poverty may result in (1) treating 
those who have gained their wealth by contributing to and unjustly 
benefiting from extreme poverty as morally equivalent to those who 
have not or those who have not to the same degree, and (2) failing 
to recognise the possibility of having responsibility towards 
alleviating extreme poverty without having any ability whatsoever. 
That is the gist of the Source of Responsibility Objection.

The Source of Responsibility Objection. The Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice assigns the same degree of 
responsibility to individuals who have the same ability 
to prevent something very bad even if some of them 
have contributed to or unjustly benefited from that very 
bad thing, and it assigns no responsibility to those who 
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have contributed to or unjustly benefited from that very 
bad thing if they lack ability.

	 To make the objection clear, consider several 
examples.

Philanthropy Company . There is a for-profit 
organisation called the Philanthropy Company which 
offers consultancy services to people, companies, 
institutions and governments to do philanthropic work 
more effectively for the extremely poor. Out of good 
faith, one of the very hard-working researchers of the 
Philanthropy Company, who was very poor and 
unlucky in the past, does some very successful and 
diligent research to alleviate extreme poverty, which 
has led the wage of the researcher to soar. Living a 
minimalistic life, the researcher has shared millions 
with the extremely poor by donating to charities. The 
researcher has still the ability to donate £1,000,000 to 
alleviate extreme poverty without sacrificing anything 
morally significant.

Successful Profit-Seeker. A rich company owner 
decides to deplete the water resources with the high 
hopes of making a profit while many of the extremely 
poor will be condemned to drought. The endeavour 
becomes successful and the rich company owner 
makes a profit. The successful profit-seeker now has 
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the ability to donate £1,000,000 to alleviate extreme 
poverty without sacrificing anything morally significant.

Good Luck. A poor university student has recently 
inherited a tremendous wealth from an unknown 
distant relative. The university student is no longer 
poor, and now has the ability to donate £1,000,000 to 
alleviate extreme poverty without sacrificing anything 
morally significant.

	 According to the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, since all of 
these parties have the same degree of ability, they have the same 
degree of responsibility.  They all have to allocate £1,000,000 to 80
alleviate extreme poverty. Surely, this cannot be true, as some of 
these parties should have more responsibility and thus pay more. 
That is why we need to go beyond the mere ability framework of the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice.

	 The researcher of the Philantrophy Company does not 
deepen extreme poverty. In fact, the researcher of the Philantrophy 
Company is working to ameliorate the lives of the extremely poor. 
Moreover, the researcher has allocated millions to alleviate extreme 
poverty. The type of responsibility that the researcher has is linked to 
mere ability. As discussed before, according to this approach, we 
are required to sacrifice anything that is not morally significant if we 
could prevent something very bad. The researcher earns immensely 
and is under this type of responsibility.

	 Here, I use the term responsibility in terms of the amount of required payment. 80
If one has a greater responsibility, one has to pay more.
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	 In contrast, the successful profit-seeker deepens extreme 
poverty and unjustly benefits from extreme poverty through 
wrongdoing and did nothing in the past to alleviate extreme poverty. 
Although both the researcher and the successful profit-seeker have 
the same amount of monetary power -£1,000,000- to alleviate 
extreme poverty without sacrificing anything morally significant, the 
latter has more responsibility and the source of responsibility is also 
different. The type of responsibility that the successful profit-seeker 
has is not only linked to mere ability, but also linked to wrongdoing. 
In the case of wrongdoing, the successful profit-seeker has an 
additional moral obligation to redistribute to compensate for the loss 
brought about. Here, the responsibility emerging from mere ability 
and the responsibility emerging from wrongdoing should be 
separated, and the Weaker Principle fails to do so.

	 This is also evident in Singer's proposed scaled donation 
scheme. According to this scaled donation scheme, individuals who 
earn between $105,001-$148,000 a year are asked to donate 5% of 
their earnings.  The responsibility of individuals who earn between 81
$105,001-$148,000 a year through wrongdoing such as producing 
extremely toxic substances which harm the health of the extremely 
poor is way greater but they are not given an additional donation 
requirement. They would be required to donate the same as the 
individuals who earn between $105,001-$148,000 a year by doing 
social work which does not cause the extremely poor to suffer. 
Given that the sources of their responsibility are vastly different, 
individuals who earn money through wrongdoing have to be asked a 
substantially higher amount of money to donate. But the scaled 
donation scheme, just like the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, is so 
	 Singer, The Life You Can Save, 6.81
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narrow in its scope that it cannot draw a line between different 
sources of responsibility.

	 In Good Luck, things are a bit different. The university student 
is again bound by the moral obligation assigned by mere ability. 
Moreover, the university student is also under a responsibility to 
share the good luck received because the university student did not 
deserve the wealth inherited and the good luck in the first place.

	 Suppose that to eradicate extreme poverty, we need a final 
amount of £1,000,000. According to the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice, since they have the same ability, the researcher and the 
university student each owe £500,000 to alleviate extreme poverty. 
Such a conclusion fails to recognise past actions. The researcher, 
who had a poor life in the past and owed most of the wealth earned 
to hard-work, has already donated millions, whereas the university 
student could not because of past inability (but not past refusal to 
contribute, because the university student did not have any 
considerable wealth in the past). But, thanks to luck, the university 
student now has the ability to alleviate extreme poverty with 
£1,000,000 without sacrificing anything morally significant. Since the 
researcher has already donated an immense amount of money in the 
past and that the researcher is actively working to alleviate extreme 
poverty, the obligation to provide the final amount should fall upon 
the university student because of luck. Requiring £500,000 from 
each would not only be insensitive to the distribution of luck but also 
past actions. It would be insensitive to luck distribution because it 
would ask the same from the one who had been unlucky but gained 
wealth through hard-work and the one who had been unlucky but 
owed all of the inherited wealth to luck. It would also be insensitive 
to past actions because the researcher has already donated millions, 
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but the university student did not. The Weaker Principle fails to do 
such a prioritisation: it treats both parties as equals and asks the 
same, although the university student should cover the final amount.

	 A more plausible response would be to list the past actions of 
parties who have the same ability to alleviate extreme poverty, and 
assign more responsibility to those who have not done anything or 
have done less to alleviate extreme poverty. In that case, the 
university student would have more responsibility as well. Once we 
calculate, perhaps we will understand that only the resources of 
those who have not acted in accordance with their respective 
degrees of responsibility would suffice to eradicate extreme poverty.





Unsuccessful Profit-Seeker. A rich company owner 
decides to deplete the water resources with the high 
hopes of making a profit where many of the extremely 
poor will be condemned to drought. The endeavour 





	 The unsuccessful profit-seeker has currently no ability 
whatsoever to alleviate extreme poverty because of bankruptcy. But 
the type of responsibility that the unsuccessful profit-seeker is under 
is linked to the wrongdoing of depleting the water resources. Since 
the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is only concerned with those who 
have the ability to alleviate extreme poverty, it cannot assign any 
78
moral obligation to the unsuccessful profit-seeker. The Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice is also insufficient in this regard. 
82
	 In the cases of Successful Profit-Seeker and Unsuccessful 
Profit-Seeker, both profit-seekers have responsibility. For the 
unsuccessful profit-seeker, there was a responsibility not to make a 
profit by depleting water resources. But since this has been violated, 
the unsuccessful profit-seeker now owes a compensation which is 
another responsibility. For the successful profit-seeker, it is the same 
with a twist: apart from sharing all of the responsibilities that the 
unsuccessful profit-seeker has, the successful profit-seeker has an 
additional responsibility with regards to the unjust enrichment. The 
successful profit-seeker has to give up the unjust enrichment and 
redistribute it because it has been gained through exploiting 
injustices and inequalities. In other words, the successful profit-
seeker not only owes compensation for the loss of the extremely 
poor but also owes restitution to the extremely poor because of 
unjust enrichment. The difference between compensation and 
restitution is made clear by Todd Calder:

While the purpose of compensation is to rectify a 
plaintiff's unjust loss, the purpose of restitution is to 
rectify a defendant's unjust gain. For instance, if you 
smash into my car, you owe me compensation for the 
damage done to my car. You must compensate me for 
	 An objector might say "Ought implies can" so that we should not assign 82
responsibilities to those who lack ability. A response might be that those who 
are responsible should be asked to give up morally significant things. 
Moreover, even if they do not have any sort of ability now, we can still ask 
them to fulfill their obligation to alleviate extreme poverty once they regain 
their ability. Therefore, thinking that they are responsible (even if they do not 
any sort of ability now) helps us to understand what they ought to do in the 
future.
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my unjust loss. If instead you make a profit by 
performing a song I wrote without my consent, you 
owe me restitution for the profit you have made from 
the unjust use of my property. You must give up your 
unjust gain. 
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	 The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice recognises that the 
successful profit-seeker has an obligation to alleviate extreme 
poverty (though it recognises the successful profit-seeker's 
responsibility insufficiently, because it only focuses on mere ability). 
But it does not recognise that the unsuccessful profit-seeker has an 
obligation to alleviate extreme poverty because the unsuccessful 
profit-seeker does not have any ability. Instead, we should say that 
because of the harms brought about, the unsuccessful profit-seeker 
is under a serious responsibility to alleviate extreme poverty, despite 
the fact that unsuccessful profit-seeker does not have any current 
ability to alleviate extreme poverty. This is practically important 
because if one day in the future the unsuccessful profit-seeker gains 
some enormous wealth, we would ask the unsuccessful profit-
seeker to pay more to alleviate extreme poverty as opposed to 
others who have the same amount of ability but not contributed to 
extreme poverty. But, if we follow the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, 
we would still ask the same from the unsuccessful profit-seeker and 
others.

	 As a summary, we have the following:

	 Todd Calder, "Shared Responsibility, Global Structural Injustice, and 83
Restitution," Social Theory and Practice 36, no. 2, (2010): 270-271.
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1. Responsibility because of mere ability: Philanthropy 
Company.

2. Responsibility because of wrongdoing (with ability): 
Successful Profit-Seeker.

3. Responsibility because of luck (with ability): Good Luck.

4. Responsibility because of wrongdoing (without ability): 
Unsuccessful Profit-Seeker.

	 In a nutshell, the source of responsibility objection states that 
if the parties all have the same ability in terms of monetary power (1, 
2, and 3), then the Weaker Principle assigns the same level of 
responsibility to them, which is shown to be wrong. Moreover, due 
to the narrow scope of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, 4 is not 
recognised where responsibility could emerge without ability.

	 Being aware of the different sources of responsibility is 
important because it shows one of the important limitations of the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice: in assigning moral obligations, the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is insensitive to the different sources of 
responsibility and solely focuses on mere ability. To avoid such a 
problem and the complications discussed, we have to accept a 
principle to back up the Weaker of Principle of Sacrifice, which is the 
Source of Responsibility Principle.

The Source of Responsibility Principle. Individuals who 
have a greater responsibility ought to allocate greater 
resources to prevent something very bad from 
happening, even if they share the same degree of 






	 One may ask the point of assigning increased levels of 
responsibility and thus increased levels of redistribution to those 
who have contributed to or unjustly benefited from extreme poverty. 
After all, most of the individuals who have contributed to or unjustly 
benefited from extreme poverty may be thought as having a greater 
ability to alleviate extreme poverty (where they will be asked more) 
so the source of responsibility objection may be claimed to have 
become redundant.

	 I disagree. It is still important to mark the differences between 
individuals in terms of responsibility as those who have brought 
about less harm would be protected against overdemandingness. 
Parallelly, those who have brought about more harm would not be 
allocating less to extreme poverty than they should be. Relatedly, it 
is utterly possible for a middle-income individual to have contributed 
to or unjustly benefited from extreme poverty more than a high-
income individual. If we appeal to mere ability as the only source of 
responsibility, then we would demand more from that high-income 
individual and less from that middle-income individual, which is 
unjust.

	 Perhaps for practicalities of public presentation, effective 
altruists usually appeal to mere ability as the source of responsibility 
or they just draw attention to mere ability to show what ordinary 
individuals could achieve to alleviate extreme poverty. Even though 
this strategy to emphasise ability may be beneficial to attract new 
donors, it risks hiding different sources of responsibility, different 
levels of harm, and muddles the relationship between ability and 
responsibility. I am not arguing against deriving responsibility from 
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mere ability through the utility calculation, but overstressing mere 
ability as the only source of responsibility has its downsides.

	 It may also be objected that the motivation behind the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice is to guide individuals to understand their moral 
obligations towards extreme poverty without being accusatory. One 
may add that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice just shows that 
individuals have an ability to alleviate extreme poverty and they can 
do so without sacrificing something morally significant: so the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not intend to hide the other 
sources responsibility, such as contributing to extreme poverty and 
being unjustly enriched by that. But we cannot rely on the motivation 
behind a moral principle to offset the moral problems it leads to. The 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice fails to expose the different sources of 
responsibility and this problem has to be taken seriously by effective 
altruists.

2.6	 The lack of rights objection

	 The lack of rights objection exposes another vulnerability of 
the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. In a severe problem like extreme 
poverty, the rights of the extremely poor as subjects to whom 
individuals owe their resources are not mentioned.

	 What might the importance of using the terminology of rights 
be? Effective altruists often emphasise the importance of doing the 
most good, benefiting others as much as we can with our scarce 
resources, and improving lives. While the importance of these is 
evident especially in the case of extreme poverty, we might miss the 
importance of stressing the agency of the extremely poor if we do 
not use the terminology of rights. Without the terminology of rights, 
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the extremely poor could be conceived of as good receivers, 
beneficiaries, those who are helped, and the victims. With the 
terminology of rights, they are conceived of as rights-holders whose 
rights are violated, tarnished and unfulfilled by an unjust system: 
they are now moral agents rather than moral patients. The difference 
between these discourses may be regarded as merely semantic, but 
in fact, it is not: using the terminology of rights makes it apparent 
that the extremely poor are members of a set of people who are 
chronically deprived of their chance of having flourishing lives—the 
awareness of this connection is not only important for political 
mobilisation but also for understanding the social status quo in the 
right way. Any systemic deprivation would count as violating their 
rights rather than failing to do good, where the former has a much 
stronger connotation. Moreover, it may also affect the way we view 
potential solutions and which are preferable. When the extremely 
poor are patients, we have to work out the most effective way to 
help them. When they are viewed as rights-holders who can demand 
things of us, we should listen to their demands. Unfortunately, the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not empower the extremely poor 
by recognising them as rights-holders, and effective altruists may be 
prone to regard morality as a one-way street where solely moral 
obligations are recognised.

The Lack of Rights Objection. The Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice assigns individuals a moral obligation to 
alleviate extreme poverty but it does not recognise the 
extremely poor as rights-holders.
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	 What rights may the extremely poor have? I distinguish two 
types of moral rights, namely, absolute moral rights and relational 




	 Absolute moral rights are absolute in the sense that they are 
independent of the relations between individuals. In other words, 
they could be established without appealing to the relative 
inequalities across individuals.

	 In the case of extreme poverty, one example of absolute 
moral rights is subsistence rights.  For instance, Charles Jones 84
argues that subsistence rights are human rights, which means that 
they are inherently valuable and immune to changes in time and 
location. For Jones, subsistence rights have to be considered as 
human rights because they "protect capabilities to achieve adequate 
functionings in the spheres of nutrition, shelter, and health".  Since 85
subsistence will always be required for us to exist, and since 
protecting those capabilities are fundamentally important for us to 
have a minimally decent life, subsistence rights can be within 
absolute moral rights if we value human existence. Under this 
interpretation, we can claim that the extremely poor have an 
absolute moral right to subsistence.

	 Moreover, on the basis of three different assumptions, 
Stéphane Chauvier argues that there is a human right to non-
poverty, which we could also take to be absolute. Chauvier's first 
	 Charles Jones, "The Human Right to Subsistence," Journal of Applied 84
Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2013): 61.
	 Jones, 61..85
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assumption is the universal accessibility of non-poverty.  According 86
to Chauvier, the existence of non-poverty proves the accessibility of 
non-poverty, although it does not necessitate the possibility that 
non-poverty can universally be reached. However, Chauvier claims 
that "[T]here seems to be no logical impossibility in the concept of a 
world where no inhabitant is poor".  Chauvier further claims that 87
this shows that poverty is linked to empirical and economic 
problems, and since the poor are not predestined to poverty, the 
human right to non-poverty can be established. Chauvier's second 
assumption is that the poor are generally not responsible for their 
poverty, and in the majority of the cases, Chauvier believes that the 
poor have been subjected to poverty.  Since they have been 88
subjected to poverty, they should have a right to non-poverty. 
Chauvier's third assumption is that poverty can be a negative 
external result of economic activities.  Nonetheless, there is a 89
possible dilemma: arguably, all human activities produce both 
positive and negative effects, so why not we should not state that 
economic activity also alleviates poverty? Especially in the case of 
globalisation, the benefits of economic activity in alleviating poverty 
are hotly debated. Chauvier has a smart move here: "Neither global 
markets, through which the effects of individual decisions 
propagate, nor international economic organizations are designed to 
generate poverty. However (though this is perhaps more debatable), 
	 I regard human rights as a form of moral rights.86
	 Stéphane Chauvier, "The Right to Basic Resources," in Freedom From Poverty 87
As A Human Right: Who Owes What To The Very Poor?, ed. Thomas Pogge 




they are also not designed to alleviate or eradicate poverty".  90
Therefore, since global structures pertinent to economic activity are 
not created to alleviate or eradicate poverty, the poor involuntarily 
undergo the systemic effects of deprivation which calls for the 
recognition of their right to non-poverty. According to these 
assumptions, the right to non-poverty could be considered among 
the absolute moral rights of the extremely poor.

	 Both of these philosophers give us insights about the 
absolute moral rights of the extremely poor. Absolute moral rights 
are important because they are normatively substantive, expose the 
deontic considerations that we may have about the features of a 







	 Relational moral rights are relational in the sense that they 
arise from the relations between individuals. For instance, initially, I 
may have no absolute or relational moral right to take your £1,000. 
But once you damage my belongings, I have a relational moral right 
to be compensated for my loss. Likewise, I may have no absolute 
and relational moral right to live in your house. But once we sign a 
tenancy agreement, I gain a relational moral right to live in that 
house. In the case of extreme poverty, relational moral rights of the 
extremely poor emerge from (1) luck, and (2) chronic deprivation.

	 Consider luck. Numerous philosophers argue that wealth and 
welfare differences between individuals should depend on choices 
and not on coincidences. Some regard luck as a benchmark to 
	 Chauvier, 309.90
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assess the advantages that some have compared to others and 
subsequently to evaluate the demands of justice.  Since luck 91
favours some individuals over others by arbitrarily distributing 
wealth, some conclude that the coincidental circumstances 
interfering with the welfare of individuals ought to be compensated 
for. For instance, luck egalitarians advocate "counteracting the 
distributive effects of luck on people's lives". 
92
	 Brute luck is distinguished from option luck. Brute luck "is a 
matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate 
gambles".  Conversely, option luck "is a matter of how deliberate 93
and calculated gambles turn out–whether someone gains or loses 
through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated 
and might have declined".  Many luck egalitarians subscribe to the 94
distinction between brute luck and option luck, and many of them 
find bad brute luck worthy of compensation. 
95
	 I do not intend to show how luck egalitarianism could help to 
establish relational moral rights. But, I think, luck itself can be a 
useful concept to understand who deserves or does not deserve 
what. There are many individuals who possess more wealth than the 
extremely poor just because of luck. They either have been born into 
rich societies and families or they have gained their wealth thanks to 
luck over their lifetime. They are also lucky enough to retain that 
	 Larry Temkin, "Equality as Comparative Fairness," Journal of Applied 91
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	 Henceforth, whenever I use the term luck, I will refer to brute luck.95
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wealth as they do not encounter health issues, ecological disasters 
and wars. Their labour might amplify the wealth they already 
possess.

	 At a point in time, t1, wealth is finite. Suppose that at t1, two 
children are born: the first has been born in a high-income country 
to a wealthy family and the second has been born in a low-income 
country to a family who are in extreme poverty. The first has 
undeservingly grabbed a significant portion of the limited wealth at t1 
and the other has been condemned to what is left of that limited 
wealth at t1. The first child can use the wealth wisely over time by 
significantly increasing it through the skills gained thanks to a high-
quality education, while the second child cannot, as the second 
child is going to suffer from preventable diseases, hardships and a 
poverty cycle. Obviously, the unequal distribution at t1 out of luck is 
very likely to create another, more radical unequal distribution at tn, 
where tn is any point in time after t1.

	 This raises the Problem of Desert which is the base of the 
relational moral right from luck.

The Problem of Desert. Luck lacks morally justified 
reasons to favour some individuals by endowing them 
with some wealth and disfavour other individuals by 
withholding some wealth from them.

To elucidate on the problem of desert, some conception of 
desert has to be accepted. I use Gillian Brock's conception of 
desert, and take it as the basis for what individuals can deserve or 
not deserve: "A necessary condition of some people defensibly 
deserving certain goods is that others are adequately positioned to 
89
deserve (and achieve) rewards too".  Brock also states that "[A] 96
similar conclusion holds for entitlement, that is, a necessary 
condition of some people defensibly being entitled to certain goods 
is that others are adequately positioned to be similarly entitled as 
well".  Hence, all else being equal, an individual can be said to 97
deserve a resource only if all individuals are adequately positioned 
to attain and retain all resources.

	 Since luck is by nature coincidental, it favours some 
individuals over others by arbitrarily distributing more wealth to them 
without any morally justified reason whatsoever. Accordingly, since 
not all of the individuals have begun their lives with the same chance 
to prosper, and since luck has unjustifiably influenced the course of 
their lives either positively or negatively, lucky individuals cannot 
claim to deserve all of their wealth. For instance, individuals who are 
born to middle-class families in rich societies, and who can use their 
income and savings flexibly, cannot be said to deserve all of their 
wealth. From the very beginning, they as lucky individuals have had 
an advantage over billions of people in the world in terms of wealth 
which has also increased their advantages with respect to health, 
education, security, self-fulfilment and social networks by which they 
have been given a substantially greater chance to prosper. 

Nonetheless, one of the reasons why others who are unlucky 
individuals such as the extremely poor have not been provided with 
an equal chance to prosper is that they have lacked that wealth. 
Practically, it means that unlucky individuals are not adequately 
positioned to attain and retain the wealth with which lucky 




individuals are endowed. Thereby, the problem of desert 
demonstrates that lucky individuals have unjustifiably attained some 
wealth where unlucky individuals have been unjustifiably withheld 
some wealth that lucky individuals are endowed with. We can call 
some of the wealth that lucky individuals possess as undeserved 
wealth. Lucky individuals attain and retain undeserved wealth at the 
cost of unlucky individuals such as the extremely poor. The 
unsettling consequence of the problem of desert is that retaining 
undeserved wealth is the moral equivalent of unjustified stealing: 
after all, retaining undeserved wealth is the result of lucky individuals 
arbitrarily possessing and gaining control over some wealth that has 
been undeserved by them. If lucky individuals who retain 
undeserved wealth fail to redistribute it, then they not only exploit 
the advantage of the power that luck endows them with but also 
prevent unlucky individuals such as the extremely poor from 
accessing wealth which could have been used to ameliorate their 
miserable conditions.

The presence of undeserved wealth is the basis of the moral 
right of the extremely poor to the redistribution of undeserved 
wealth. This is a relational right because it arises from the wealth 
asymmetry between different parties and it owes its existence to 
undeserved wealth. The extremely poor have a moral right to the 
redistribution of undeserved wealth where they would be entitled to 
receive some of the wealth of lucky individuals. We can introduce 
the Luck Principle.

The Luck Principle. Unlucky individuals have a moral 
right to some of the wealth of lucky individuals.

91
One might think that the Luck Principle is as demanding as 
the Stronger Principle of Sacrifice. It may be said that it forces us to 
redistribute our wealth up to the point of marginal utility, just like the 
Stronger Principle of Sacrifice. In fact, the Luck Principle does not 
necessarily require that. The difference is that the Luck Principle 
does not necessitate the redistribution of the portion of one's wealth 
which has been gained through one's own labour. Admittedly, this 
brings us to the difficult task of separating own's own labour from 
one's own luck. I concede that I do not have a definitive solution on 
this issue. But it seems plausible to me to say that people can be 
wealthy without owing all of their wealth solely to luck. In other 
words, they owe some portion of their wealth to some factors apart 
from luck, such as labour. If that is the case, then they are only 
obligated to redistribute the portion of their wealth owed to luck—
they do not need to sacrifice everything up to the point of marginal 
utility if they have some wealth owed to labour. But the Stronger 
Principle of Sacrifice would require everything to be sacrificed up to 
the point of marginal utility, even if one has gained some portion of 
their wealth owed to labour. Even though the Luck Principle is not 
necessarily as demanding as the Stronger Principle of Sacrifice, it 
could still be regarded as a relatively demanding principle, especially 
if there are lucky individuals who owe almost all of their wealth to 
luck.

Another relational moral right of the extremely poor can arise 
from the moral right to necessity. For instance, Alejandra Mancilla 
claims that "[A] chronically deprived agent has a right to take, use 
and/or occupy the resources required to get out of his plight, even if 
this implies encroaching upon someone else’s property or 
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territory".  Here, the moral right to necessity is framed by three 98
conditions. Firstly, only the material resources which are required for 
subsistence or the means which are needed to obtain them can be 
claimed. The former can be food or space, and the latter can be 
money. Secondly, the exercise of the right of the poor should not 
interfere with other equally important moral interests such as 
security rights. Thirdly, other options to reach subsistence should be 
tried beforehand, such as "offering one's work and services, directly 
asking for help, and appealing to the relevant authorities".  99
Therefore, the exercise of the right to necessity should be the last 
resort.

Apart from these conditions concerning the moral right to 
necessity, Mancilla has two recommendations to potential claimants. 

Firstly, to diminish the possibility of interference, potential 
claimants should act covertly instead of overtly:

Meanwhile, in cases where there is no alternative and 
the needy are faced with the resistance of others in the 
course of their acting, the use of force should be kept 
to the minimum, and take into account mitigating 
circumstances, such as the lack of relevant knowledge 
that the duty-bearers may have regarding the situation, 
the economic burden that the taking will represent for 
the owners of the targeted resources, the number of 
	 Alejandra Mancilla, "What the Old Right of Necessity Can Do for the 98




times that the latter have already been targeted by 
other needy agents, etc.  
100
Secondly, potential claimants should target the individuals 
who will be least affected by the loss of their resources compared to 
other individuals, and they should take into account how many times 
individuals have been targeted by other claimants.

The moral right to necessity can be claimed to be absolute 
rather than relational, but in Mancilla's context, it is only available 
when these certain conditions are met so that it is always relational. 
These conditions implicitly suggest that there are some individuals 
who are relatively well-off, and the moral right of necessity are 
exercised upon them rather than other individuals who are deprived. 
In other words, deprived individuals such as the extremely poor 
cannot exercise their moral right to necessity upon other deprived 
individuals such as the other extremely poor. Again, there has to be 
a wealth asymmetry between individuals for the moral right of 
necessity to be exercised, which makes it relational. The importance 
of Mancilla's work is that it shows the presence of chronic 
deprivation coupled with the presence of richness can arise a 
relational moral right. We can introduce the Chronic Deprivation 
Principle.

The Chronic Deprivation Principle. The chronically 
deprived individuals have a moral right to some of the 




	 Both the Luck Principle and the Chronic Deprivation Principle 
demonstrate how we can give a shape to the relational moral right of 
the extremely poor to receive some of the wealth of individuals who 
are wealthy enough to live a comfortable life. The Chronic 
Deprivation Principle may be regarded as a less demanding principle 
than the Luck Principle because it is limited to necessity. 
Nonetheless, relational moral rights of the extremely poor arising 
from luck and chronic deprivation should strike us as strong.





The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice has serious problems. It is 
overpermissive, it is insensitive to the sources of responsibility other 
than mere ability, and it assigns moral obligations without 
recognising moral rights. What can effective altruists learn from 
these?

Recall the permissiveness objection. It entails that not all 
morally significant things should be left outside the domain of 
sacrifice. In other words, deliberately cultivated morally significant 
lavish pursuits should be sacrificed to alleviate extreme poverty. The 
permissiveness objection is important because it asserts that the 
moral value of satisfying one's deliberately cultivated morally 
significant lavish pursuits cannot outweigh the moral value of 
alleviating extreme poverty. To avoid permitting deliberately 
cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits, I have introduced the 
Permissiveness Principle which can be followed alongside the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. The Permissiveness Principle limits the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice but is compatible with it.

95
	 Unfortunately, without being supplemented by the 
Permissiveness Principle, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice brings 
about an image problem for effective altruism. For instance, Amia 
Srinivasan is one of those who are concerned that effective altruism 
has a laid-back approach. Srinivasan's concerns are pretty much 
aligned with the concerns related to moral problems brought about 
by the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. Srinivasan writes that

Effective altruism takes up the spirit of Singer's 
argument but shields us from the full blast of its 
conclusion; moral indictment is transformed into an 
empowering investment opportunity. Instead of down 
grading our lives to subsistence levels, we are 
encouraged to start with the traditional tithe of 10 per 
cent, then do a bit more each year. Thus effective 
altruism dodges one of the standard objections to 
utilitarianism: that it asks too much of us. But it isn't 
clear how the dodge is supposed to work. MacAskill 
tells us that effective altruists – like utilitarians – are 
committed to doing the most good possible, but he 
also tells us that it's OK to enjoy a 'cushy lifestyle', so 
long as you're donating a lot to charity. 
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	 Srinivasan is concerned that effective altruism comforts 
individuals to the extent that they can have a "cushy lifestyle" if they 
donate enough to charities. Given that the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice permits deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish 
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pursuits, effective altruism could understandably be perceived as a 
movement which would not find unnecessary and high-end 
spendings unproblematic. It could also understandably be perceived 
as an approach which does not aim to question and challenge more 
of the substantive issues concerning the wealth of individuals—for 
instance, the means by which the wealth of the individuals has been 
accumulated, how it is used overall, and to what extent individuals 
have a moral right to their wealth (even if they donate large sums of 
money). That being the case, effective altruism could be found to 
emancipate individuals from investigating the moral nature of their 
wealth while encouraging them to make low-cost sacrifices that are 
not morally significant. In that respect, some may claim that effective 
altruism deflects attention from those serious matters and 
buttresses the existing inequalities and injustices.

	 Nonetheless, we can respond that effective altruism does not 
need to have answers on those questions since a single moral 
approach cannot be reasonably anticipated to be overarching and 
answer each and every moral question concerning individual wealth. 
However, it is crucial to encourage effective altruists to seek 
answers on those serious matters concerning individual wealth, and 
to transform effective altruism in a way that it begins to require 
individuals to ponder over the cases in which they might have been 
overpermissive.

	 Regardless of these, we should not be uncharitable to the 
usefulness of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. Singer provides the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice in the hope of convincing people who 
may be disenchanted with the Stronger Principle of Sacrifice. The 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice can especially be useful for those who 
are just starting their exploration of moral obligations and extreme 
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poverty because it is arguably a common-sense principle. Effective 
altruists can use the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice in a variety of 
ways, for instance, to promote effective altruism as an accessible 
way of living but it has to be stressed that it only assigns a minimal 
obligation. Simultaneously, the Permissiveness Principle can 
reasonably limit the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice.

	 Now, recall the source of responsibility objection. By only 
emphasising the mere ability of individuals to alleviate extreme 
poverty, effective altruism assigns individuals a responsibility to 
alleviate extreme poverty. But emphasising mere ability is never 
enough and this is the essence of the source of responsibility 
objection. It stresses the importance of emphasising the other 
sources of responsibility as well, such as whether individuals have 
contributed to extreme poverty or unjustly benefited from it. What 
would effective altruism gain by emphasising them?

	 By directing attention to the other sources of responsibility 
other than mere ability, effective altruists could distinguish parties 
which have relatively more and which have relatively less 
responsibility in addressing the plight of the extremely poor, even if 
they both have the same amount of wealth. If one has deepened 
extreme poverty, then it sounds implausible to require the same 
amount of donation from another individual who has not deepened 
extreme poverty. The former has a greater responsibility in the form 
of compensation, and if the former has also been unjustly enriched 
as it is in the case of the successful profit-seeker, then there is a 
requirement for restitution as well.

	 Effective altruists not paying attention to this nuance would 
not only not ask for the same amount of money from both but they 
would also not notice the differences between individuals with 
98
respect to their moral standings. Put differently, recognising the 
source of responsibility would also help to avoid exaggerating one's 
moral standing, especially if they are blameworthy in deepening or 
unjustly benefiting from extreme poverty. Jennifer Rubenstein's 
warning against effective altruists who might be regarding 
themselves or individuals who donate as "heroic rescuers" is 
important here.  Effective altruists usually utilise the drowning child 102
analogy to stress the responsibility of individuals to alleviate extreme 
poverty, where they are labelled as heroic rescuers.

This kind of high-drama emergency rescue scenario is 
powerfully motivating (which might be why Singer 
consistently invokes such scenarios in his work). 
However, it might also encourage aspiring Effective 
Altruists to think of themselves as rescuers, and the 
people they wish to assist as helpless victims more 
generally. This conception of 'self and other' can have 
several negative and distorting effects. It can make it 
harder for the self-described rescuer to notice the 
ways in which she has contributed to and/or benefited 
from the problems she seeks to address, and it can 
lead her to discount the insights of the 'victims.' 
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	 Effective altruists regarding themselves as heroic rescuers not 
only implies that they are not cognisant of the problems they 
contribute to as Rubenstein suggests, but such a self-perception 
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would also bring about a moral hierarchy between the rescuer and 
the victim. For some, perceiving oneself as a heroic rescuer may 
appear to reflect a psychological state without any negative social 
consequences, but an increasing number of effective altruists 
treating themselves as heroic rescuers may harm the effective 
altruism community as a whole. Over the long-run, this perception of 
effective altruism within and outside of the effective altruism 
community may immensely harm the movement. The merit of the 
source of responsibility objection and hence the Source of 
Responsibility Principle is that it takes the lid off the moral standings 
of individuals before they give too much credit to themselves.

	 Finally, recall the lack of rights objection. One may ask 
whether recognising the moral rights of the extremely poor add 
anything new to the discussion: are we just fetishising the concept 
of moral rights? I think there are serious benefits of recognising the 
moral rights of the extremely poor alongside the recognition of the 
moral obligation of individuals to alleviate extreme poverty.

The first benefit is that we go beyond effective altruism's 
standard discourse of "doing good" and "maximising good". For 
practical reasons, many effective altruists use these terms since they 
appeal to emotions which could encourage people to donate 
without making them feel guilty. Surely, donating to alleviate extreme 
poverty brings about good in the world but alleviating extreme 
poverty is now not merely perceived as something which is an 
opportunity to do good. Alleviating extreme poverty is now 
perceived as a way to fulfil the moral rights of the extremely poor, 
which would be a matter of social justice. This makes the case for 
alleviating extreme poverty stronger as it acts as a "second lock" 
alongside the moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty which we 
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can call the "first lock". Particularly in the case of the relational moral 
rights, provided that effective altruists recognise that some of their 
wealth is undeserved, it is very likely that they would not find the do-
good framing of effective altruism sufficient. It is not that the do-
good framing is inherently wrong, it is that it is insufficient to capture 
the moral realities of the current state of affairs. In that case, 
individuals may be inclined to donate even more because they 
would have the awareness that some of their wealth is undeserved.

	 Relatedly, as only appealing to ability as the source of the 
moral obligation of individuals without appealing to moral rights of 
the extremely poor is way weaker, doing so can also develop an 
unhealthy relationship between individuals and the extremely poor 
because we are not correctly pinpointing the base of obligations:

Mistaking the bases of our duties toward the distant 
needy is an invitation for the creation of new 
relationships of domination and subordination. If the 
global rich repay their moral debt to the global poor 
unconditionally, the rich retain no power to interfere 
with the affairs of the global poor and implicitly 
recognize the poor as social equals. However, if the 
rich impose conditions on repaying this debt (perhaps 
because they do not realize it is actually a debt), they 
may retain the power to withdraw the resources if they 
change their minds or they do not like the way the poor 
are managing these resources. 
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	 Lechterman is right to argue that new relationships of 
domination and subordination may be born unless the moral debt is 
recognised. Only referring to mere ability as the source of the moral 
obligation to alleviate extreme poverty and stressing the opportunity 
to do good give the sentiment that individuals might justifiably 
change their minds whenever they find appropriate. But the 
introduction of moral rights restricts those attempts and unearths 
the moral debt that individuals owe to the extremely poor.

Relatedly, the concept of moral rights honours and empowers 
the agency of the extremely poor. Some have been concerned by 
the shallow pond analogy, which has been widely used in effective 
altruism and is also linked to the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, 
because it has no recognition of the agency of the extremely poor:

In the shallow pond case, there is one agent. There are 
two persons, each worthy of moral consideration, but 
only one person capable of making choices and acting 
on those choices. The savior stands at the pond's 
edge, deciding whether or not to save the helpless 
child. The child awaits this savior, incapable of doing 
anything to respond to his or her unfortunate 
circumstances.

People who actually live with and struggle against 
poverty on a daily basis might reasonably be offended 
by being compared to drowning children. Poor people 
are rational actors who make a variety of decisions, 
many difficult, to attempt to survive and prosper 
despite the circumstances they face. Taking the 
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shallow pond case seriously, one could reasonably 
infer that the fate of poor people rests entirely on the 
moral choices of the wealthy, and poor people are 
entirely incapable of having any influence over their 
chances of surviving and flourishing. 
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After making these points, Scott Wisor concludes that:

The uniformed might imagine that poor people simply 
consume everything they can get their hands on, just 
as a drowning child will grasp onto anything that will 
get him or her above the surface. But this view is 
mistaken, and treating poor people as such both fails 
to respect their agency and results in misguided 
policies. 
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Thanks to the terminology of rights, the extremely poor are no 
longer mere objects of good receivers but they become subjects 
whose moral rights ought to be fulfilled. They may be victims, but 
they are not victims who are just waiting there as moral patients to 
receive help. They are subjects who are protected by rights and any 
contribution to their well-being would count as reversing the 
violation of their moral rights. This would also mark the importance 
of developing a collective consciousness for the extremely poor as 
now they would find themselves as not just some people in the 
world who are in misery but as members of a group who have been 
	 Scott Wisor, "Against shallow ponds: an argument against Singer's approach 105
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systemically deprived of their wealth and welfare. This is also good 
news for those who are not among the extremely poor but who are 
the political allies of the extremely poor: by deploying the discourse 
that the extremely poor have moral rights, calling for political 
solidarity becomes relevant than ever.

One may suspect that an approach defending moral rights is 
incompatible with effective altruism. Surprisingly, effective altruists 
have emphasised the role of luck in one's moral obligation, although 
they have not taken it to its full conclusion that we can also derive 
moral rights from luck. Both Singer and MacAskill recognise the 
negative distributive effects of luck with respect to the moral 
obligation of individuals. Through stressing the undesirable 
inequality caused by luck, Singer makes a case for a moral 
obligation to assist which can be extended to a moral obligation to 
alleviate extreme poverty:

The argument for an obligation to assist can survive, 
with only minor modifications, even if we accept an 
individualistic theory of property rights. In any case, 
however, I do not think we should accept such a 
theory. It leaves too much to chance to be an 
acceptable ethical view. For instance, many of those 
whose forefathers happened to inhabit some sandy 
wastes around the Persian Gulf are now fabulously 
wealthy, because oil lay under those sands; whereas 
many of those whose forefathers settled on better land 
south of the Sahara live in extreme poverty, because of 
drought and bad harvests. Can this distribution be 
acceptable from an impartial point of view? If we 
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imagine ourselves about to begin life as a citizen of 
either Kuwait or Chad – but we do not know which – 
would we accept the principle that citizens of Kuwait 
are under no obligation to assist people living in 
Chad? 
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In this example, the ancestors of citizens now living in Kuwait 
who "happened to inhabit" the Persian Gulf had luck which let them 
find oil. Thanks to an emerging additional luck as the time proceeds, 
some of them gained enormous wealth by selling oil. Inevitably, their 
children who inherited their ancestors' wealth also had luck which 
resulted in some of the Kuwait citizens to inherit large sums of 
money.

Singer uses the term "chance" in a negative connotation to 
rule out the permissibility of individualistic theory of property rights. 
By the individualistic theory of property rights, Singer refers to the 
assumption that property rights are so sacrosanct that they cannot 
be overturned or otherwise interfered with. Singer thinks that 
accepting the individualistic theory of property rights "leaves too 
much to chance" so that it cannot "be an acceptable ethical view". 
Once rejected, Singer moves on to argue against the suggestion that 
the distribution of wealth due to the coincidental circumstances 
such as the discovery of oil or climate conditions is fair. Applied 
globally, Singer does not regard the status quo of some individuals 
being rich and some individuals being poor due to luck decent. As 
Singer is a utilitarian, the reason behind finding such a distribution 
unfair may be that the principle of impartiality is violated. Singer's 
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concern over the violation of the principle of impartiality is 
harmonious with the Luck Principle because the Luck Principle is 
fundamentally concerned with treating all individuals equally.

Similarly, Singer states that

We truly are lucky to be Australians. The overriding 
reason each one of us is in little danger of slipping into 
extreme poverty is that we were born in, or able to 
migrate to, this country. Our abilities and our work 
ethic may help, but as the American billionaire Warren 
Buffett said, when told that it was his talent for picking 
stocks that had produced his wealth, 'If you stick me 
down in the middle of Bangladesh or Peru, you’ll see 
how much this talent is going to produce in the wrong 
kind of soil.' 
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And then Singer asks: "What is an ethical response to such 
good luck?" 
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Here, Singer makes a point which goes further than merely 
recognising the negative distributive effects of luck. With quoting 
Buffett, Singer implies that some of the advantages of our behaviour 
patterns like the type of work ethic that we employ and stick to can 
even be offset by luck. In that case, luck does not only produce 
negative effects but it also neutralises or negates the positive effects 
that are cultivated by choice. By deeming it inappropriate, Singer's 
last sentence in the form of a question implies that the presence of 




luck compels us to find an ethical response which we should act 
upon.

Likewise, MacAskill asserts in 2016 that "[I]f you’re reading 
this book, then, like me, you're probably lucky enough to be earning 
$16,000 (£10,500) per year or more, putting you in the richest 10% 
of the world's population. That's a remarkable situation to be in".  110
Parallelly, MacAskill expresses the thought that "[T]hrough some 
outstanding stroke of luck, we have found ourselves as the inheritors 
of the most astonishing period of economic growth the world has 
ever seen, while a significant proportion of people stay as poor as 
they have ever been".  Although MacAskill does not indicate that 111
we can draw a moral obligation from luck, MacAskill still 
acknowledges the significance of luck in increasing or decreasing 
the wealth of individuals. 

Recognising the negative distributive effects of luck and 
drawing moral obligations from it does not contradict effective 
altruism. Given Singer's argument for a moral obligation to alleviate 
extreme poverty via underscoring the negative distributive effects of 
luck and MacAskill's emphasis on individuals benefiting from the 
legacy of luck, taking into account luck is compatible with effective 
altruism. Regardless of how philosophers of effective altruism 
ground their arguments for a moral obligation to alleviate extreme 
poverty, considering the moral implications of luck is likely to 
empower the reasoning behind effective altruism. Nevertheless, 
what is lacking in the discourses of philosophers of effective altruism 
is a discourse around moral rights. For instance, Singer does not 
recognise the moral right of Chadians as Singer only mentions the 
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moral obligation of Kuwaitians to assist Chadians. Similarly, 
MacAskill does not use the expression of "moral right" with respect 
to extreme poverty.

	 Recognising the moral right of Chadians in Singer's example 
or the moral right of the extremely poor can buttress the moral 
commitments of effective altruism. In fact, it adds a further gravity to 
convince individuals that they have a moral obligation to alleviate 
extreme poverty because of the moral rights of the extremely poor. 
In that respect, they would decide to alleviate extreme poverty not 
only because they have an ability to do so but also because the 
extremely poor have to have access to the wealth that lucky 
individuals do not deserve. Therefore, recognising the moral rights of 
the extremely poor has the potential to strengthen effective altruism.

One may claim that emphasising the terms such as 
undeserved wealth and moral rights when asking for donations 
would cause effective altruism to become belligerent. One may 
simultaneously add that effective altruism would lose its non-
aggressive character by adopting these. Surely, for some, the use of 
these terms may be controversial and overwhelming. But with 
careful strategies, these are powerful terms to convince individuals. 
Even the term moral obligation which is used by many effective 
altruists frequently appears to be belligerent because it signals that 
one is required to do something—nonetheless, effective altruists 
have been very successful in promoting what effective altruism asks 
by using the term of moral obligation through neat arguments 
without being hostile. Hence, the concern related to the circulation 
of terms like undeserved wealth and moral rights should be directed 






Chapter 2 has explained and evaluated the Weaker Principle 
of Sacrifice as one of the premises of effective altruism. Firstly, 
Chapter 2 has aimed to disaggregate several distinct interpretations 
of the principle, by showing several interpretations of the central but 
vague term "morally significant". It has then sought to single out a 
version of the principle which many effective altruists could accept 
as one of the premises of effective altruism. Discussing what could 
be meant by moral significance should be particularly important for 
effective altruists and their critics, because the interpretations of it 
drastically change how we view the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. 
Secondly, Chapter 2 has aimed to introduce three new objections to 
the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. All of these objections have 
evaluated different aspects of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice and 
effective altruism, and they are combined with the existing concerns 
about effective altruism. Thirdly, Chapter 2 has aimed to provide 
some new principles to supplement the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
without undermining it.

The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice represents the general 
demands of effective altruism. But it falls short in many aspects. The 
first shortcoming of it is that it justifies deliberately cultivated morally 
significant lavish pursuits, which is challenged by the 
permissiveness objection. The second shortcoming of it is that it is 
insensitive to the sources of responsibility other than mere ability to 
alleviate extreme poverty, which is attacked by the source of 
responsibility objection. The third shortcoming of it is that it explains 
moral obligations without implying any type of moral rights, which is 
found problematic by the lack of rights objection. 
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	 Nevertheless, we do not have a sufficient reason to abandon 
the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
has the potential to resonate with ordinary people. For those who 
are rightly uncomfortable about the problematic aspects of the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, the Permissiveness Principle, the 
Source of Responsibility Principle, the Luck Principle, and the 
Chronic Deprivation Principle can be embraced alongside the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. Furthermore, individuals can use the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice to hold themselves accountable to 
themselves. After all, individuals need a clear moral principle on 
which they can base their actions, and the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice is an easy-to-understand and an easy-to-accept principle. 
Nevertheless, provided that we have to evaluate a moral principle 
holistically, and since there are problematic aspects of the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice, it should not be the moral principle that 
effective altruists should only stick to. In fact, effective altruists 
should regard and promote the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice as a 
principle which assigns a minimal obligation rather than a decisive 
obligation. It should be minimal because the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice is in dire of need of by being supplemented with other 
moral principles. In the face of global problems, ethics centred 
around justice, equality and solidarity demands that we have to 
carefully reflect on our decisions and principles, and rectify them 
whenever it is needed.

	 Since this chapter has demonstrated what effective altruism 
asks from individuals, we can now focus on the effectiveness part, 






Individuals ought to choose the 




	 Distinguishing it from other movements, one of the 
commitments of effective altruism is effectiveness. Effectiveness is 
of utmost significance for effective altruism, indeed even the name 
of the movement comes from it. In this chapter, I evaluate Premise 3, 
namely, the Effectiveness Principle to which effective altruism 
subscribes. The Effectiveness Principle states that individuals ought 
to choose the most effective option in preventing very bad things. 
This means that whenever we can prevent more than one very bad 
thing from happening, we are, so it claimed, morally obligated to 
prevent the worst of these things from happening with our limited 
resources at stake. As extreme poverty is one of the cause areas of 




Whenever I appeal to the Effectiveness Principle, I appeal to 
the standard position of effective altruism with respect to 
effectiveness: quality-adjusted life years (QALY) maximisation with a 
given unit of resource in the case of extreme poverty. Effective 
altruists almost universally endorse the Effectiveness Principle, 
understood in this way.

	 At the outset, I briefly show why Premise 2, or the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice, is limited in scope with regards to 
effectiveness. After introducing the Effectiveness Principle, I justify 
Effectiveness Principle both through an outcome-based principle 
and an obligation-based principle in no-conflict cases. For the 
former, I follow the lines of Theron Pummer's Avoid Gratuitous 
Worseness, and for the latter, I formulate a new principle, namely, 
the Better Fulfilment Principle. Nevertheless, endorsing effectiveness 
in conflict cases is not as easy as no-conflict cases: I explore an 
objection from fairness which challenges the Effectiveness Principle. 
I show that whenever the Effectiveness Principle is universally 
endorsed in conflict cases, effective altruists become prone to 
unjustly favour the well-off, prefer tiny improvements in the lives of a 
large number of well-off over massive improvements in the lives of a 
small number of worst-off, and perpetuate the unequal luck 
distribution among the worst-off (especially when choosing 
charities). To overcome those challenges, I apply Martin Peterson's 
mixed view and Iwao Hirose's formal aggregation to effective 
altruism. I conclude that the Effectiveness Principle is for the most 
part a plausible principle in addressing extreme poverty but effective 
altruists should be aware of some of its morally repugnant 
conclusions before basing their moral judgements on it.
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	 This chapter has four aims. The first aim is to show that 
Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not lead to effective 
altruism but leads only to altruism. This means that the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice cannot be a substitute for a principle based on 
effectiveness. The second aim is to demonstrate that effectiveness 
can also be appealing to deontologists, as an obligation-based 
principle is formulated to justify effectiveness. Effectiveness is often 
thought to be tied to utilitarianism and other consequentialist 
theories, but it can also survive and thrive with deontic theories. The 
third aim is to extend the discussion of effectiveness and fairness to 
choosing charities to donate for extreme poverty alleviation. The 
question "Which charities should individuals donate to?" is a major 
question for effective altruists, whose answer is ever-evolving, and 
this chapter hopefully aims to make a contribution to that at a 
philosophical level. The fourth aim is to support a method of 
comparing effectiveness and fairness in rescue cases (Martin 
Peterson's mixed view and Iwao Hirose's formal aggregation, which 







	 Recall Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice: "If it is in our 
power to prevent something very bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, 
morally, to do it".  The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice asks 112
individuals to prevent something very bad if it does not take on 
moral significance. It assigns a minimal obligation to individuals and 
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has been quite influential in explaining and promoting effective 
altruism.

	 However, while the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice implies 
altruism, it does not imply effective altruism. Consider the following:

A is very bad. There are two solutions to it, B and C. 
For a given unit of impact, B requires slightly fewer 
resources than C.

	 Which solution is the effective one? Surely, B is the effective 
one. Nevertheless, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not 
indicate which solution we should prefer over the other. If we do not 
sacrifice something morally significant, what we derive from the 
Weaker Principle of Sacrifice is that we ought to prevent A, and we 
are not required to do it in a particular way. In that case, the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice permits us to choose C over B, even though 
we will unnecessarily lose resources. It also permits choosing B over 
C, which does not waste resources. It treats both scenarios as 
equals. This shows that the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not 
require effectiveness and is not sufficient to guide us in the cases 
where resources are scarce or we must choose some solutions 
instead of others.

	 In addition, while the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not 
require us to sacrifice something morally significant, provided that 
we are prepared to sacrifice something morally significant to prevent 
very bad things, then it does not guide us to sacrifice non-morally 
significant things over morally significant things. For instance, if B is 
morally significant and C is not, if we are prepared to sacrifice B to 
prevent something very bad, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice would 
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not advise us to sacrifice either B or C. Imagine, for example, that I 
could sacrifice either my home or £5 to prevent something very bad 
from happening. The Weaker Principle of Sacrifice does not tell me 
to sacrifice the £5, even though this is the effective solution.

	 Also, consider the following:

1. A and B are equally very bad. With a given unit of resource, 
addressing A brings about a greater overall benefit than 
addressing B.

2. C and D are both very bad, but C is slightly worse. With a 
given unit of resource, addressing C brings about a greater 
overall benefit than addressing D.

3. E and F are both very bad, but E is far worse. With a given 
unit of resource, addressing E brings about a greater overall 
benefit than addressing F.

	 According to the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, provided that 
we do not sacrifice something morally significant, we are required to 
address all of A, B, C, D, E, and F, since each reaches the threshold 
of being "very bad". However, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice fails 
to tell us what to prioritise in situations in which there are at least 
two very bad things. In that case, we are not barred from addressing 
B rather than A, D rather than C, and F rather than E. We are not 
required to commit to the problems whose solution will bring about 
a greater overall benefit. Consequently, the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice alone does not reflect the most important and distinctive 
element of effective altruism although it has been central to the 
establishment and development of effective altruism.
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	 A potential reply might be that B, D and F are things that are 
very bad, so if we instead prevent A, C and E, we sacrifice 
something of moral significance (preventing B, D and F). However, if 
"moral significance" is read in this way, the Weaker Principle of 
Sacrifice demands nothing of us at all. We would not be required to 
do anything: since whatever we choose, we will not be preventing 
something very bad from happening, and so will be sacrificing 
something of moral significance, and if we sacrifice something of 
moral significance, then we are not required to do something. Such 
reading of moral significance is self-defeating, even for the purposes 
of the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice.

	 In order to turn Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice into one 
which supports effectiveness, and thus effective altruism, we have 
to add another principle, namely, the Effectiveness Principle:

The Effectiveness Principle. Individuals ought to 
choose the effective option in preventing very bad 
things. 
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	 In the context of effective altruism, effectiveness signifies two 
things. Firstly, it means that the solution proposed to the problem is 
functional and thus, at least potentially, successfully addresses the 
problem. Secondly, it amounts to cost-effectiveness: a solution is 
cost-effective only if it brings about the greatest overall benefit with 
a given unit of resource when compared with different solutions. The 
Effectiveness Principle combines both of these aspects.

	For simplicity, I use the term "the effective option", but in fact, it refers to the 113
most effective option. I use these terms interchangeably.
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	 There are two dimensions of effectiveness. The first 
dimension concerns with what is to be distributed. In the case of 
extreme poverty, effective altruists attach importance to QALYs as 
the units of distribution.  The second dimension concerns with 114
how QALYS are to be distributed. Effective altruists could be 
sufficientarians, prioritarians or QALY maximisers.  None of these 115
approaches is incompatible with effective altruism in the case of 
extreme poverty. For instance, if you are a sufficientarian, and if you 
want to be as effective as possible as an effective altruist, you would 
want to lift the greatest number of people above a certain threshold 
with a given unit of resource. If you are a prioritarian, and if you want 
to be as effective as possible as an effective altruist, you would aim 
to improve or save the greatest number of lives of the extremely 
poor with a given unit of resource while giving priority to worse off 
people over better off people. If you are a QALY maximiser, and if 
you want to be as effective as possible as an effective altruist, then 
you would opt for saving the most QALYs of the extremely poor with 
a given unit of resource. I do not take a side regarding which of 
these approaches is better than which but it is notable that effective 
	Note that there is another metric called welfare-adjusted life years (WALY). 114
WALY is a much more comprehensive metric since it includes every 
component of well-being as opposed to QALY which focuses on health. 
Effective altruists are trying to maximise QALY not because they only care 
about health. In contrast, they are interested in every component of welfare. 
But what often happens in extreme poverty alleviation through charities is that 
GiveWell recommended effective charities usually improve the health of the 
extremely poor so effective altruists emphasise QALY maximisation. Refer to 
Benjamin Todd, "We care about WALYs not QALYs," last modified November 
13, 2015, https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/nevDBjuCPMCuaoMYT/
we-care-about-walys-not-qalys.
	To read a neat and brief account of what sufficientarianism and prioritarianism 115
are, refer to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Egalitarianism", last 
modified April 24, 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism.
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altruism is compatible with all of these whenever we think of 
addressing extreme poverty.

	 One may be curious about the approach which effective 
altruism employs in the case of extreme poverty. As I stated earlier, 
different effective altruists hold different normative claims, and they 
may differ on the approach that they subscribe to. Nonetheless, the 
leading figures of effective altruism and the donation campaigns 
currently stress the importance of QALY maximisation, and they 
usually cite the empirical data about how effective charities against 
extreme poverty have an advantage over ordinary charities 
concerning QALY maximisation.  There are many charities which 116
are recommended by GiveWell and are thought to be effective when 
compared with ordinary charities.  GiveWell's methodology looks 117
at many factors, all of which are concerned with welfare changes, 
where they try to maximise the welfare gain (or minimise the welfare 
loss). Following that, many effective altruists advocate donating to 
effective charities which bring about the greatest QALYs with a given 
unit of resource. In the following, I assume that effective altruism is 
primarily concerned with QALY maximisation when it comes to 
extreme poverty, and understands effectiveness in terms of QALY 
maximisation. I base my arguments on this assumption, and 
whenever I support or challenge the Effectiveness Principle, I refer to 
QALY maximisation. Moreover, I use the expressions "effectiveness" 
and "the Effectiveness Principle" interchangeably.

	For a thorough discussion of QALYs, refer to MacAskill, Doing Good Better.116
	Effective charities and the methodology of designating them will be carefully 117
explained and discussed in Chapter 4. To assess the Effectiveness Principle, 
we do not need their names nor to know how they are compared with ordinary 
charities. Currently, it suffices to suppose that there are some charities which 
are better in improving or saving lives than others.
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	 It is important to note that there are what I will call "no-
conflict cases" and what I will call "conflict cases". No-conflict 
cases are cases in which we can either help A and B, or help only A. 
Whichever option we go for, A benefits from our decision. But B may 
not benefit from our decision if we choose to help only A. I call this a 
"no-conflict case" because at least one party always benefits from 
our decision, and our decision makes no difference to them. In 
contrast, "conflict cases" are cases in which we help either C or D. 
This is called a conflict case because different people's interests 
compete. Throughout the chapter, I focus on both no-conflict and 
conflict cases. Effectiveness seems uncontroversial when applied to 
no-conflict cases. However, when it comes to conflict cases it 
seems controversial. In §3.3, I use no-conflict cases to support an 
outcome-based and obligation-based principles of effectiveness.  118
In §3.4, I make clear that when it comes to conflict cases, the moral 
value of fairness comes in and tension arises between effectiveness 
and fairness. To address the tension between effectiveness and 
fairness, I endorse a method which grants some degree of moral 
value to effectiveness and some degree of moral value to fairness—







3.3.1	Justifying effectiveness through an outcome-based 
principle

 I use only one conflict case in this section, which is formulated for some other 118
purpose than supporting the outcome-based and obligation-based principles.
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	 As one of the effective altruists who embraces an outcome-
based principle in justifying effectiveness, Theron Pummer 




Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak). It is wrong to 
perform an act that is much worse than another, if it is 
no costlier to you to perform the better act, and if all 




	 Being an outcome-based principle, Avoid Gratuitous 
Worseness (weak) requires individuals to choose the better outcome 
in cases in which one outcome is much worse than another, 
provided that the better outcome does not bring about an additional 
cost to individuals.  Given that Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) 120
does not require individuals to choose better outcomes at all costs, 
it escapes the demandingness objection.

	 Better outcomes could be achieved by minimising harm or 
maximising good. Arguably, Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) is 
more appealing in minimising harm cases than maximising good 
cases. Consider a no-conflict case where we are to decide between 
providing medication to relieve the extreme suffering of one child 
(Poyraz) and providing medication to relieve the extreme suffering of 
a thousand children (including Poyraz). All else is equal and it is no 
costlier to us to perform the better act which is relieving the extreme 
	Theron Pummer, "Whether and Where to Give", 84.119
	Pummer thinks that "[T]here are many cases in which there is optionality about 120
whether to give without optionality about where to give" in Pummer, 87. Since 
I have already assumed that individuals are required to alleviate extreme 
poverty in Chapter 2, I remain uninterested in exploiting those cases where 
individuals are not required to donate, but they are required to donate to 
effective charities once they decide to donate.
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suffering of a thousand children. Given the enormous degree of 
suffering we can prevent by performing the second act, performing it 
is much better than performing the first act. Symmetrically, 
performing the first act is much worse than performing the second 
act, even though performing the first act is not bad in and of itself. 
According to Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak), if we choose to 
relieve the extreme suffering of one child as opposed to reliving the 
extreme suffering of a thousand children, then we do wrong because 
we do not use our capacity to minimise harm despite the fact that it 
is no costlier to us. Such a conclusion is surely correct.

	 Turning our attention to providing benefits, rather than 
preventing harm, suppose that we are to choose between 
entertaining a child (Erdem) and entertaining a thousand children 
(including Erdem) in a theatre hall. This is again a no-conflict case. 
All else being equal, it is no costlier to us to perform the better act 
which is entertaining a thousand children. The amount of pleasant 
feelings that a thousand children could get out of being entertained 
clearly surpasses the amount of pleasant feelings that a single child 
could get out of being entertained. Entertaining one child is not bad 
in and of itself. But entertaining a thousand children against 
entertaining one child is much better and thus the latter is much 
worse. Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) suggests that it is wrong 
to entertain one child if we could entertain a thousand children 
provided that is it no costlier to us. While there can be occasions 
where we grant the conclusion that not maximising good is wrong, 
asserting that it is wrong to entertain a child rather than an audience 
of thousand children is less appealing than asserting that it is wrong 
to provide medication to relieve the extreme suffering of one child 
rather than a thousand children. Presumably, for many, Avoid 
121
Gratuitous Worseness (weak) has more force when applied to 
minimising harm cases in contrast to maximising good cases. 
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	 Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) could also be applied to 
extreme poverty because interventions are usually targeted to 
address harms to fundamental interests, and there are different 
degrees of effectiveness. Many would find addressing extreme 
poverty as a minimising harm case. Nonetheless, one may argue 
that unlike the cases presented above, in the case of extreme 
poverty, minimising harm often becomes maximising good over the 
long-term where the distinction between them gradually fades away. 
After all, addressing malnutrition, curing diseases, repairing slums 
and combatting with the lack of education not only eliminates or 
otherwise reduces existing suffering but also prevents future 
suffering while increasing the welfare of the extremely poor over 
time. Even if we do not buy this argument, we could still find Avoid 
Gratuitous Worseness (weak) applicable to extreme poverty with its 
full strength due to the existence of interventions resulting in harm 
reduction for the extremely poor.





	By having two versions of Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak), one for harm 121
minimisation and one for good maximisation, we may avoid the implication of 
Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) that it is wrong to not maximise good. The 
one for harm minimisation can be the same as the current form of Avoid 
Gratuitous Worseness (weak). The one for good maximisation could state that 
"It is morally preferable to perform an act that is much better than another, if it 
is no costlier to you to perform the better act, and if all other things are equal". 
Solely in good maximisation cases, it would entail that performing the better 
act is morally preferable but not performing it is not wrong. In that respect, 
entertaining a thousand children rather than one child is morally preferable but 
entertaining a child rather than a thousand children is not wrong. We could 
also find cases where failing to maximise good is wrong but such a principle 
would at least recognise that not all cases of failing to maximise good are 
wrong.
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Malaria Vaccine. Three researchers are independently 
working to invent a malaria vaccine to use in the 
regions where many of the extremely poor are living. 
After relevant tests, they finalise their research and 
decide to present their findings. It turns out that the 
first researcher has invented a malaria vaccine which 
provides one-year immunisation, the second 
researcher has invented a malaria vaccine which 
provides five-year immunisation, and the third 
researcher has invented a malaria vaccine which 
provides ten-year immunisation. They will choose a 
vaccine to distribute. All else is equal.

	 Which vaccine should they distribute? There would hardly be 
a discussion about this. The vaccine which provides ten-year 
immunisation against malaria is far better in improving and saving 
the lives of the extremely poor. Any position defending the 
distribution of the vaccines which respectively provide one-year 
immunisation and five-year immunisation is unreasonable given 
what is at stake. As the researchers decide to distribute the vaccine 
which provides ten-year immunisation, they choose the effective 
vaccine with respect to the impact on the welfare of the extremely 
poor.

	 Also, imagine the following:

Malaria Charities. With a given unit of resource, Charity 
A prevents one extremely poor person from 
contracting malaria, Charity B prevents two extremely 
poor from contracting malaria, Charity C prevents ten 
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extremely poor from contracting malaria, Charity D 
prevents a hundred extremely poor from contracting 
malaria, and Charity E prevents a thousand extremely 
poor from contracting malaria. The difference in the 
impact of charities lies in differences concerning the 
drugs used, personnel productivity, and overhead 
costs.

	 Suppose that this is a no-conflict case. Which charity should 
we donate to? Given the consequences, we should donate to 
Charity E. In both Malaria Vaccines and Malaria Charities, the nature 
of the decision that we are making is identical: we are deciding 
between improving more lives and improving fewer lives, and saving 
more lives and saving fewer lives. It is unreasonably arbitrary to 
choose anything other than Charity E to donate to, especially if we 
have initially thought that the vaccine which provides ten-year 
immunisation should be distributed. Avoid Gratuitous Worseness 
(weak) would also require us to do the same.

	 Similar to Malaria Charities, choosing a charity over another 
charity for extreme poverty alleviation is almost never costlier to us. 
We are donating to improve or save the lives of those who we do not 
know. Via reading bulletins, taking a look at photos and watching 
informative videos online, we interact with the regions we have never 
been to. In that respect, we can easily comply with what Avoid 
Gratuitous Worseness (weak) requires, that is, donating to effective 
charities for extreme poverty alleviation.

	 Nonetheless, one might may point out the realistic possibility 
that donating to effective charities for extreme poverty alleviation 
could sometimes be slightly costlier to ourselves. Consider a conflict 
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case this time. Think of two rich business people who are 
emotionally connected to their native countries and want to address 
extreme poverty there. Rather than choosing the effective charities 
which target the extremely poor living in the other regions of the 
world, they instead want to donate to the ordinary charities which 
improve and save the lives of the extremely poor living in their native 
countries. With the donation that they are willing to make, they could 
provide 10 children in their native country with the necessary 
nutrition, while an effective charity could provide 100 children in 
another country with the necessary nutrition. There is a tenfold 
difference between charities. Choosing the effective charity over 
choosing the other charity would render the businesspeople mildly 
discontent. This draws our attention to Avoid Gratuitous Worseness 
(still pretty weak):

Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (still pretty weak). It is 
wrong to perform an act that is much worse than 
another, if it is slightly costlier to you to perform the 
better act, and if all other things are equal. 
122
	 In fact, the slight cost incurred by the businesspeople comes 
out of an intervention not being "value-effective".  According to 123
Amy Berg, value-effectiveness means being ". . .effective at 
promoting, securing, or maximising some value. 'Value' is more 
broadly construed than 'impartial good': people value art, political 
power, and community, even when they are known to contribute 
	Pummer, 93.122
	Amy Berg, "Effective Altruism: How Big Should the Tent Be?," Public Affairs 123
Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2018): 270.
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very little to the impartial good".  Even though donating to effective 124
charity is "overall-effective" (or, in my terms, effective), that is, being 
"effective at promoting, securing, or maximising the impartial good", 
it is not value-effective in this example because the businesspeople 
would not act on their values that they deem important if they 
donate to the effective charity.  Nevertheless, the moral value of 125
the mild discontent that the businesspeople receive from donating 
to effective charity cannot trump the moral value of the tenfold 
advantage that the extremely poor would receive from the effective 
charity. Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (still pretty weak) is plausible in 
this example. 
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	 In the context of extreme poverty, the outcome-based 
principle for effectiveness is simple, clear and plausible: we have the 
ability to improve and save the lives of the many against the few by 
donating to effective charities, and on the basis of that, we ought to 
choose the effective charities to donate to if we do not incur an 
additional cost or an additional unbearable cost.





The Careless Driver. Causing near-fatal injuries, a 
careless driver who is on the phone hits a pedestrian. 
	Berg, 270.124
	Berg, 269.125
	Before this example, I have always used no-conflict cases. But this is a con126 -
flict case and I have not yet justified why we should help 100 extremely poor 
rather than 10 extremely poor. I will thoroughly discuss no-conflict cases in 
§3.4. For the sake of the argument, accept that it is right to donate to the 
charity which helps 100 extremely poor. The purpose of this particular ex-
ample is to show the possibility of slight costs.
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There is no fault of the pedestrian and the fault lies 
entirely with the careless driver. The pedestrian has to 
be taken to a hospital.

	 A relationship which was previously absent has now been 
formed between the careless driver and the pedestrian. The careless 
driver owes compensation to the pedestrian. Compensation can 
take different forms such as making sure that the pedestrian is 
treated and cared for, an apology, and the relevant legal charges.

	 The careless driver is about to call an ambulance and choose 
one of the available hospitals: Hospital A, Hospital B and Hospital C, 
all of which the careless driver is well-informed about. They are 
equally close to the scene of the accident. Having exceptionally 
clean facilities, top-notch technology and caring personnel, Hospital 
A is stellar. Hospital B is mediocre with its modest facilities and 
average technology. Awaiting to be demolished and reconstructed, 
Hospital C is fifty-years-old, crumbling and overcrowded, and its 
personnel is very impatient towards patients. As the treatment cost 
is equal in all of the three hospitals, the careless driver will pay the 
same price in any of the hospitals—it is no costlier to the careless 
driver to choose any of the hospitals over others. Which hospital 
should the driver choose to take the pedestrian to?

	 Acknowledging that the pedestrian will be better cared for in 
Hospital A, the careless driver would fulfil their obligation of 
compensation better than any other option by sending the 
pedestrian there. Since the fault lies entirely with the careless driver, 
and since the accident should not have happened in the first place, 
it is the obligation of the careless driver to make sure that the 
pedestrian is treated as soon as possible and as good as possible. 
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We can draw a principle from the conclusion, namely, the Better 
Fulfilment Principle (weakest).

The Better Fulfilment Principle (weakest). If one is 
assigned with an obligation, then one has to choose 
the option which best fulfils it, provided that it is no 
costlier to oneself.

	 The Better Fulfilment Principle (weakest) has three criteria. 
The first is to have been assigned with an obligation. The second is 
to have at least two comparable options to be weighed against each 
other through which the better option could be identified. The third 
is that the better option does not bring about an additional cost to 
oneself.

	 We can have two further versions of the Better Fulfilment 
Principle.

The Better Fulfilment Principle (weak). If one is 
assigned with an obligation, then one has to choose 
the option which best fulfils it, even if it is slightly 
costlier to oneself.

The Better Fulfilment Principle (moderate). If one is 
assigned with an obligation, then one has to choose 
the option which best fulfils it, even if it is moderately 
costlier to oneself.

	 In The Careless Driver, the Better Fulfilment Principle (weak) 
would still make sense. For instance, even if the careless driver had 
128
had to spend an extra hour with the boring paperwork in Hospital A 
compared to Hospital B and Hospital C, the Better Fulfilment 
Principle (weak) would remain attractive. Nevertheless, I am agnostic 
about the Better Fulfilment Principle (moderate). Assume that the 
careless driver had had to spend all of their savings to get the 
pedestrian treated in Hospital A, and as a result of it, their children 
would have had to study in a considerably lower-quality high school. 
If that constitutes a moderate cost, then I would be inclined to 
accept that the careless driver could permissibly take the pedestrian 
to Hospital B which does not have that cost but yields a longer 
recovery time for the pedestrian, provided that the life of the 
pedestrian will be saved and there will be no permanent and 
unmanageable injuries. As another example, if the careless driver 
had had to suspend their leisure habit of travelling around Asia for 
the following two years, and if that brings about a moderate cost, 
then I would be inclined to assign the careless driver the obligation 
to get the pedestrian treated in Hospital A rather than Hospital B 
even though it is moderately costlier for the careless driver. As 
demonstrated by the latter example, the Better Fulfilment Principle 
(moderate) may not always be desirable. The harms brought about 
by a moderate cost may outweigh the harms brought about by not 
choosing the better option, where the obligation to choose the 
better option may be cancelled out. Likewise, the moral value of 
what is being lost due to a moderate cost may outweigh the moral 
value of choosing the better option, where the obligation to choose 
the better option may again be cancelled out. In that respect, given 
the variety and fluidity of moderate costs, one has to review the 
Better Fulfilment Principle (moderate) on a case-by-case basis.
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	 The Better Fulfilment Principle is an obligation-based 
principle buttressing the Effectiveness Principle, whose scope also 
covers extreme poverty. In Chapter 2, I argued that some 
individuals' responsibility to address extreme poverty comes from 
the fact that they have deepened extreme poverty, they have 
unjustly benefited from extreme poverty, or their luckiness has lead 
to others' unluckiness where the problem of desert emerges. In 
other words, they have a moral obligation to alleviate extreme 
poverty because they have to repair what they have caused. The 
Better Fulfilment Principle gains prominence here. With a given unit 
of resource, effective charities benefit a greater number of the 
extremely poor or they benefit a given number of extremely poor 
more. By choosing to donate to effective charities rather than 
donating to ordinary charities, individuals would fulfil their obligation 
better. Effectiveness is not only compatible with the Better Fulfilment 
Principle but it could also be an essential component of it in some 
cases like this. Note that while outcome-based principles like Avoid 
Gratuitous Worseness which underpin the Effectiveness Principle are 
unbounded, the Better Fulfilment Principle is bound by our moral 
obligations. Therefore, it should be especially attractive for non-
consequentialists who doubt that we have a general obligation to do 
good, or do the most good.

	 Consider plutocrats who have been born into very rich 
families and live extravagant lives. The plutocrats soon inherit the 
wealth of their families and start to extract natural resources by 
making contracts with violent groups in South America. The natural 
resources which benefit the extremely poor are gradually depleted, 
the violent groups oppress the extremely poor, and the extremely 
poor become even more deprived. As a result, the plutocrats make 
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even more money. Although the plutocrats have a legal right to 
control their wealth, they should not be regarded as having a moral 
right to it. Given that they did not deserve their money in the first 
place and dramatically exacerbated the conditions of the extremely 
poor, they have a moral obligation to redistribute most of their 
wealth to alleviate extreme poverty. In doing so, by appealing to the 
Better Fulfilment Principle, we could say that they have a moral 
obligation to alleviate extreme poverty effectively where they have to 
find cost-effective solutions to address extreme poverty. By 
choosing the effective options, they have the chance to rectify more 
of their harms as opposed to other options: the Better Fulfilment 
Principle necessitates such a conclusion.

	 Now, leave the plutocrats example behind and focus on the 
idea that some individuals are assigned with an obligation to 
alleviate extreme poverty. As I stated in the previous section, it is 
rarely costlier for individuals to choose effective charities over 
ordinary charities. There may be cases in which it is slightly costlier 
to them, but the obligation still stands given the severity of extreme 
poverty. However, if there is a moderate cost, then we can discuss 
whether the Better Fulfilment Principle still stands concerning the 
extent and the nature of that moderate cost. I would be very 
sceptical of the idea that not donating to ordinary charities and 
instead donating to effective charities comes with a strong or 
extreme additional cost. It is safe to suppose that it is either no 
costlier or slightly costlier to choose effective charities over ordinary 
charities on most occasions, and the Better Fulfilment Principle is 
still relevant to fulfilling the obligation to alleviate extreme poverty.
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	 Once we start to move from the weaker versions to the 
stronger versions of the Better Fulfilment Principle, the cost incurred 
naturally increases. Consider the following:

The Better Fulfilment Principle (strong). If one is 
assigned with an obligation, then one has to choose 
the better option in fulfilling it, even if it is much costlier 
to oneself.

The Better Fulfilment Principle (extreme). If one is 
assigned with an obligation, then one has to choose 
the better option in fulfilling it, even if it is extremely 
costlier to oneself.

	 The obligation-based nature of the Better Fulfilment Principle 
may seem to be tarnished because we increasingly feel the urge to 
compare the potential individual cost incurred with the potential 
benefit of fulfilling the obligation to alleviate extreme poverty. We 
may also need to take into account the inability of fulfilling 
obligations other than alleviating extreme poverty when the cost 
becomes high. Nevertheless, justifying effectiveness through an 
obligation-based principle such as the Better Fulfilment Principle is 
different from justifying effectiveness through an outcome-based 
principle such as Avoid Gratuitous Worseness in one vital way: the 
driving force to assign an obligation out of an obligation-based 
principle to someone is not about achieving unbounded impartial 
goodness. In justifying effectiveness through an obligation-based 
principle, we appeal to the pre-formed relationship between 
individuals as obligation-bearers and the relevant beneficiaries on 
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the basis of the values such as the moral importance of fairness, 
compensation and restitution, along with solidarity and empathy. 
Note that such a relationship has not been formed between parties 
in Avoid Gratuitous Worseness—it is only built upon utility analysis.

	 The importance of the Better Fulfilment Principle I formulated 
here is that it shows that effectiveness can be harmonious with 
deontological approaches. Contrary to the general view that 
effectiveness is exclusively tied to outcome-based theories like 
utilitarianism and consequentialism, effectiveness can be merged 
with deontological theories. However, one limitation of the Better 
Fulfilment Principle is that it is only applicable to individuals who 
already owe some of their wealth to others. If one does not owe their 
wealth to others, then the Best Fulfilment Principle does not apply to 
them. Nevertheless, there are many individuals who are living in rich 
societies who owe some of their wealth to the extremely poor so the 
obligation-based principle for effectiveness should be applicable to 
a meaningful number of individuals in the world. This particular 
limitation of the Better Fulfilment Principle also has its advantage: as 
mentioned before, the Better Fulfilment Principle escapes the idea 
that we must always limitlessly do the best thing, which many non-
consequentialists would reject.

3.4	 Effectiveness and fairness

	 As stated in §3.1, the Effectiveness Principle suggests that 
individuals ought to choose the effective option in preventing very 
bad things. Effective altruism owes its novelty largely to its 
adherence to the Effectiveness Principle. Nevertheless, when we 
accept the Effectiveness Principle, we confront an inevitable 
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question: should effective altruism always ask individuals to follow 
the Effectiveness Principle?

	 My response has two aspects, outlined and explored in 
§3.4.1 and §3.4.2, respectively. 

	 In §3.4.1, I demonstrate that always subscribing to 
effectiveness can unjustly favour the well-off. By showing that 
lifetime fairness of welfare is violated, I argue that we should not 
always choose effectiveness over fairness. Moreover, always 
choosing effectiveness over fairness can buttress the Unjustly 
Gained Advantages Multiplier which morally permits benefiting those 
who have unjustly gained advantages if they are in a position to 
have better lives, even though their being in this position stems from 
their unjustly gained advantages. Furthermore, always choosing 
effectiveness over fairness may result in providing tiny benefits to a 
large number of well-off in contrast to providing massive benefits to 
a small number of worst-off.

	 In §3.4.2, I point to the tensions between effectiveness and 
fairness. I now focus on another type of fairness, namely, selection 
fairness which is giving equal chances of being helped.  By turning 127
to the discussion related to numbers and the distribution of benefits 
and burdens, I show that the case for effectiveness may strengthen 
or weaken with population size. The same applies to fairness. I 
expose the potential conflicts between different moral commitments 
to which effective altruists should pay attention to before endorsing 
effectiveness at the cost of all other values. 
128
	Giving equal chances to be helped could include (1) giving equal chances to 127
everyone where one of them or some of them will be saved, or (2) giving equal 
chances to everyone where one's life or the lives of some will be improved.
	 I still follow the standard position of effective altruism that effectiveness is 128
QALY maximisation.
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3.4.1	Unjustly favouring the well-off

	 Effectiveness can sometimes unjustly favour the well-off, 
which is against lifetime fairness of welfare. Before explaining what 
lifetime fairness of welfare is, consider Treatments as an example.

Treatments. We have a finite amount of resources 
which will be spent on treating either Aspen or Blair. 
Having benefited from the immense privileges of the 
surrounding conditions since childhood, Aspen is quite 
a well-off person. Nevertheless, Aspen suffers from a 
non-lethal condition which drastically decreases 
mobility, creates shortness of breath and leads to 
severe tiredness. Having been born into extreme 
poverty, Blair suffers from the same condition. If we 
use our resources to treat Aspen, then Aspen will fully 
recover. Aspen's life will be full of happiness and 
fulfilment. Likewise, if we use our resources to treat 
Blair, then Blair will fully recover. Nevertheless, Blair's 
life will still be very difficult under the conditions of 
extreme poverty. Both of their lives have been and will 
be worth living. We have to choose one of them as we 
cannot use our scarce resources to treat both of them. 
As this is a non-lethal condition, the unchosen one will 
still live but will continue to suffer from this condition. 
All else is equal.
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	 Aspen has benefited from the wonders of life much more than 
Blair as Aspen has had the chance of experiencing worldly 
pleasures, received adequate healthcare and proper education, and 
gained the other advantages with which life endows the well-off. 
Moreover, Aspen would be better cared for before and after the 
diagnosis as Aspen has a highly effective support network and does 
not need to worry about making ends meet. Assuming that Aspen 
will keep living as a well-off person and that Blair will remain 
extremely poor, thanks to the treatment, saving Aspen will produce 
more QALYs than saving Blair. Once we embrace the standard 
understanding of effectiveness that effective altruism adheres to, 
which is QALY maximisation, we notice that treating Aspen is more 
effective than Blair.

	 By pointing out that effective altruism is primarily interested in 
helping the worst-off including the extremely poor, one may resist 
the idea that it would find treating Aspen more effective than Blair. 
But effective altruism is primarily interested in helping them not 
because it is sufficientarian, prioritarian or egalitarian in spirit. It is 
because the wealth, health, and resources gaps between the worst-
off and the well-off are so high that the same amount of resources 
usually bring about much more benefit to the former. There is no 
underlying moral commitment of effective altruism to benefit the 
worst-off whenever it can. Effective altruism is much more aligned 
with effectiveness, understood as maximising benefit. As William 
MacAskill makes clear: "As I and the Centre for Effective Altruism 
define it, effective altruism is the project of using evidence and 
reason to figure out how to benefit others as much as possible, and 
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taking action on that basis".  Revisiting some of the past 129
definitions of effective altruism and finding this closest to the one 
commonly preferred, MacAskill concludes that effective altruism is 
"(i) the use of evidence and careful reasoning to work out how to 
maximize the good with a given unit of resources, tentatively 
understanding 'the good' in impartial welfarist terms, and (ii) the use 
of the findings from (i) to try to improve the world".  Indeed, there 130
is no mention of benefiting the worst-off but benefiting people 
whomever they are as long as they are benefited as much as 
possible. The reason why effective altruists currently focus on 
extreme poverty is that curing preventable diseases affecting the 
worst-off is quite cheap compared to curing the diseases that are 
contracted by the well-off for the same amount of welfare gain in 
terms of QALYs. For instance, Ord highlights the empirical research 
done on different interventions against HIV/AIDS. By comparing 
surgical treatment for Kaposi's sarcoma, antiretroviral therapy, 
prevention of transmission during pregnancy, condom distribution, 
and the education for high-risk groups, Ord states that "In total, the 
best of these interventions is estimated to be 1,400 times as cost-
effectiveness [sic] as the least good, or more than 1,400 times better 
than it would need to be to be funded in rich countries".  Then, 131
Ord argues that 

	William MacAskill, "Effective Altruism: Introduction," Essays in Philosophy 18, 129
no. 1 (2017): 2.
	William MacAskill, "The Definition of Effective Altruism," in Effective Altruism: 130
Philosophical Issues, eds. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (New York: 
Oxford University, 2019), 14.
	Toby Ord, "The Moral Imperative toward Cost-Effectiveness in Global Health," 131
in Priority-Setting in Health: Building institutions for smarter public spending 
(Center for Global Development, 2012), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/
files/1427016_file_moral_imperative_cost_effectiveness.pdf.
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People who decide how to spend health budgets hold 
the lives or livelihoods of many other people in their 
hands. They are literally making life-or-death decisions. 
Most decisions of this sort take dramatically 
insufficient account of cost-effectiveness. As a result, 
thousands or millions of people die who otherwise 
would have lived. The few are saved at the expense of 
the many. 
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	 Ord's conclusion does not imply that we should benefit the 
worst-off because of fairness. It entails that we should benefit them 
because of utility.

	 An effective altruist who always prioritises effectiveness 
would subscribe to the idea that treating Aspen instead of Blair is 
justified. This should remind us of the "Benefit" approach regarding 
the usage of resources: "[P]articular individuals on one side stand to 
benefit from the resource so much more than those on the other 
side that it justifies their getting the resource".  However, such a 133
position violates fairness as we are favouring a well-off person as 
opposed to a person who is among the worst-off. Moreover, taken 
to its extreme, if we know that addressing the problems of the well-
off creates higher overall welfare gain, then always subscribing to 
effectiveness would permit us to benefit the well-off whenever it is 
the case so regardless of how severely we violated fairness.

	Ord, 9.132
	Andrew Stark, "Benefit versus Numbers versus Helping the Worst-off: An 133
Alternative to the Prevalent Approach to the Just Distribution of Resources," 
Utilitas 20, no. 3 (2018): 356.
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	 Here, the type of fairness that I am appealing to is based on 
the lifetime view formulated by Daniel Sharp and Joseph Millum.  134
The lifetime view has three assumptions. The first assumption is that 
people's whole lives as units of moral concern have primacy over 
the temporal parts of their lives. Sharp and Millum state that "If the 
proper locus of moral concern is indeed persons, rather than 
populations or life-stages within a person, then we ought to be 
concerned with the lives of individuals as a whole".  To support 135
this assumption, they draw attention to the accumulation of 
disadvantages: those who have the greatest disadvantages are 
regarded as the worst-off, and we determine them by looking at their 
complete lives rather than life-stages since only looking at their 
specific life-stages may mislead us. The second assumption is that 
any advantage or disadvantage matters regardless of when it 
happens. Put differently, past advantages and past disadvantages 
equally morally matter as future advantages and future 
disadvantages, all else being equal. The third assumption is that a 
disadvantage at some point in the past can be compensated for by 
an advantage at some point in the future. For instance, "[S]omeone 
may take on additional shifts at an unpleasant job in order to save 
money for a more comfortable retirement". 
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	 The lifetime view yields us what I call lifetime fairness of 
welfare. According to lifetime fairness of welfare, provided that none 
of the parties has deserved their positions, it is unfair to further 
benefit those who have experienced relatively high levels of lifetime 
	Daniel Sharp and Joseph Millum, "Prioritarianism for Global Health 134
Investments: Identifying the Worst Off," Journal of Applied Philosophy 35, no. 
1 (2018): 112-132.
	Sharp and Millum, 115-116.135
	Sharp and Millum, 116.136
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welfare over those who have experienced relatively low levels of 
lifetime welfare.  It is especially pressing in the cases of choosing 137
whether to benefit the well-off or the worst-off. In our case, it is 
unfair to benefit Aspen because he has had strikingly higher lifetime 
welfare compared with Blair's lifetime welfare. If we are to treat 
Aspen and Blair with equal concern, then we have to help Blair. 
Such a conclusion entails that treating Aspen rather than Blair 
violates lifetime fairness of welfare.

	 Relatedly, choosing effectiveness in Treatments and treating 
Aspen result in discriminating against the worst-off just because 
they are less able to receive more welfare than they currently do. 
Practically, it means that we are putting an extra burden to those 
who have already been undeservingly burdened much more than 
others. The non-linkage principle encapsulates the worry that I am 
hinting at here. According to Kamm, "Linkage means that what 
happens to me at t1 affects what will happen at t2. It accounts for 
those who have, getting more and those who do not have, not 
	One weakness of this approach is that we may prefer benefiting to someone 137
whose overall disadvantage is slightly greater than someone who has just 
recently started to suffer from some extreme disadvantage such as extreme 
pain. In that case, we would not take the presence of the extreme pain into 
account just because that person has had a slightly greater overall advantage 
in their lifetime. But, surely, the suffering experience of that person is 
unbearable. That is why Sharp and Millum has developed a revised account of 
the lifetime view: "According to this revised conception of the lifetime view, the 
value of providing a benefit to someone depends on both the level of 
disadvantage in her life overall and the degree to which she is disadvantaged 
at the time that she is benefited. The lower someone's overall advantage 
would be without intervention, the more important it is to increase her overall 
advantage. Likewise, the lower a person's advantage would be at a time, the 
more important it is to increase her advantage at that time." in Sharp and 
Millum, 116. A similar stance has been taken as to whether we should 
distribute even the trivial benefits to the worst-off at the expense of 
distributing great benefits to others in need: refer to Tyler M. John, Joseph 
Millum and David Wasserman, "How to Allocate Scarce Health Resources 
without Discriminating Against People with Disabilities," Economics and 
Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2017): 17.
140
getting".  Hence, if some undeserved bad thing happened to 138
someone, we would not normally use this fact to put a further 
burden on them, provided that we follow the non-linkage principle. 
Brock reformulates the non-linkage principle as the following:

I would reformulate [the non-linkage] principle a bit 
more precisely as: we should not use a person's 
undeserved or unjustified disadvantages as the 
grounds or basis for choosing to impose a further 




	 Treating Aspen rather than Blair violates the non-linkage 
principle. Surely, Blair has not deserved the disadvantages, namely, 
the conditions of extreme poverty, which bring about the inability of 
receiving the same amount of welfare gain per unit of resources that 
Aspen would receive thanks to the treatment. Put differently, opting 
for effectiveness imposes a further disadvantage on Blair here: we 
would be unjustly discriminating against Blair and unjustly favouring 
Aspen just because Blair has been affected by negative 
consequences which impede Blair's potential to receive as much 
welfare as Aspen. Drifting further us away from fairness, this does 
not strike me as a moral inclination to embrace.

	 Moreover, favouring the well-off through only focusing on 
effectiveness may also entail being wilfully or unwilfully ignorant 
about how advantages have been brought about: perhaps some of 
	Frances Kamm, "Deciding Whom to Help, Health-Adjusted Life Years and 138
Disabilities," in Public Health, Ethics, and Equity, eds. Sudhir Anand, Fabienne 
Peter, and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University, 2004), 240.
	Dan W. Brock, "Cost-effectiveness and Disability Discrimination," Economics 139
and Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2009): 35.
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the well-off have accumulated tremendous wealth through the 
exploitation of others, degradation of natural resources and tax 
evasion which can easily translate into a capability to have a better 
life. However, that capability to have a better life is unjustly gained 
out of morally impermissible actions. In that vein, opting for 
effectiveness alone may mean subscribing to the Unjustly Gained 
Advantages Multiplier.

Unjustly Gained Advantages Multiplier. We should 
prioritise allocating our resources to benefit those who 
have unjustly gained advantages if they are more 
capable to have better lives, even though their 
capability stems from their unjustly gained advantages.

	 This is an implausible principle. By allocating our resources 
so as to prioritise benefiting those who have unjustly gained 
advantages, we multiply their advantages. Even if we condemn the 
intentions behind and the processes of unjust gains, we justify the 
consequences of unjust gains as long as we opt for the Unjustly 
Gained Advantages Multiplier Principle. We must view ourselves as 
required to allocate our resources to rich and devil-may-care 
dictators, healthy but greedy polluters who sit on the executive 
committees of multinational corporations, and self-indulgent arms 
traffickers over allocating our resources to the worst-off. If 
effectiveness is the only concern, then favouring the well-off may be 
said to intentionally or unintentionally perpetuate the advantages 
that the well-off have gained unjustly in the first place.

	 By showing that some effective options owe their 
effectiveness to ineffective distributions of utility which stem from 
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ineffective distributions of wealth, it can be made clear that only 
caring about effectiveness is wrong. Now, think of Aspen as 
someone who has had the ability to alleviate extreme poverty but 
refused to do so to receive some infinitesimal pleasures (at the 
moment of experiencing them) which slowly but incrementally 
increased the quality of Aspen's life over the decades. Aspen has 
also gotten rich partly because of not donating, and if Aspen had 
consistently donated over the decades, Aspen would have not 
reached the same amount of overall welfare that Aspen now has. 
Aspen would have had lower welfare, though still sufficiently large to 
have a very high-quality life. The current distribution of wealth and 
utility where Aspen has not donated is ineffective because the 
alternative where Aspen had donated would have significantly 
improved the welfare of thousands of people, dramatically 
exceeding the total utility that Aspen has had gained so far. 
Permitting favouring Aspen in Treatments would signify that we 
could permissibly base our decision to choose the effective option 
(treating Aspen) on pre-existing ineffectiveness (Aspen's refusal to 
donate). Relatedly, this pre-existing ineffectiveness was caused by 
Aspen alone, and not by someone else or luck. If we think that 
treating Aspen is a plausible option because it is the current 
effective option, then it means that neither the existence of pre-
existing ineffectiveness nor who was responsible in causing it and 
benefiting from it should inform our decision-making process. We 
are forced to make decisions on effectiveness due to the ineffective 
distribution.

	 For a considerable number of consequentialists, by refusing 
to donate and hence receiving accumulative infinitesimal pleasures, 
Aspen has violated the obligation to maximise utility. Failing to 
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maximise utility has led to an ineffective distribution of utility. 
Deciding to treat Aspen just because it is the current effective option 
means that we justify the consequences of a pre-existing ineffective 
distribution from which Aspen has greatly benefited. Some 
consequentialists may be tempted to call for a compensation of 
utility to fix the ineffective distribution that Aspen has caused, which 
may take the form of redistributing Aspen's wealth and, in our case, 
treating Blair instead of Aspen. In other words, some 
consequentialists may be tempted to opt for lifetime effectiveness of 
utility (instead of lifetime fairness of welfare) where future 
effectiveness of utility is partly or mostly denied to those who have 
failed to maximise utility and benefited from the ineffective 
distribution of welfare that they have caused in the past. In that 
case, we could choose the other option which is treating Blair 
because we would deny future effectiveness of utility to Aspen. That 
results in choosing the ineffective option in Treatments but it has a 
compensatory effect on pre-existing ineffectiveness of utility: not 
only those causing and benefiting from ineffective distributions are 
not collecting the rewards, but also the parties who were wronged 
and harmed as a result of ineffectiveness in the past are receiving 
their due share at last. In some cases, choosing to treat Blair may be 
more effective than choosing to treat Aspen, because effectiveness 
is now considered on a three-factor scale (past-present-future) 
rather than on a two-factor scale (present-future) where the pre-
existing ineffectiveness is also considered alongside current and 
future effectiveness. Put simply, this idea denies that current and 
forward-looking QALYs are what only matters because it also takes 
into account the past distribution of QALYs, that is, backward-
looking QALYs. If choosing to compensate for the pre-existing 
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ineffectiveness is not effective over the long-run, one may still find 
doing it, and thus satisfying lifetime effectiveness of utility, morally 
preferable over not doing it.  This train of thought still contains 140
some deontic concerns but at least it is still based on effectiveness 
and utility.

	 Treatments is a case where we compare the interests of the 
well-off with the interests of the worst-off and there is an equal 
stake, that is, recovering from the same illness. But what if the 
numbers are not equal and there are unequal stakes?

3.4.2	Unequal stakes and unrestricted aggregation

	 This theme where there are unequal stakes has come up 
again and again in the literature, usually in the form of comparing the 
interests of people who do not have morally relevant differences. In 
this kind of case, the issue boils down to the plausibility of 
unrestricted aggregation where we are asked to ponder over 
whether tiny improvements in the lives of a large number of people 
could be justified at the cost of the massive improvements in the 
lives of a small number of people. Among those who find this 
implausible are non-aggregationists or anti-additive aggregationists. 
What particularly makes the aggregation problem interesting and 
important in the case of effective altruism and extreme poverty is 
that effectiveness coupled with unrestricted aggregation may allow 
the minor interests of the well-off to outweigh the basic or 
fundamental interests of the worst-off. If we could avert the loss of 
	Not complying with the lifetime effectiveness of utility may be permissible in 140
some circumstances where the gap between the effective and the ineffective 
option is outstandingly high and there are other morally relevant factors to 
consider, but in Treatments, it is not the case.
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more QALYs with the same amount of resource by donating to bring 
about tiny improvements in the lives of many well-off people, then 
why should we donate to significantly improve the lives of a small 
number of the worst-off? This would be even more controversial 
than defending distributing tiny improvements to a large number of 
people at the cost of distributing massive improvements to a small 
number of people where people do not have morally relevant 
differences, because this time effectiveness would disregard the 
morally relevant differences between the well-off and the worst-off 
and yet ask us to bring about tiny improvements in the lives of the 
well-off. If true, effective altruism could be severely damaged by this 
conclusion.

	 One objection which has already been considered in 
Treatments is that donating to improve the lives of the extremely 
poor is much more effective than donating to improving the lives of 
the well-off in the real world. But we can present a case where it is 
the opposite. Consider Charity and Museum.

Charity. We have a £10,000 to donate. We could 
donate our money to a charity which provides a basic 
income to 10 extremely poor people for a year, that is, 
£1,000 per person for a year. With this type of support, 
10 extremely poor people will not starve and lead 
healthier, more secure lives. Moreover, they will be able 
to commute to other regions to find sustainable 
employment over the long-term. Donating to that 
charity will result in massive improvements in the lives 
of 10 extremely poor people.
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Museum. We have a £10,000 to donate. We can 
donate it to an art museum which will replace its chairs 
with slightly more comfortable chairs. The museum has 
a budget deficit of £10,000—it has made every effort 
to raise resources, and collected a great amount of 
money through private donors and crowdsourcing, but 
exhausted all of its options. If we donate our money to 
the museum, the time spent in the museum by 
hundreds, thousands and even hundreds of thousands 
of people over the long-term will increase thanks to the 
slightly more comfortable chairs. As engaging with art 
increases welfare, a large number of well-off individuals 
will have tiny improvements in their lives. Moreover, 
people will also slightly be more comfortable when 
resting, thinking or examining the artworks. Its visitors 
will disproportionately be well-off and the extremely 
poor do not have any chance to visit the museum.

	 Donating to the charity will avert a great deal of QALY loss for 
10 extremely poor people. For those 10 extremely poor people, 
receiving £1,000 per person means an opportunity to start a new life 
where they no longer suffer from the vicious cycle of deprivation. In 
contrast, donating to the museum will not save the worst-off from 
misery but it will bring about tiny improvements in the lives of many 
well-off individuals because of new chairs. Donating to the museum 
will also produce a very high amount of QALYs over the very long-
term.

	 Surprisingly, given the many tiny improvements in the lives of 
many well-off, donating £10,000 to the museum could be much 
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more effective than donating it to the charity. After all, the sum of the 
tiny improvements in the lives of hundreds of thousands of well-off 
can exceed the sum of the massive improvements in the lives of the 
10 extremely poor people. In other words, donating to the museum 
is more effective with respect to total utility in the world. 
Nonetheless, since the distribution per capita would be so tiny, the 
benefits to each person will be almost meaningless: well-off 
individuals will not experience a morally meaningful increase in their 
welfare, and those benefits would be in some sense wasted since 
we do not use our chance to bring about a morally meaningful 
increase by massively improving the lives of a small number of 
worst-off people. 

	 Obviously, effectiveness fails to establish a moral difference 
between favouring the well-off and the worst-off, even in the cases 
of unequal stakes. Once again, effectiveness unjustly favours the 
well-off because it does not put additional weight to the interests of 
the worst-off. It violates lifetime fairness of welfare in Museum. 
Violating lifetime fairness of welfare in Museum is perhaps more 
serious than violating lifetime fairness of welfare in Treatments: 
choosing effectiveness in the latter means that we choose to provide 
tiny improvements to a large number of well-off who have not 
deserved their positions whereas choosing effectiveness in the 
former means that we choose to provide a massive improvement to 
one person, Aspen, who has not deserved the favourable position 
either. In other words, we benefit starkly more individuals in Museum 
as opposed to Treatments who have not deserved their positions. 
Moreover, donating to the museum may easily result in Unjustly 
Gained Advantages Multiplier because there will presumably be 
some well-off individuals visiting the museum who owe their wealth, 
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welfare and privileges to unjust advantages. Solely subscribing to 
effectiveness may make us insensitive to the moral difference 
between helping the well-off and helping the worst-off.

	 Additionally, as it is the case in Museum, solely subscribing to 
effectiveness may lead to finding unrestricted aggregation plausible. 
The dilemma is this: if one always subscribes to effectiveness, then 
one has to accept unrestricted aggregation, or if one rejects 
unrestricted aggregation, then one cannot always subscribe to 
effectiveness. This is especially apparent in the cases like Museum. 
But unrestricted aggregation, at least in Museum, is implausible 
because the improvements in the lives of the well-off are almost 
unnoticeable yet effectiveness requires improving the lives of the 
well-off. Hence, Museum shows that always subscribing to 
effectiveness not only opts for improving the lives of the well-off but 
it also neglects the importance of how benefits are distributed 
because it only considers the amount of total benefit.

	 As we understand that effectiveness may lead to unjustly 
favouring the well-off through unrestricted aggregation, it is 
discernible that effective altruism risks requiring us to improve the 
lives of the well-off if it always chooses effectiveness over fairness. 
As shown in Treatments, effective altruism would require us to treat 
Aspen rather than Blair if treating the former is more effective than 
treating the latter. In that case, Kamm's non-linkage principle and 
lifetime fairness of welfare are violated, and the Unjustly Gained 
Advantages Multiplier may arise. Furthermore, in Charity and 
Museum, effective altruism is also susceptible to providing tiny 
benefits to a large number of well-off as opposed to providing 
massive benefits to a small number of worst-off in which it again 
violates lifetime fairness of welfare, may trigger Unjustly Gained 
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Advantages Multiplier and fails to establish a moral difference 
between helping the well-off and helping the worst-off.

	 In response, one might pinpoint the charities recommended 
by GiveWell to which effective altruists donate. They are not charities 
which improve the welfare of the well-off. In contrast, they are 
among the charities which contribute to ameliorating the conditions 
of the worst-off including the extremely poor. But, perhaps one day, 
charities recommended by GiveWell will require much more 
resources than now due to unprecedented costs such as problems 
in transportation, climate crisis or wars—or, the treatment costs of 
the life-threatening diseases and the serious non-life-threatening 
diseases affecting the well-off will be much cheaper thanks to the 
technological advancements. Obviously, current effectiveness does 
not guarantee future effectiveness. Moreover, in the case that 
effective altruism chooses to improve the lives of any well-off person 
over improving the lives of worst-off once it is found to be much 
more effective, effective altruism may inevitably support the Unjustly 
Gained Advantages Multiplier Principle. This would render effective 
altruism even more unconvincing.

	 Today, effective altruism focuses on the interventions which 
drastically improve the conditions of the worst-off including the 
extremely poor because these are effective. Tomorrow, it is uncertain 
that effective altruism is going to support those interventions when 
they become relatively ineffective when compared with the 
interventions affecting the lives of the well-off, unless effective 
altruism values fairness independently of effectiveness to some 
extent. The extent to which it should appeal to fairness is an open 
question. But one thing is for sure: avoiding such repugnant 
conclusions requires effective altruism to appeal to fairness where 
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there should be a readiness to prioritise improving the lives of the 
extremely poor than the lives of the well-off even if doing so is 
relatively ineffective.





	 So far, I have considered a particular type of fairness, namely, 
the lifetime fairness of welfare. Apart from the lifetime fairness of 
welfare, there is another type of fairness, known as selection 
fairness.  Selection fairness is fulfilled when each individual is 141
initially assigned the same chance to be helped. 
142
	 The moral value of effectiveness and the moral value of 
fairness could sometimes severely compete with each other. The 
former usually appeals to numbers where the concern is helping the 
greatest number or bringing about the greatest welfare gain. The 
latter usually appeals to deontic concerns like treating each person 
equally and showing due respect to people. It is important to show 
how effectiveness and fairness compete here, because it will inform 
our discussion about the plausibility of donating to effective charities 
rather than ordinary charities.

	 One of the main questions to consider is how we should treat 
numbers in choosing whom to help. The first position states that we 
	While selection fairness is usually the type of fairness that philosophers refer 141
to when discussing numbers and fairness, Gerald Lang wisely distinguishes it 
from outcome fairness. Outcome fairness is fulfilled when the distributed 
outcomes are identical. For the sake of my argument, I do not discuss 
outcome fairness. Refer to Gerald Lang, "Fairness in Life and Death Cases," 
Erkenntnis 62, no. 3 (2005): 321-351.
 From now on, whenever I appeal to fairness, I appeal to selection fairness as 142
opposed to the lifetime fairness of welfare.
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should always directly help the greatest number. In other words, 
when there are groups of unequal sizes and we cannot help them all, 
we should target the largest group. This is the standard act-
utilitarian position. For instance, Ben Bradley aims to show the 
strength of the first position by appealing to utilitarianism and 
contractualism.  This position is the standard position of effective 143
altruism as effectiveness is normally tied to helping the greatest 
number with scarce resources if they are equally badly off.

	 The second position holds that we should never directly help 
the greatest number and instead assign equal chances to all parties 
in need of help. The second position has sub-positions. One sub-
position is epitomised by the stance taken by John Taurek who 
argues that we have no grounds to save the greatest number and 
instead we should toss a coin as "it would seem to best express 
[our] equal concern and respect for each person".  Another sub-144
position makes a case for "the individualist lottery" where every 
claim is initially given equal weight but one's good luck can benefit 
the group that one is in.  Timmermann states that
145
To give the claims of A, B and C equal weight, a coin 
will not do. We need a wheel of fortune with three 
sectors, each of which bears the name of one islander. 
The person whose sector comes up is saved. If this 
person is A, both B and C perish. If B's sector is 
	Ben Bradley, "Saving People and Flipping Coins," Journal of Ethics and Social 143
Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2009): 1-13.
	John M. Taurek, "Should the Numbers Count?," Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, 144
no. 4 (1977): 303.
	Jens Timmermann, "The Individualist Lottery: How People Count, but Not 145
Their Numbers," Analysis 64, no. 2 (2004): 110.
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selected, B is saved. Having reached the island, the 
rescuer then incurs an obligation to save C. Similarly, if 
C wins B is also saved. We neither count, nor 
aggregate, nor quantify; nor do we arbitrarily assign 
roles to individual islander. 
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	 This position is often combined with what Otsuka -one of the 
critics of it- calls the Principle of Nonaggregation where "one's 
duties to come to the aid of others are determined by the claims of 
individuals considered one by one rather than by any aggregation of 
the claims of individuals". 
147
	 The third position rejects both the first and the second 
positions. The third position has sub-positions as well. One sub-
position defends the idea that a greater chance should be given to 
the larger group in proportion to their size.  This is the weighted 148
lottery.  Another sub-position defends the idea that if the 149
difference between the additional number of people who could be 
helped between the best and the second-best intervention is small 
relative to group sizes, we should give equal chances to the 
individual members of each group: if it does not meet this 
requirement, then we should choose effectiveness. This position is 
formulated by Martin Peterson (under the name the mixed view) and 
Iwao Hirose (under the name formal aggregation).

	Timmermann, 110.146
	Michael Otsuka, "Skepticism about Saving the Greater Number," Philosophy 147
and Public Affairs 32, no. 4 (2004): 415.
	Ben Saunders, "A Defence of Weighted Lotteries," Ethical Theory and Moral 148
Practice 12, no. 3 (2009): 279-290.
	Note that, in the end, this is the same with Timmermann's proposal but the 149
initial motivation and hence the point of departure are different.
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	 My method of comparing the moral value of effectiveness and 
fairness derives its roots from the mixed view and formal 
aggregation. These approaches to the number problem have not 
unfortunately been extensively studied and discussed. Their 
positions are very similar. Peterson writes that 

The Mixed View assigns moral weight to two 
conflicting considerations, viz. fairness and the number 
of people saved. In this context, fairness can be 
conceived of as a moral value that supervenes on the 
distribution of resources, such as chances of being 
rescued, in a population. Hirose (2004) argues that an 
unfair distribution of chances is morally bad, and that 
t h i s m o r a l b a d n e s s c a n b e a g g r e g a t e d 
interpersonally. 
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	 Peterson refers to a piece by Hirose where Hirose 
distinguishes the moderate account of fairness from the strict 
account of fairness. The moderate account of fairness "allows a 
trade-off between unfairness and other considerations" whereas the 
strict account of fairness rules out any policy which is unfair.  In 151
other words, the strict account of unfairness entails that no amount 
of good could outweigh the badness of unfairness, and thus we 
should avoid unfairness at all costs. In contrast, the moderate 
account of unfairness leaves a room for assessing the relative moral 
significance of the goodness of a given amount of utility and the 
	 Martin Peterson, "Some Versions of the Number Problem Have No Solution," 150
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13, no. 4 (2010): 444.
	 Iwao Hirose, "Aggregation and Numbers," Utilitas 16, no. 1 (2004): 75.151
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badness of a given amount of unfairness, whereby we could 
plausibly conclude that it is permissible to allow some unfairness to 
bring about some utility or it is permissible to allow some loss of 
utility to treat some people fairly. The moderate account of fairness 
could work in both ways.

	 Both Peterson and Hirose opt for the moderate account of 
fairness. The moderate account of fairness entails that there is no 
general obligation to save the members of the larger group. Nor it 
does entail a general obligation to give everyone an equal chance of 
being saved. As Hirose suggests, it is inherently flexible:

First, when we measure the overall bad of unfairness: If 
the number of the smaller group gets larger, it works in 
favour of tossing a coin. Second, when we measure 
the good of extra lives saved: If the difference between 
two groups gets larger, it works in favour of saving the 
greater number. 
152
	 As Hirose implies, if the number of people in the smaller 
group gets larger, it works in favour of tossing a coin because the 
amount of the badness of unfairness increases. Likewise, if the 
number of additional people between the groups gets larger, it 
works in favour of saving the greatest number because the amount 
of the goodness of utility increases. In order to decide which group 
to save, we should compare the goodness of utility with the badness 
of unfairness.

	 This conclusion can also be derived from Hirose's formal 
aggregation. Essentially, formal aggregation neither commits to a 
	 Hirose, 78-79.152
155
particular conception of good nor a specific method of 
"consolidating the morally relevant factors into an overall 
judgement".  Rather, formal aggregation provides us with a 153
structure. It first asks which factors we deem morally relevant. Next, 
it asks to what degree we value them. Then, it asks us to compare 
them. To make it clear, Hirose gives two examples. The first example 
is the Rescue Case, where we could either save one person or five 
people. The second is the Large-Scale Rescue Case, where we 
could either save 1,000 people or 1,001 people.

. . .let us denote the unfairness done to each person by 
u. In the original Rescue Case, if we directly save five 
lives, this is unfair to one person: so the badness of 
unfairness is u. In the Large-Scale Rescue Case, if we 
directly save 1,001 lives, this is unfair to 1,000 people; 
so the overall badness of unfairness is u × 1, 000. 
Thus, an unfairness done to 1,000 people is greater 
than the same unfairness done to one person.

We are thus led to compare ⟨1,000 and a half lives 
saved⟩ and ⟨1,001 lives saved – u × 1, 000⟩. Is the 
goodness of half a life saved greater than the badness 
of the unfairness done to each of 1,000 people? We 
should toss a coin if u × 1,000 is greater than the 
goodness of half a life saved. Alternatively, we should 
save 1,001 lives if the goodness of half a life saved is 
greater than u × 1,000. Formal aggregation can, and 
likely will, judge that the badness of the unfairness 
	 Iwao Hirose, Moral Aggregation (New York: Oxford University, 2015), 220.153
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done to 1,000 people is greater than the goodness of 
half a life saved, and hence that it is right to toss a 
coin. At a minimum, formal aggregation can claim that 
it is right to toss a coin when the size of the two groups 
of individuals is sufficiently large and the relative 
difference in the size of the two groups is sufficiently 
small. 
154
	 Hence, formal aggregation overlaps with the mixed view. 
They are defending the same with the same reasons.

	 In the following, I pose a challenge for effective altruists who 
always subscribe to effectiveness by considering some cases where 
we are prepared to donate to charities. My aim is not only to show 
plausibility of the mixed view and formal aggregation but also 
support it with additional reasons and examples, and discuss it with 
respect to effective altruism. By introducing First Case, Second Case 
and Fourth Case, I show that the case for effectiveness and the case 
for fairness both come in degrees. Next, I show that the moral value 
of effectiveness and the moral value of fairness severely compete in 
Third Case. Note that in each case I discuss, I assume that we 
	 Iwao Hirose, 199.154
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cannot or will not divide our resources, that is, we have to donate to 
one of the charities, but cannot or will not donate to both. 
155
	 Consider First Case and Second Case.

First Case. We have a finite amount of resources. We 
will donate our resources either to Charity A or Charity 
B which prevent starvation. Nonetheless, they operate 
in vastly distant regions from each other and thus they 
are targeting different extremely poor. With the 
resources we have, Charity A would prevent starvation 
of 100 extremely poor living in a region and Charity B 
would prevent starvation of 20 extremely poor in 
another region. All else is equal.

Second Case. We have a finite amount of resources. 
We will donate our resources either to Charity A or 
Charity B which prevent starvation. Nonetheless, they 
operate in vastly distant regions from each other and 
thus they are targeting different extremely poor. With 
the resources we have, Charity A would prevent 
starvation of 100 extremely poor living in a region and 
	This may happen in the cases where (1) both of the causes are too urgent that 155
the loss of time between donating to two charities may result in not benefiting 
some people and wasting resources, (2) we have small resources, and they 
will become so small by splitting that our resources may not benefit either 
charities or both. Some people also prefer sticking to a charity rather than 
donating to multiple charities to form a consistent and sustainable bond with 
that charity and the cause it represents. Moreover, effective altruists tend to 
allocate all of their spare resources to effective charities rather than splitting 
their resources between effective and ordinary charities, because it is what 
effective altruism essentially asks. Therefore, I assume that we cannot or will 
not divide our resources.
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Charity B would prevent starvation of 90 extremely 
poor in another region. All else is equal.

	 In both of the cases, effectiveness requires us to donate to 
Charity A rather than Charity B. But always donating to Charity A 
because of effectiveness leaves the extremely poor living in the 
region where Charity B operates unnoticed and they will not receive 
any resources whatsoever.

	 This raises the problem of luck. Since the founders of Charity 
A have decided to initiate their interventions in that region, studied 
and found the cost-effective methods to tackle starvation, and the 
operational costs have been lower for a myriad of reasons, the 
extremely poor living in the region where Charity A operates are 
luckier compared to the extremely poor living in the region where 
Charity B operates. Luck appears to have contributed to the 
emergence of effectiveness: the founders of Charity A might have 
chosen another region to set up their charity or natural or political 
conditions might have interfered with working in that region. While 
all parties suffer from the same condition and thus they are equally 
badly off, we are favouring a party over another just because the 
latter does not have an effective charity which could help them in 
that region. Relatedly, once we deny resources to the extremely poor 
living in the region where Charity B operates and donate our 
resources to the extremely poor living in the region where Charity A 
operates, we also violate the non-linkage principle. The absence of 
effective charities in the region where Charity B operates translates 
into the unluckiness of the extremely poor living there, and we are 
basing our denial on their unluckiness which they have not 
159
deserved. Therefore, effectiveness appears to perpetuate the 
unequal luck distribution across the extremely poor. 
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	 Moreover, in First Case, the difference between the number of 
extremely poor that Charity A and Charity B are capable of getting 
out of starvation (80) is larger than the difference between the 
number of extremely poor that Charity A and Charity B are capable 
of getting out of starvation in Second Case (10). The case for 
effectiveness in First Case is stronger than the case for effectiveness 
in Second Case since the additional number of people capable of 
being saved is noteworthy.  If the case for effectiveness in First 157
Case is stronger than the case for effectiveness in Second Case, 
then we should think that the case for effectiveness comes in 
degrees.  We can still opt for effectiveness in both cases but the 158
position that effectiveness comes in degrees implies that there may 
be other variables to consider which can offset our reasons to 
choose effectiveness, unless we are strict consequentialists who 
think that effectiveness (no matter what the strength of the case for 
effectiveness is) is always prior to any other variable.

	 Indubitably, flipping a coin to satisfy fairness would reduce 
the expected utility in both of the cases. In First Case, the expected 
utility of allocating our resources to Charity A in the case where do 
	As shown in Chapter 2, effective altruists like Singer and MacAskill are 156
concerned with the unequal distribution of luck, and this motivates them to 
argue for donating, yet they appear to miss the importance of luck regarding 
how we should donate.
	 It is not to say that we should opt for effectiveness in Second Case.157
	Although relatively irrelevant to our case, a similar point is made where "The 158
small differences in life years and their quality are insufficient to justify the very 
great difference in how the different patients are treated – some live and the 
others die." in Dan W. Brock, "Cost-effectiveness and Disability 
Discrimination," 35. The word questionable instead of insufficient may be more 
appropriate but the problem remains.
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not toss a coin and thus choosing effectiveness is 100 EU whereas 
the expected utility of tossing a coin between Charity A and Charity 
B and thus choosing fairness is 60 EU.  In Second Case, it is 100 159
EU and 95EU, respectively. 
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	 For the most part, in First Case and Second Case, effective 
altruists would have an inclination to donate to Charity A regardless 
of the concerns related to the violation of selection fairness. But that 
inclination might be reversed or at least weaken with Third Case.

Third Case. We have a finite amount of resources. We 
will donate our resources either to Charity A or Charity 
B which prevent starvation. Nonetheless, they operate 
in vastly distant regions from each other and thus they 
are targeting different extremely poor. With the 
resources we have, Charity A would prevent starvation 
of 1,000,000 extremely poor living in a region and 
Charity B would prevent starvation of 999,990 
extremely poor in another region. All else is equal.

	 In Second Case, the difference between the number of 
extremely poor saved between donating to Charity A and Charity B 
is 10. In Third Case, it is also 10. However, the populations are 
strikingly different. For some, directly donating to Charity A rather 
than tossing a coin in Second Case may be easier than directly 
donating to Charity A rather than tossing a coin in Third Case. In 
other words, opting for effectiveness over fairness may be easier in 
Second Case as opposed to Third Case. Once we increase the 
	100 EU: (100 × 1/1); 60 EU: (100 × 1/2) + (20 × 1/2).159
	100 EU: (100 × 1/1); 95 EU: (100 × 1/2) + (90 × 1/2).160
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population without increasing the additional number of people who 
could be helped between the best and the second-best 
interventions, choosing fairness becomes more and more attractive. 
Unless they are strict consequentialists, I doubt that effective 
altruists would have the intention of donating to Charity A in Third 
Case to the same degree as they have in Second Case. Possibly, 
satisfying selection fairness emerges to be at least slightly more 
important in Third Case than Second Case.

	 Moreover, even if we still opt for effectiveness in both Second 
Case and Third Case, we may still recognise that the moral value of 
fairness in Third Case is greater than the moral value of fairness in 
Second Case. That is, even if we believe that effectiveness always 
trumps choosing fairness, the degree of the moral value of fairness 
across different cases can be different. Rob Lawlor neatly explains 
the logic:

In the case where we can save one, or we can save 
two, the extra life we can save is weighed against the 
moral value of giving one person – the lone individual – 
some chance of survival. In the case where we can 
save 1,000,000 or we can save 1,000,001, however, 
the one extra life we can save is weighed against the 
moral value of giving a million people a chance of 
survival. This explains why many will have the intuition 
that we should toss a coin in one case, but not the 
other. 
161
	Rob Lawlor, "Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities," Ethical Theory and Moral 161
Practice 9, no. 2 (2006): 161.
162
	 In explaining why fairness gets more compelling, Lawlor 
compares the moral value of saving one against the moral value of 
giving a chance of survival to 1,000,000 people. In Third Case, it is 
the moral value of saving 10 people against giving a chance of 
survival to 999,990 people. This first explanation on why fairness 
becomes more and more attractive rests on comparing the moral 
value of saving a very few people against the moral value of giving a 
chance of survival to a very large number of people.

	 The second explanation may be that the difference in the 
utility remains constant when we move from Second Case to Third 
Case, but the number of people who are treated unfairly, whose 
claims are not counted at all, is larger. In Second Case, 90 people 
were treated unfairly (they have not been given a chance to survive) 
but in Third Case it is 999,990 people even though the additional 
number of saveable people in both is the same. Consequently, 
fairness as opposed effectiveness becomes more appealing. Some 
effective altruists who are strict consequentialists may still be 
tempted to directly donating to Charity A in Third Case, following 
their usual path. But if we reiterate this case, and present Third Case 
over and over to them, then the number of unfairly treated people 
get so high that the standard stance that they take may become 
questionable.

	 The third explanation of why the moral value of fairness 
becomes greater in Third Case compared to Second Case may be 
that the unluckiness of the unlucky group costs collectively more to 
them in Third Case than Second Case because 999,990 people will 
die without having equal chances to be saved in the former and 90 
people will die without having equal chances to be saved in the 
latter. In other words, unluckiness which is an undeserved 
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disadvantage is dramatically more pressing and penetrating in Third 
Case compared to Second Case. If the unluckiness of the unlucky 
group in Third Case morally matters more than the unluckiness of 
the unlucky group in Second Case, then we can accept that the 
moral value of fairness comes in degrees as well.

	 These three explanations could make clear why both the 
mixed view and formal aggregation are plausible. When analysed 
with regards to effective altruism and extreme poverty, they provide 
additional reasons to keep wary of always committing to 
effectiveness at the expense of fairness.

	 Consider the last case, namely, Fourth Case.

Fourth Case. We have a finite amount of resources. We 
will donate our resources either to Charity A or Charity 
B which prevent starvation. Nonetheless, they operate 
in vastly distant regions from each other and thus they 
are targeting different extremely poor. With the 
resources we have, Charity A would prevent starvation 
of 1,000,000 extremely poor living in a region and 
Charity B would prevent starvation of 100,000 
extremely poor in another region. All else is equal.

	 Here, we have a large population and a large difference 
between the number of the extremely poor to be saved. For effective 
altruists, not donating to Charity A would be unthinkable. The moral 
value of effectiveness seems to be greater than the moral value of 
fairness.

	 In a nutshell, here is what we have:
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1. The moral value of effectiveness may be greater than the 
moral value of fairness, if

a. the group sizes are low, and the additional number of 
people who could be helped between the best and the 
second-best interventions is large relative to group sizes. 
(First Case)

b. the group sizes are low, and the additional number of 
people who could be helped between the best and the 
second-best interventions is small relative to group sizes. 
(Second Case)

c. the group sizes are high, and the additional number of 
people who could be helped between the best and the 
second-best interventions is large relative to group sizes. 
(Fourth Case)

2. The moral value of fairness may be greater than the moral 
value of effectiveness, if

a. the group sizes are high, and the additional number of 
people who could be helped between the best and the 
second-best interventions is small relative to group sizes. 
(Third Case)

	 These cases display the potential tendency of some to find 
the moral value of effectiveness greater than the moral value of 
fairness, or vice versa, when people are presented with different 
group sizes and stark differences between the number of people 
who could be helped.

	 These considerations may not be as relevant to low-income 
and middle-income effective altruists as high-income effective 
altruists because the likelihood of the former to affect large 
165
populations is limited. But in the case where each low-income and 
middle-income effective altruist individually opting for effectiveness 
could collectively result in perpetuating the unequal luck distribution 
among large populations, the moral value of fairness could still be of 
importance even in individual decisions where resources are quite 
limited. Moreover, given that there are high-income effective altruists 
who have millions or billions, the moral value of fairness should be 
taken into account since an exclusive commitment to effectiveness 
might perpetuate the unequal luck distribution among the extremely 
poor. Furthermore, philosophers of effective altruism who are 
inclined to always appeal to effectiveness should be wary of the 




	 In this chapter, I have first shown that Singer's famous 
argument, first articulated in "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", 
implies an obligation to prevent very bad things from happening, but 
does not guide us as to which bad things we should prevent. It does 
not require us to be effective and so does not imply effective 
altruism. We also need a principle of effectiveness.

	 This raises two distinct questions: Can effectiveness be 
justified? Should effective altruism always prefer effectiveness over 
fairness?

	 To the first question, I said yes: I supported an outcome-
based principle, Avoid Gratuitous Worseness, and developed an 
obligation-based principle, the Better Fulfilment Principle.

	 To the second question, I said no: always preferring 
effectiveness over fairness could unjustly favour the well-off over the 
166
worst-off, force us to commit ourselves to prefer tiny improvements 
in the lives of a large number of well-off over massive improvements 
in the lives of a small number of worst-off, and perpetuate the 
unequal luck distribution between the worst-off. Towards the end, in 
analysing the competition between effectiveness and fairness, I 
defended the idea that we should be cognisant of the group sizes 
and whether the additional people who could be helped is relatively 
large. We could justifiably choose effectiveness over fairness under 
certain conditions discussed, and that could perfectly fit into 
effective altruism. Nonetheless, effective altruists have to abandon 
the position that we should always prefer effectiveness over 
fairness, if they want to avoid the complications examined.

	 This chapter has aimed to show that effectiveness can be tied 
to deontological theories, alongside it being tied to consequentialist 
theories; that fairness imposes serious challenges to the usual 
preferences of effective altruists; and that we should question the 
universal commitment of effective altruism to effectiveness, 
especially in the cases of choosing charities. It has also provided a 
method to overcome those challenges by applying the mixed view 
and formal aggregation.

	 In the next chapter, I will assess whether donating to effective 




The Systemic Change Objection: 




Donating to effective charities is one 




	 One of the distinctive features of effective altruism, alongside 
its emphasis on donating to charity, is its insistence on finding a 
methodology to find the right charities to donate to. To that end, 
effective altruists argue that fulfilling the moral obligation to alleviate 
extreme poverty requires us to carefully consider the consequences 
of donating by assessing and comparing the impact of charities. As 
they believe that alleviating extreme poverty is possible through 
donating, they rigorously promote donating to what they deem to be 
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effective charities. They submit that donating to effective charities is 
one of the best ways to alleviate extreme poverty. This is Premise 4.

	 Premise 4 is challenged by the systemic change objection. 
The systemic change objection holds that effective altruism 
unjustifiably distracts individuals from allocating their spare 
resources to systemic change. According to the proponents of the 
systemic change objection, effective altruism and philanthropic 
causes in general prevent us from focusing on more serious aspects 
of extreme poverty, that is, the systemic causes of extreme poverty.

	 This chapter has several parts.

	 In §4.2, I show how effective charities are identified by 
GiveWell -a meta-charity whose evaluations are taken very seriously 
by effective altruists- and discuss some of its limitations regarding 
its moral commitments.

	 In §4.3, I present some empirical findings to understand the 
distinction between systemic causes of extreme poverty (such as 
illicit financial flows, foreign debt, war and military spending, 
inheritance laws, colonialism) and symptoms of extreme poverty 
(such as malaria and neglected tropical diseases). This distinction is 
quite important because the proponents of the systemic change 
objection often appeal to this distinction, and understanding the 
relative importance of the systemic causes of extreme poverty 
weighed against the symptoms of extreme poverty can only be 
determined by engaging with some empirical research. By 
presenting the empirical findings, I demonstrate that systemic 
causes of extreme poverty are indeed more serious than its 
symptoms. The word "serious" is used in two different senses. The 
first is that the systemic causes of extreme poverty are more serious 
than its symptoms because they have brought about much more 
169
harm than the symptoms and hence successfully tackling the 
systemic causes would save much more resources to combat the 
effects of extreme poverty. The second is that the systemic causes 
of extreme poverty are more serious than its symptoms because 
addressing the systemic causes paves the way for addressing the 
symptoms, or, in other words, it significantly increases the chances 
of eliminating the symptoms. 
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	 In §4.4, I start analysing the gist of the systemic change 
objection by identifying and explaining three possible propositions 
that we can draw from the systemic change objection, which vary in 
the commitment to addressing systemic change that they demand. 
The first proposition is that individuals should allocate all of their 
spare resources to systemic change. The second proposition is that 
individuals should allocate most of their spare resources to systemic 
change. The third proposition is that individuals should allocate 
some of their spare resources to systemic change. I evaluate these 
three propositions with respect to low-risk actions versus high-risk 
actions in §4.5.

	 I conclude that we have sufficient reasons to submit that 
donating to the most effective charities is one of the best ways to 
alleviate extreme poverty, but I suggest that we should not allocate 
all of our spare resources either to effective charities or to systemic 
change. Instead, we should divide our resources between effective 
charities and systemic change. In that regard, while it carries some 
weight, the systemic change objection does not have the power to 
undermine the very foundations of effective altruism.

	Note that symptoms can also deepen extreme poverty, but they are called 162
"symptoms" because they are mostly the result of neglecting systemic causes 
of extreme poverty and the systemic causes of extreme poverty are much 
more responsible in creating extreme poverty than symptoms.
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	 There are three points to make here. Firstly, normally, the 
systemic change objection is discussed in relation to whether 
individuals have obligations towards improving institutions. Among 
those who argue that we have obligations towards improving 
institutions, there is little or no attempt made to scrutinise what 
portion of our spare resources we should allocate to systemic 
change. That is why I delineate and clarify three different 
propositions we can draw from the systemic change objection, and 
assess the systemic change objection accordingly.

	 Secondly, unfortunately, most of the philosophical discussion 
regarding how to weigh the importance of systemic causes and 
symptoms of extreme poverty against each other is done without 
relying on proper empirical research. By separating the systemic 
causes and the symptoms of extreme poverty and by relying on 
empirical research, I make a solid distinction between systemic 
causes and symptoms.

	 Thirdly, most of the literature focuses on the weight of 
obligations towards reforming global institutions to tackle extreme 
poverty, but pays little attention to the comparison between low-risk 
and high-risk actions when it comes to individual donors. I open a 
debate on risk specifically on this issue.

4.2	 The criteria for designating effective charities

	 Effective altruists single out what they call effective charities. 
In a nutshell, according to effective altruists, effective charities are 
the charities which deal with (1) important problems, which are great 
in size, (2) neglected problems, which are underfunded, and (3) 
tractable problems, which have a high probability of being solved. 
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Note that problems which are great in size, comparatively neglected 
and tractable are likely to bring about a lot of good when addressed, 
and for the most part, much more than the problems which are 
smaller in size, comparatively unneglected, and intractable. In 
deciding what to do against a counterfactual baseline where 
everyone else acts as they ordinarily would (business-as-usual), 
singling out effective charities seem to be very important because 
we have the ability to multiply the amount of utility created.

	 Firstly, all else being equal, effective charities deal with 
important problems which are great in size. The term size refers both 
to the number of people affected and how seriously they are 
affected by a given problem. Charities working towards alleviating 
extreme poverty pass this criterion easily as extreme poverty brings 
about extensive misery for hundreds of millions of people. 
Nonetheless, when charities dealing with important problems are 
compared, they need not only be effective but also cost-effective. 
While effectiveness refers to implementing the right policies so that 
charities can make a positive impact, cost-effectiveness requires 
comparing the positive impact brought about with respect to finite 
resources. In other words, effective charities not only bring about 
positive impact but also result in greater improvements per unit of 
resource compared to other charities. The positive impact is often 
understood in QALY terms. 
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	 Referring to research on school attendance, MacAskill 
supports donating to deworming charities rather than charities 
transferring cash to girls, merit scholarships or free uniforms 
because deworming results in additional 139 years of schooling per 
$1,000 compared to 0.2, 2.7 and 7.1 additional years, 
	This is the broad approach of effective altruism as discussed in Chapter 3.163
172
respectively.  In the case of assessing the cost-effectiveness of 164
charities pertinent to health, MacAskill thinks that the metric of QALY 
is a plausible guide to understand how the activities of charities 
affect the extremely poor.  All else being equal, greater QALYs per 165
unit of money means greater cost-effectiveness.

Secondly, effective charities are more likely to be found in 
neglected areas. Effective altruists point out the funding gaps, the 
plugging of which could do a lot of good. Nevertheless, funding 
gaps have to be assessed with regards to marginal utility. MacAskill 
gives an example of the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2011 Japan 
earthquake where similar disastrous consequences happened, such 
as thousands of deaths, an outbreak of diseases, and the lack of 
electricity and water.  However, there were significant differences. 166
Haiti had around 150,000 deaths, and Japan had around 15,000 
deaths. Haiti was one of the poorest countries in the world whereas 
Japan was the fourth-richest country with the capacity and 
resources to address the earthquake on its own. Japan is 1,000 
times richer than Haiti.  Although the international aid to each of 167
the earthquakes came to about $5 billion, MacAskill criticises the 
way in which the world was biased towards Japan as "funding 
seems to be allocated in proportion with how evocative and widely 
publicised the disaster is, rather than on the basis of its scale and 
diversity".  Despite the huge differences, the amount of money 168






poured into Haiti and Japan was almost the same. Causes which are 
already well-funded, or where someone else would likely fund them 
if we did not, are unlikely to be effective causes because of 
diminishing marginal returns and replaceability: in this case, funding 
Japan would be the relatively ineffective choice. 

For an individual considering where to donate, if others are 
already donating to Japan, and if it is predictable that others will 
donate to Japan, funding Haiti would still save more lives because it 
would bring about more QALYs. But since the amount of money 
poured into Haiti and Japan was almost the same, despite the 
differences in the scales of the disasters, Haiti was neglected. All 
else being equal, charities which supported Haiti tackled a more 
neglected problem. Dollar for dollar, donations to such charities had 
a higher marginal utility than supporting Japan. Therefore, it is 
significant for effective altruists that only the charities working on 
highly neglected problems in which a lot of marginal utility could be 
realised should be identified as effective.

	 Thirdly, effective charities have to work on tractable causes. 
MacAskill gives the example of ageing: 

[A]lmost two-thirds of global ill health is a result of 
aging. It's a problem that's highly neglected: there are 
only a tiny number of research institutes focused on 
trying to prevent the causes of aging (rather than to 
treat its symptoms, like cancer, stroke, Alzheimer's, 
and so on). However, the reason it's neglected is that 
many scientists believe it to be highly intractable. 
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Preventing the aging process is just a very difficult 
problem to solve. 
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	 Therefore, given the low degree of tractability of ageing at the 
moment, charities which address ageing are not regarded as 
effective. However, MacAskill adds that ". . .it's important not just to 
look at our current best-guess estimates but to make estimates 
about the long-run tractability of the cause as well".  One day if 170
ageing becomes as tractable as other causes which are highly 
tractable, then it may become suitable to be recognised as a 
promising cause. The assessment of tractability means that effective 
charities cope with highly tractable causes which would yield a great 
amount of good when solved.

	 Many people are inclined to include administrative costs to 
the criteria in assessing where to donate. MacAskill does not think 
that it is wise to do so: MacAskill states that administration costs 
alone do not mean anything. In that regard, MacAskill compares the 
charities Books for Africa, Development Media International, and 
GiveDirectly. MacAskill states that

Books For Africa ships one book with every fifty cents 
donated to them. GiveDirectly gives the poor ninety 
cents with every dollar donated to them. Development 
Media International spends $1.5 million to run a mass 
media campaign promoting health education in a 
particular country. But those numbers alone don't tell 




schoolbooks, transfer $1.35 million to poor people, or 
educate a country's populace about how they can stay 
healthy (each of which would cost $1.5 million)? To 
answer that, we have to know how these different 
expenditures affect people's lives. 
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According to MacAskill, Books for Africa has low 
administration costs.  But, according to MacAskill, there is no 172
high-quality evidence regarding the impact that it has on the lives of 
people.  MacAskill discourages us from donating to Books for 173
Africa. Then, MacAskill compares Development Media International 
and GiveDirectly with regards to cost-effectiveness in terms of 
QALYs, the robustness of evidence regarding their impacts, the 
quality of implementations, and the funding gaps: the winner is 
GiveDirectly.  In other words, MacAskill combines the criteria of 174
size, neglectedness, and tractability in finding GiveDirectly better 
than others. As evident from MacAskill's evaluation, it is not the 
administration costs but the impact of that charities that matters.

	 As MacAskill points out in 2016, earning at least $16,000 
(£10,500) per year puts individuals in the richest 10% of the global 
population, and those individuals can anticipate doing "at least one 






benefit [themselves]".  This is what he calls the 100x Multiplier.  175 176
To prove the 100x Multiplier, MacAskill makes a comparison 
between medical treatments in rich societies and treatments in poor 
societies. MacAskill states that public health experts regard 1 QALY 
for less than $50,000 "as a good value, and health programs will 
often be funded even if the cost per QALY is much higher than 
$50,000" in the United States of America.  Nevertheless, the same 177
benefit, that is, saving 1 QALY can be done by spending "as little as 
$100" in poor societies, for instance, on malaria prevention.  178
Therefore, by spending $100 on the treatment of a disease from 
which the extremely poor severely suffer, individuals can produce 
500 times more benefit compared to spending the same amount of 
money on a treatment for a disease prevalent in a rich society. 
MacAskill makes this comparison not only to remind individuals who 
pass the annual threshold of $16,000 that they have the 100x 
Multiplier but also to show that donating to effective charities could 
have a tremendous effect on the lives of the extremely poor.

	 Who evaluates the degree of the cost-effectiveness of 
charities, ranks them, and identifies some charities as effective? 
Currently, effective altruists tend to deem the charities 
recommended by GiveWell effective. Founded as a non-profit charity 
assessment organisation in 2007 by two friends who worked at a 
hedge fund, GiveWell assesses the cost-effectiveness of charities 
instead of focusing on the traditional metrics such as administrative 






ratio. Since effective altruists believe that putting cost-effectiveness 
at the heart of the charity assessment guarantees identifying the 
charities which have the greatest positive impact with the lowest 
resources possible, GiveWell fulfils the urge of effective altruists to 
discover what they call effective charities. GiveWell also considers 
the evidence of effectiveness (apart from cost-effectiveness), the 
room for more funding, and transparency. Today, many effective 
altruists consult GiveWell when choosing which charities to donate 
to. Their work is so central to effective altruism that a website run by 
the Centre for Effective Altruism has included GiveWell under "EA 
Concepts" which are composed of ideas, problems and 
organisations most relevant to effective altruism. 
179
	 As of 2020, GiveWell judges that Against Malaria Foundation, 
Schistosomiasis Control Initiative Foundation, and GiveDirectly are 
among the top charities.  There are other selected charities which 180
have top programs, such as Malaria Consortium (Seasonal Malaria 
Chemoprevention), Evidence Action (Deworm the World Initiative), 
The END Fund (Deworming Program), Sightsavers (Deworming 
Program), Helen Keller International (Vitamin A Supplementation 
Program).  Except for GiveDirectly which transfers unconditional 181
cash directly to the people living in extreme poverty, and for Helen 
Keller International's vitamin deficiency-focused program, all of 
GiveWell's top charities work on preventable diseases exacerbated 
by extreme poverty affecting hundreds of millions of people.








	 There are limitations of the methodology used for designating 
effective charities. GiveWell extensively explains these limitations.  182
For instance, GiveWell appeals to representative studies which may 
not provide us with the whole picture. Because of the data 
limitations on the long-term consequences of interventions, GiveWell 
has to assess quantifiable, and immediate and short-term impacts 
of interventions. The unintended effects and long-term effects are 
for the most part omitted. Moreover, in some cases, there could be 
extremely limited information about social conditions, and hence the 
estimates based on this extremely limited information may 
significantly weaken the estimates.

	 There may also be a value conflict between the evaluators, 
donors, and the beneficiaries. The moral weight of the value of 
income versus health, and the value of averting the death of young 
children versus adults may be interpreted differently by each 
party.  Through surveys, GiveWell has started to include the 183
opinions of the extremely poor, who are the beneficiaries, in 
assigning relevant moral values.  The results demonstrate that the 184
extremely poor "place a higher value on averting a death than 
predicted by most extrapolations from studies in high income 
countries (HICs)", and the "central estimate of value placed on 
	"Cost-Effectiveness," GiveWell, November 2017, givewell.org/how-we-work/182
our-criteria/cost-effectiveness.
	"Approaches to Moral Weights: How GiveWell Compares to Other Actors," 183
GiveWell, November 2017, https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criter-
ia/cost-effectiveness/comparing-moral-weights.




averting death for individuals 5 and older was $40,721, which is 1.7 
times higher than the current GiveWell staff median".  Results also 185
show that the extremely poor "consistently value the lives of 
individuals under 5 higher than individuals 5 and older, which is 
consistent with HIC studies but contrary to median GiveWell moral 
weights", where the "central estimate of value placed on averting 
death for individuals under 5 was $65,906, which is 4.9 times higher 
than the current GiveWell staff median".  Moreover, before 186
collecting opinions from the extremely poor about this, GiveWell 
thought that averting the death of individuals under 5 is 48 times 
more important than the value of doubling consumption, and that 
averting the death of individuals at the age of 5 or over 5 was 85 
times more important than the value of doubling consumption.  In 187
other words, they valued saving the life of those 5 and over as 
almost twice as valuable as saving the life of an under 5. After doing 
the moral weighting research with the extremely poor, they equalised 
the values and thought that averting the death of individuals at any 
age is 100 times more important than doubling consumption. 
Donors may disagree with the outputs of these surveys. These 
disagreements are not peculiar to GiveWell's work. They represent 
the difficulties of comparing charities, which involves attaching 
values to specific circumstances like averting death, increasing 
consumption, and comparing the moral value of averting death 
across different age groups.





	"Research on Moral Weights - 2019," GiveWell.187
180
	 Another limitation is that GiveWell has a moral assumption 
about what the good is and how the good should be distributed, 
when it compares the moral value of averting death and the moral 
value of increasing consumption. The assumption is that they think 
the moral value of averting death and the moral value of increasing 
consumption are commensurable. As mentioned above, GiveWell 
states that averting death is morally preferable to increasing 
consumption and hence reducing poverty to some degree. Averting 
death surely brings about some good. According to GiveWell, when 
assessing the goodness of averting death, some GiveWell evaluators 
"have considered factors such as life expectancy, how someone's 
degree of personhood develops as they age, the level of grief 
associated with death at different ages, economic contributions 
made by people at different ages, etc.".  Increasing consumption 188
and hence reducing poverty has also positive effects on welfare. For 
instance, when there is increased consumption, there is less 
malnutrition, and when there is less malnutrition, there is less 
susceptibility to diseases. Those with increased consumption are 
also likely to contribute more to economic and social life. What is 
being compared here are the welfare effects of preserving and 
extending life, and the welfare effects of increasing consumption. 
This may be a controversial move: some may think that it needs a 
clearer justification.

	 One of the other serious limitations of GiveWell might be that 
it is not clear whether it includes the well-being future generations to 
its evaluation. For instance, do donations make any welfare 
difference in the lives of the new children brought to our world by the 
extremely poor who are the beneficiaries? If yes, are the welfare 
	"Research on Moral Weights - 2019," GiveWell.188
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effects on future generations significant enough to reconsider our 
donation decisions? Is there any discount rate for future 
generations? These questions have not been answered by GiveWell 
and we have no clue how these questions might alter their decision-
making process.

	 Above are some of the limitations that the evaluations of 
GiveWell have. Despite these limitations, GiveWell's research has 
always been very valuable. Nonetheless, one of the most serious 
objections to donating is more fundamental, namely, the systemic 
change objection, which states that effective altruism unjustifiably 
distracts individuals from allocating their spare resources to 
systemic change. GiveWell only measures charities against each 
other. But the most effective charity is not necessarily the most 
effective way for us to fight extreme poverty. Perhaps the charities 
claimed to be effective are not in fact effective, as they are only 
interested in bringing about improvements in the lives of extremely 
poor but they do not undermine the unjust nature of global order? 
Perhaps they waste resources because they divert attention from 
other kinds of movement combatting extreme poverty? Perhaps 
their insistence on remedying the suffering caused by the 
"symptoms" of extreme poverty only creates a vicious cycle where 
the "systemic causes" of extreme poverty are either neglected or 
exacerbated? To respond these questions and to assess the rigour 
of the systemic change objection, we first need to refer to the 
empirical research about extreme poverty to understand the nature 
of extreme poverty.

4.3	 Empirical research on extreme poverty

182
	 Especially on the progressive side of politics, there is a 
tendency to argue that there are "systemic causes" of extreme 
poverty as opposed to "symptoms" of extreme poverty. Proposing a 
radical transformation in the status quo, philosophers who support 
the systemic change objection against effective altruism often buy 
the distinction between systemic causes and symptoms. Illicit 
financial flows, foreign debt, war and military spending, inheritance 
laws, and colonialism are claimed to be among the systemic causes 
of extreme poverty. These are thought to be structural and their 
presence enforces the idea that the struggle against extreme 
poverty will not prove to be fruitful unless they are eroded. 
Contrasted with systemic causes, preventable diseases such as 
malaria and neglected tropical diseases are treated as some of the 
symptoms of extreme poverty. Malaria and neglected tropical 
diseases are two of the most emphasised preventable diseases by 
effective altruists. While there are no charities recommended by 
GiveWell which work on the systemic causes of extreme poverty, 
many of GiveWell's recommended charities work on preventable 
diseases.

	 As we will see in the later sections of this chapter, it is 
commonly thought that the systemic causes of extreme poverty are 
more serious than the symptoms of extreme poverty. The word 
"serious" can be understood in multiple ways. The first is that it 
points at the judgement that by targeting the systemic causes of 
extreme poverty, we can maximise the available resources to 
combat extreme poverty, so only or mostly tackling the symptoms of 
extreme poverty is relatively unfruitful. Relatedly, the second is that 
by treating the systemic causes of extreme poverty, we can mostly 
address the symptoms of extreme poverty.

183
	 Most of the philosophical discussion around what constitutes 
the systemic causes and symptoms of extreme poverty is about the 
credence that we lend to the proposed solutions concerning 
extreme poverty: emphasising that we should be focusing on the 
systemic causes rather than symptoms of extreme poverty may 
trigger us to feel sympathetic to solutions such as systemic change 
through lobbying, mobilisation and revolution to which we would not 
be otherwise sympathetic, and perhaps reflect more on the ones we 
are uncertain about. Appealing to the gravity of the systemic causes 
of extreme poverty and requiring systemic change, the systemic 
change objection accuses effective altruism of being fundamentally 
flawed, and brings the philosophical puzzles concerning low-risk 
actions versus high-risk actions under scrutiny. After presenting 
important empirical data on extreme poverty, I analyse these 
philosophical puzzles with respect to the rigour of the systemic 
change objection against effective altruism.

	 Before starting to analyse the systemic causes and the 
symptoms of extreme poverty, I should note that there is one 
famous estimate of Jeffrey D. Sachs regarding the eradication of 
extreme poverty. According to Sachs, the cost to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals which include eradicating extreme 
poverty would have required $135 billion to $195 billion per year 
between 2005-2015 "which is about .44 to .54 percent of the rich-
world GNP each year during the [then] forthcoming decade".  The 189
total figure to end extreme poverty between 2005-2015 sums up to 
less than $2 trillion. Although Sachs acknowledges that there is 
some degree of imprecision around these estimates, we should still 
	Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time 189
(New York: Penguin, 2005), 299.
184
keep these figures in mind while analysing the systemic causes and 




	 Illicit financial flows is an umbrella term for different 
malpractices such as tax injustice through transfer mispricing and 
tax havens, smuggling, and corruption by officials. For instance, 
misinvoicing flows include changing the true value of goods so as to 
evade tax. Likewise, illicit hot money flows are realised through 
infiltration, such as by hiding and transporting money internationally 
so as to decrease tax liability or manipulate and destruct economies. 
These practices result in a decrease in resources which could 
otherwise be used for public services such as funding healthcare, 
education, and promoting opportunity and equality.

	 Global Financial Integrity reports that Sub-Saharan Africa lost 
a nominal $528.9 billion between 2002-2013 alone because of illicit 
financial flows.  This indicates an average loss of 5.5% of its 190
GDP.  Asia lost a nominal $2,655.6 billion in the same period.  191 192
This translates into an average loss of 3.7% of its GDP.  All 193
developing countries lost a nominal $6,587.1 billion in total which 
comprised of a nominal $5,101.1 billion for trade misinvoicing flows 
and a nominal $1,486.0 billion for illicit hot money flows.  The loss 194
	Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing 190
Countries: 2003-2012 (Global Financial Integrity, 2014), 7.
	Kar and Spanjers, 11.191
	Kar and Spanjers, 7.192
	Kar and Spanjers, 11.193
	Kar and Spanjers, viii.194
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of all developing countries accounts for an average of 3.9% of their 
GDP.  For all developing countries, the combined real illicit 195
financial flows add up to $6,840.5 between 2002-2013 alone.  The 196
total foreign direct investment and official development aid 
combined were slightly less than illicit financial flows.  According 197
to Janvier D. Nkurunziza from United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development,

Illicit financial flows increase risk and uncertainty in the 
domestic economy, discouraging investment and its 
potential positive effect on poverty reduction. 
Moreover, in countries where corruption allows the 
elites to unlawfully appropriate resources and transfer 
them abroad, the incentive to put in place economic 
and social measures that reduce poverty is weakened. 
Illicit financial flows allow the elites to easily access 
foreign services such as healthcare and education, 
leaving the poor to fend for themselves. 
198
One form of illicit financial flows called transfer mispricing is 
often done by multinational companies. Transfer mispricing allows 
multinational companies to evade tax which "keeps states from 
	Kar and Spanjers, 11.195
	Kar and Spanjers, 7.196
	Kar and Spanjers, vii.197
	Janvier D. Nkurunziza, "Illicit Financial Flows: A Constraint on Poverty 198
Reduction in Africa," Association of Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin 87, 
(2012): 16.
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devoting maximum available resources to human rights".  It 199
"impedes the fulfilment of the right to development".  It also 200
"damages accountability and transparency". 
201
Illicit financial flows diminish the quality of life of the extremely 
poor and reproduce the conditions bringing about extreme poverty. 
By deliberately avoiding paying tax, those who are engaged in illicit 
financial flows attack the rights and the welfare of the extremely 
poor. In that regard, illicit financial flows deny the access of the 
extremely poor to current and potential improvements in their 
income and the infrastructure that they can benefit from. Obstructing 
current and potential improvements signifies making the extremely 
poor poorer with respect to the opportunities that could have been 
seized and taking away their wealth to which they are entitled. In 
other words, illicit financial flows not only tarnish the principles of 
distributive justice but also contribute to extreme poverty by shifting 
resources from those who need them. Some of those resources 
could have been used to build hospitals, schools, and roads which 
would drastically increase the chances of eliminating preventable 
diseases, providing better skil ls training, and lowering 
unemployment. For instance, global medical research funding, 
public and industry combined, was $265 billion in 2011.  If we had 202
avoided illicit financial flows only between 2002-2013, we could 
	Monica Iyer, "Transferring Away Human Rights: Using Human Rights to 199
Address Corporate Transfer Mispricing," Northwestern Journal of Human 
Rights 15, no. 1 (2017): 10.
	 Iyer, 13.200
	 Iyer, 17.201
	Hamilton Moses III, David H. M. Matheson, Sarah Cairns-Smith, Benjamin P. 202
George, Chase Palisch, and E. Ray Dorsey, "The Anatomy of Medical 
Research: US and International Comparisons," The Journal of the American 
Medical Association 313, no. 2 (2015): 181.
187
have almost 25 times more global medical research funding in 2013 
than we had in 2011. Most of this could have been used for curing 
the diseases that the extremely poor suffer from.

There is, of course, no guarantee that the public funds 
generated by the elimination of illicit financial flows would end up 
being used for the extremely poor. Those resources could be used 
towards a variety of causes. But the elimination of illicit financial 
flows is very important for creating the maximum available resources 
for states which, through rational planning and just procedures, 
could alleviate extreme poverty. Without the maximum available 
resources, the potential funds for extreme poverty diminish, and 
there is more pressure on the decision-making procedure to restrict 




	 Foreign debt is a debt owed by states to states, banks, 
financial institutions and individual creditors. Low-income countries 
owe money usually with interest rates charged to high-income 
countries, international banks, the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. The discussion around foreign debt and extreme 
poverty is a sensitive one, and the literature is composed of 
nuanced opinions. Nonetheless, there are figures which demonstrate 
that rising foreign debt in low and middle-income countries is likely 
to worsen extreme poverty.

	 According to the World Bank Group, the foreign debt stock of 
the International Development Association-only countries which 
include the world's poorest had risen to $356 billion by the end of 
188
2017, 11% higher than 2016.  The World Bank Group notes that 203
the external debt stock of International Development Association-
only countries over the past decade has doubled.  Moreover, the 204
interest rates are also a concern:

At end 2017, one third of countries in [Sub-Saharan 
Africa] had a debt service-to-export ratio above 10 
percent, and in several, including Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya and Zambia that ratio 
surpassed 15 percent. In the future, higher debt 
service payments, in part due to bullet repayments 
falling due on maturing international bond issues, 
coupled with rising global interest rates, look set to 
keep debt-to-export ratios on an upward trajectory, 
exacerbating concerns about debt sustainability. 
205
	 The presence of interest rates carries the risk that many of the 
total amount borrowed will have to be repaid many times over, if 
interest rates generate a debt that is greater than the original debt.

Research suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa's growth rate 
would have averaged almost 50% higher during the 1980s if the 
foreign debt had been absent.  Likewise, research on 25 low and 206
middle-income countries between 2000-2015 has found that a 1% 
	World Bank Group, International Debt Statistics 2019 (World Bank Group, 203
2019), 8.
	World Bank Group, 8.204
	World Bank Group, 11.205
	Augustin Kwasi Fosu, "The External Debt Burden and Economic Growth in the 206
1980s: Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa," Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies 20, no. 2 (1999): 315.
189
increase in foreign debt increases poverty by 0.35%.  207
Unfortunately, low-income countries without debt sustainability are 
likely to be dependent on subsidies from donors. 
208
Alarmingly, using observations for 78 low and middle-income 
countries between 1976-1998, there is empirical evidence that 
autocratic regimes, as opposed to democratic regimes, accumulate 
considerably more foreign debt compared to their income.  The 209
fact that billions have been borrowed by dictators in Africa and Asia 
from foreign creditors which eventually have to be repaid by the 
public over very long-term puts into question the legitimacy of the 
obligation to repay the foreign debt. Given that many low-income 
countries are already striving to escape the loop of extreme poverty, 
they have to allocate their resources to pay their foreign debt with 
interest rates charged rather than using them to cope with extreme 
poverty. For instance, just $7.5 billion of the $356 billion foreign debt 
of International Development Association-only countries at end of 
2017 would have been sufficient to provide vaccination to 300 
million children in low and middle-income countries which would 
have saved 6 million lives and generated up to $100 billion in 
economic benefits. 
210
4.3.3	War and military spending

	Taha Zaghdoudi and Abdelaziz Hakimi, "Does external debt-poverty 207
relationship confirm the debtoverhang hypothesis for developing counties?," 
Economics Bulletin 37, no. 2 (2017): 658.
	Kathrin Berensmann, "New Ways of Achieving Debt Sustainability beyond the 208
Enhanced HIPC Initiative," Intereconomics 39, no. 6 (2004): 330.
	Thomas Oatley, "Political Institutions and Foreign Debt in the Developing 209
World," International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2010): 191.
	Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Gavi Pledging Conference 2016-2020: Chair's 210
Summary, (Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, 2015), 1.
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	 War and military spending has increased the destructive force 
of our civilisation. Since the rapid growth of military capacities, and 
the invention of mass weapons such as nuclear and biological 
weapons, many people have lost their lives and there has been a 
constant threat to the welfare of the global population.

	 Jonathan Goodhand states that "There is some consensus 
around the proposition that conflict causes poverty. . .famine, 
pestilence, death and war riding together has been invoked in times 
of crisis through the ages".  A decade-long war could lead a 211
society to have an income 20% lower than it would otherwise have 
been, as the annual growth rate could diminish by 2.2%.  A 15-212
year war could decrease GDP per capita by 30%.  War also harms 213
the potential of human capital: when the Tajikistani civil war ended, it 
was found in 1999 that "girls aged between seven and fifteen were 
about eleven percentage points significantly less likely to be enrolled 
in school if their household's dwelling was damaged during the 
war".  Likewise, Mozambique's civil war between 1974-1995 214
resulted in the collapse of primary schools at an average annual rate 
of destruction and erosion about 6% (1983-1991).  88% of the 215
	Jonathan Goodhand, "Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty," Chronic 211
Poverty Research Centre Working Paper 6, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 
2001, 12.
	Paul Collier, "On the economic consequences of civil war," Oxford Economic 212
Papers 51, no. 1 (1999): 175.
	Collier, 175-176.213
	Olga Shemyakina, "The effect of armed conflict on accumulation of schooling: 214
Results from Tajikistan," Journal of Development Economics 95, no. 2 (2011): 
196.
	Tilman Brück, "Macroeconomic Effects of the War in Mozambique," Queen 215
Elizabeth House Working Paper 11, University of Oxford, 1997, 40.
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children between 6-15 at the time of war witnessed physical abuse 
and/or torture, 64% of them were abducted from their families, and 
28% of them were trained for combat.  All of these and similar 216
costs of war result in a lower future income, lower health and 
education prospects, and lower life satisfaction. For instance, during 
the Burundi civil war, urban poverty rose from 40.9% to 65.8% 
between 1993-2003, and rural poverty rose from 39.6% to 70.4% 
for the same period.  Given that many of the countries in Africa 217
and Asia still suffer from civil wars and other armed conflicts, it is 
obvious that the negative effects of wars will exacerbate extreme 
poverty by depriving people of income and better health, and 
undermining the capacity of the state to provide public services 
which could otherwise have led to development.

Apart from the destructive and expensive business of war, 
resources reserved for the military are gigantic. For instance, in 2017 
the United States of America spent more than $600 billion, India 
spent more than $63 billion, Taiwan spent more than $10 billion, 
Indonesia spent more than $8 billion, and Sri Lanka spent more than 
$1 billion on the military. In the same year, the world spent more than 
$1.7 trillion on its militaries, which is 2.2% of global GDP.  218
Theoretically, the higher the military spending the higher the 
potential harm to the world through military interventions because of 
	Neil Boothby, Abubacar Sultan and Peter Upton, "Children of Mozambique: 216
The Cost of Survival," (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1991), 5-6.
	 International Money Fund, "Burundi: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper," 217
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, International Money Fund, 2007, 124.
	Nan Tian, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon 218
T. Wezeman, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2017 (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2018): 1.
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ever-evolving destructive technologies.  Therefore, military 219
spending does not only go towards weapons, military outfits, 
upkeeping of barracks and intelligence services which enhances the 
capacity of the military. Rather, military spending increases the risk 
of an increased death toll, people being disabled both physically and 
psychologically, sexual assaults, the destruction of social networks, 
forced migration, the exploitation of natural resources, and the 
demolition of habitable places. Possibly, it also increases the 
chances of an arms race posing a threat to global peace. 

Given that we have scarce resources, each resource allocated 
to the military is a resource taken away from alleviating extreme 
poverty. With the resources reserved for the military, there could be 
many improvements made in public services which could improve 
the lives of the extremely poor: recall Sachs' estimate that we 
needed less than $2 trillion to have met the Millenium Development 
Goals (including the goal of ending extreme poverty) in every 
country. Provided that Sachs' estimate was relatively precise, then 
only the 2 years' global military spending at 2017 levels would meet 
the target to end extreme poverty worldwide. The current estimates 
to end poverty may be higher, but we could still safely conclude that 
if we divert the resources from military to alleviate extreme poverty 




	Admittedly, by having a deterrence effect, military power and hence military 219
spending prevents some harm. After all, states and parties reach some form of 
stalemate when there are armies ready to wage a war or defend themselves. 
But this does not rule out the possibility that in a possible world where there 
had been no military and thus military spending, the total harm could have 
been less, and with the resources not allocated to the military, we could have 
ended extreme poverty.
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	 Inheritance laws regulate the transfer process of wealth 
between the deceased and their inheritors. In almost every country, 
inheritance laws transfer the wealth of the deceased to their 
relatives. Inheritance laws have endured through different political 
systems and paradigm shifts yet have sustained their basic 
tendency to transfer wealth on the basis of kinship.

	 There are three points to make. Firstly, inheritance laws which 
prioritise distributing the wealth of the deceased to their relatives 
have to be questioned if we believe that most of the wealth created 
by individuals arises from their coincidental privileges, or, luck. 
Secondly, even if we assume that all of the individual wealth has 
been gained through personal labour, it does not necessarily follow 
that one has the moral authority to decide to whom to bequeath all 
of that wealth. Thirdly, there is empirical evidence that global wealth 
is increasingly concentrated in the rich, and parallelly, inheritance 
laws result in transferring more wealth to the relatives of the rich 
which means that inheritance laws become more and more 
problematic for the extremely poor. The first and the second points 
are philosophical points which I have previously raised in this thesis 
(Chapter 2) and I leave them aside here. The third point is an 
empirical point which stresses the way in which extreme poverty can 
be aggravated through inheritance laws. All of these points propel us 
to question the current form of inheritance laws as inheritance laws 
clearly benefit the rich and keep the wealth away from the extremely 
poor.





In the central scenario, simulations based on the 
theoretical model (which successfully accounts for the 
evolutions of 1820–2010) suggest that the annual 
inheritance flow would continue to grow until 2030–
2040 and then stabilize at around 16–17 percent of 
national income. According to the alternative scenario, 
the inheritance flow should increase even more until 
2060–2070 and then stabilize at around 24–25 percent 
of national income, a level similar to that observed in 
1870–1910. In the first case, inherited wealth would 
make only a partial comeback; in the second, its 
comeback would be complete (as far as the total 
amount of inheritances and gifts is concerned). In both 
cases, the flow of inheritances and gifts in the twenty-
first century is expected to be quite high, and in 
particular much higher than it was during the 
exceptionally low phase observed in the mid-twentieth 
century. 
220
	 According to another report focusing on 1989-2008, in the 
United States of America, there were different levels of wealth 
transfer for different income levels. For instance, if you were earning 
between $15.000-$24.999 in 1998, then you would have ended up 
receiving an average of $246.700 (in 2007 dollars) in inheritance.  If 221
you were earning $250.000 or more, then you would have ended up 
	Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, (Cambridge and London: 220
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 398.
	Edward N. Wolff and Maury Gittleman, "United States Department of Labor, 221
Inheritances and the Distribution of Wealth Or Whatever Happened to the 
Great Inheritance Boom?", United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Working 
Paper 445, 2011, 33.
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receiving an average of $2.678,4 million (in 2007 dollars) in 
inheritance.  For the period between 1998-2007, almost all of the 222
recipients received the inheritance from their relatives.  Although 223
researchers did not conclude that the inequality of wealth transfers 
increased over time, they "found first of all that the inequality of 
wealth transfers is extremely high".  They state that:
224
From 1989 to 1998, the mean value of wealth transfers 
generally increased among the lower wealth classes 
but declined among the upper wealth classes with the 
notable exception of the top one percent, which 
experienced a 77 percent gain. From 1998 to 2007, in 
contrast, all wealth classes enjoyed increases in the 
mean value of wealth transfers, with the exception of 
the second and third. Over the full 18 years, the 
bottom two wealth classes as well as the top 
($1,000,000 or more) saw their mean transfers go 
down whereas the four in the middle saw gains. The 
top one percent saw their transfers surge by 143 
percent. 
225
	 We need not establish a precise correlation between income 
and wealth transfers. Some people who have been lucky to be born 
in the United States of America are lucky enough to receive 
tremendous wealth. 1% of the United States of America has 
	Wolff and Gittleman, 33.222
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	Wolff and Gittleman, 24.224
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especially witnessed an immense wealth transfer during the years 
researched. Compare these people to the extremely poor. A mere 
difference between where one is born, to which family one is born, 
and the current inheritance laws on the basis of biological ties 
restrict wealth transfer between different people in different families. 
If you are one of the extremely poor in Uganda, then you will either 
inherit some dilapidated shack and some personal goods or nothing 
at all. Is this fair that you get nothing just because you are born in 
Uganda as one of the extremely poor? Apart from it being unfair, the 
extremely poor person deprived of their potential: if this wealth had 
been allocated in a more balanced way globally, then it could have 
made a significance difference in tackling extreme poverty. 

	 Inheritance laws radically favour the members of already rich 
families and radically disfavour the members of already poor 
families. There is no morally relevant reason why all, or even most, of 
the wealth should be left to the biological family of the deceased. 
The current biology-centred inheritance laws are unfair, and the lack 
of global cooperation to radically transform inheritance laws for the 
benefit of the extremely poor slows the pace of the struggle against 
extreme poverty—we may need an international inheritance tax, 
collected by global organisations, to alleviate extreme poverty. 
Inheritance laws prevent unlucky individuals, such as the extremely 
poor, from claiming their fair share of wealth, and legally (but not 
morally) justifies the possession of wealth by lucky individuals or the 
rich. By globally limiting the distribution of wealth and sustaining it 
among the rich, inheritance laws are apt to make the extremely poor 
actually and potentially poorer. Inheritance laws perpetuate existing 
inequalities through generations. They entrench wealth in the hands 





	 Colonialism is the domination of one group over another with 
oppression, exploitation, and discrimination. Colonial practices date 
back to ancient times but they were especially violent between 
16th-20th century when empires sought to reinforce their authority 
through colonialism. Many scholars appeal to colonialism as a factor 
in explaining why we have extreme poverty today and why the 
extremely poor have been centred in the colonised regions of the 
world.

	 Jason Hickel draws attention to the economic advantage that 
Europe gained from Latin America's silver and gold, where extensive 
theft took place. Hickel states that

By the early 1800s, a total of 100 million kilograms of 
silver had been drained from Latin America and 
pumped into the European economy – first into Spain, 
and then out to the rest of Europe as payment on 
Spain's debts.

To get a sense of the scale of this wealth, consider this 
thought experiment: if 100 million kilograms of silver 
was invested in 1800 at 5 per cent interest – the 
historical average – it would amount to $165 trillion 
today, more than double the world's total GDP in 2015. 
Europe had to purchase some of this silver from 
indigenous Americans in exchange for goods, of 
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course, but much of it came for free – the product of 
coercive extraction. 
226
	 Hickel also stresses the massacres, forced dispossession, 
and the diseases that Europeans brought with them which killed 
most of the Latin American population between the end of 1400s 
and the middle of 1600s (according to one estimate, 95% of the 
entire Latin American population had been killed).  Hickel states 227
that the United States of America benefited from 222,505,049 hours 
of forced labour which happened between 1619 and the abolition of 
slavery in 1865.  According to one estimate, it is worth $97 trillion 228
in 1993 terms.  By abusing the bodies and the social conditions of 229
the slaves who could otherwise contribute to the local economy, and 
forcing the colonised regions to produce limited agricultural 
products, colonialism prevented the growth of domestic 
industries.  For instance, British colonisers forced Indians to 230
cultivate crops to export rather than allowing them to cultivate crops 
for subsistence.  Enclosure and privatisation of forests and water 231
sources were a norm.  Under the British colonisers who enclosed 232
and privatised the commons, 30 million people starved to death 
	Jason Hickel, The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and its Solutions 226








when El Niño struck.  The dichotomy between the core (colonising 233
regions) and the periphery (colonised regions) proved to be harmful 
to the latter: firstly, the prices of the primary commodity exports in 
the colonised regions decreased relative to the prices of the 
manufactured goods they managed to import, that is, the wealth 
was transferred to the colonisers, and secondly, the wages in the 
colonised regions for the goods they traded were lower than the 
c o l o n i s i n g r e g i o n s w h i c h m e a n t t h a t t h e y w e r e 
undercompensated.  Hickel concludes that: "By the end of the 234
colonial period, the periphery was losing $22 billion each year as a 
result of unequal exchange, which is equivalent to $161 billion in 
2015 dollars. That is twice the amount of aid and investment that the 
periphery was receiving each year during the same period. This 
arrangement became a major driver of global inequality". 
235
	 Regarding colonialism, Daren Acemoglu and James A. 
Robinson state that "Colonialism didn't just freeze Africa and 
remove the possibility for endogenous reform, it created structures 
which have subsequently inhibited economic growth".  Take South 236
Africa's "dual economy" as an example.  The dual economy 237
consists of the modern economic sectors and the traditional sectors 
in rural areas. 87% of the land was allocated to Europeans who 




	Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, "Why is Africa Poor?," Economic 236
History of Developing Regions 25, no. 1 (2010): 39.
	Acemoglu and Robinson, 34.237
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disproportionately favoured.  Africans were not allowed to start a 238
business on the European side, and, for instance, they were banned 
from having a skilled job in the mining sector.  Known as the 239
"colour bar", this distinction was expanded to the entire economy.  240
Whereas the elite Europeans got richer, Africans were deprived of 
what they had would have otherwise gained. South Africa is one of 
the many examples in Africa where a sharp divide between the 
colonisers and the colonised was present, and colonial practices 
deepened extreme poverty in one way or another.

In short, wealth, welfare, and power had been moved to the 
colonising regions at the expense of the colonised regions. By 
leaving a legacy of impoverishment and unfair advantage, 
colonialism contributed to the inception of extreme poverty, and its 
after-effects have impaired the potentials of people and regions. 
Surely, it is not a coincidence that extreme poverty predominantly 
exists in Africa, Asia and South America, as opposed to Europe and 
North America.

There could be different fronts to combat the residues of 
colonialism. The first could be working on a progressive global 
scheme to neutralise the negative global outcomes of colonialism 
through conducting in-depth economic and social research. The 
second could be initiating a global compensation for the systemic 
deprivation caused by colonialism—may it be in the form of debt 
cancellation or a binding treaty for resource reallocation from the 
colonising world to the colonised world. This may also include 
questioning international borders, and questioning the status quo of 
	Acemoglu and Robinson, 36.238
	Acemoglu and Robinson, 37.239
	Acemoglu and Robinson, 37.240
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keeping some resources within national borders: we may need a 
rethink of the legitimacy of borders in general. The third could be 
restructuring some of the major international organisations, such as 
reshaping the United Nations Security Council which has the power 
to authorise military action. All of these should be buttressed by 
rapid democratisation in similar dominant institutions to secure a fair 
representation of the colonised regions. These initiatives could boost 
the speed of alleviating extreme poverty and may lead a paradigm 




The alarming rate of malaria is usually thought to be a 
symptom of extreme poverty. Prevalent in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, malaria is one of the common but preventable diseases 
which puts 21.94% of Africa's population at risk (globally it is 
5.91%).  It is estimated that 435,000 people were killed by malaria 241
in 2017 alone.  The population at risk in Africa translates into 242
hundreds of millions of people. The direct economic costs of 
avoiding and treating malaria, and its indirect economics costs, 
harms the worst-off more than others: for example, in Malawi, 
annual spending for malaria treatment, malaria prevention and 
indirect economic costs accounted for 32.1% of average annual 
income among very low-income households and only 4.7% of 
	World Health Organization, Malaria Report 2018, (World Health Organization, 241
2018): 41.
	World Health Organization, 42.242
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average annual income among low to high-income households.  243
The economic cost of malaria to poor households can be especially 
severe when the sick individual is a productive member of the 
household, particularly the primary income-earner. Other household 
labour may be diverted from income-generating activities to care for 
sick family members. Reduced productivity and time away from 
work could reduce household income. According to a study in Sri 
Lanka, "on average patients bore 74% of the economic costs of 
[malaria]".  In one study in Kenya, compared to other determining 244
factors of school absenteeism such as lack of exam fees, books, or 
pens and unspecified illness, it was found that malaria was the 
leading cause of school absence with a rate of 39.6% of all the days 
missed.  In another study, it was detected that cerebral malaria led 245
to withdrawn/depressed problems (15.6%), thought problems 
(12.5%), aggressive behaviour (9.4%) and oppositional behaviour 
(9.4%) in Ugandan children.  Although it is a preventable disease, 246
malaria is life-threatening and its economic and social costs on poor 
children, families and states are overwhelming as 200,500 million out 
	M. B. Ettling, Deborah A. MacFarland, Linda J. Schultz and Lester Chitsulo, 243
"Economic impact of malaria in Malawian households," Tropical Medicine and 
Parasitology 45, no. 1 (1994): 78.
	Nimal Attanayake, Julia Fox-Rushby and Anne Mills, "Household costs of 244
'malaria' morbidity: a study in Matale district, Sri Lanka," Tropical Medicine 
and International Health 5, no. 9 (2000): 601.
	Nia King, Cate Dewey and David Borish, "Determinants of Primary School 245
Non- Enrollment and Absenteeism: Results from a Retrospective, Convergent 
Mixed Methods, Cohort Study in Rural Western Kenya," PLoS ONE 10, no. 9 
(2015): 7.
	Paul Bangirana, Noeline Nakasujja, Bruna Giordani, Robert O. Opoka, Chandy 246
C. John and Michael J. Boivin, "Reliability of the Luganda version of the Child 
Behaviour Checklist in measuring behavioural problems after cerebral 
malaria," Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health 3, no. 38 (2009): 
4.
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of 219,000 million estimated malaria cases by World Health 
Organization in 2017 were in Africa.  All of these studies show that 247
malaria puts a very high burden on the extremely poor.

	 To reduce the malaria case incidence and the subsequent 
mortality risk by 90% globally by 2030, it is estimated that $101.8 
billion is needed over 15 years: it means that we need 40% more 
investment than now.  Given the burden of malaria on extreme 248
poverty, achieving that would drastically ameliorate the lives of the 
extremely poor. They would harvest more and earn more, the failure 
of inaccessible health services would not make them lose time and 
energy, children could invest in their future by being able to continue 
their studies, and other benefits from slowing down malaria would 
follow. As the number of cases of malaria is strikingly high, wiping 
out malaria has the potential of positively affecting the entire 





	 The prevalence of neglected tropical diseases is commonly 
thought to be a symptom of extreme poverty. These are several 
diseases which are comparable to malaria in terms of their effects 
and extent. They include Buruli ulcer, Chagas disease, dengue and 
ch ikungunya , d racuncu l i as i s ( gu inea-worm d i sease ) , 
echinococcosis, foodborne trematodiases, Human African 
trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), leishmaniasis, leprosy 
	World Health Organization, Malaria Report 2018, 37.247
	Edith Patouillard, Jamie Griffin, Samir Bhatt, Azra Ghani and Richard Cibulskis, 248
"Global investment targets for malaria control and elimination between 2016 
and 2030," BMJ Global Health 2, no. e000176 (2017): 6.
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(Hansen ' s d i sease ) , l ympha t i c fi l a r i a s i s , myce toma , 
chromoblastomycosis and other deep mycoses, onchocerciasis 
(river blindness), rabies, scabies and other ectoparasites, 
schistosomiasis, soil-transmitted helminthiases, snakebite 
envenoming, taeniasis/cysticercosis, trachoma, yaws (endemic 
treponematoses).  By affecting hundreds of millions of people and 249
killing 170,000 people annually, neglected tropical diseases impair 
health, family income, and the economic productivity of the worst-
off in Africa, Asia and Latin America.  The solution to neglected 250
tropical diseases is increasing access to health services and getting 
people treated through correct public policies, and it is viable to 
eliminate neglected tropical diseases if the funding is increased.

Neglected tropical diseases have immense externalities. 
Known or suspected blinding trachoma cases show an annual 
potential productivity loss of US$2.9 billion (in 1995 terms and 1998 
productivity measures).  Febrile illnesses including dengue left 251
67% of infected households in debt in which their debt is "more 
than double the average amount households spent on food in 2 
weeks (mean US$ 9.5 per week prior to interview)".  Another 252
example is helminth: its elimination, the Human Development Index 
(HDI), and fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) are 
	"Neglected tropical diseases," World Health Organisation, accessed May 15, 249
2020, https://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/.
	Charlotte Watts, "Neglected tropical diseases: A DFID perspective," PLoS 250
Neglected Tropical Diseases 11, no. 4 (2017): 1.
	Kevin D. Frick, Eva V. Basilion, Christy L. Hanson and M. Arantxa Colchero, 251
"Estimating the burden and economic impact of trachomatous visual loss," 
Ophthalmic Epidemiology 10, no. 2 (2003): 128.
	Rekol Huy, Ole Wichmann, Mark Beatty, Chantha Ngan, Socheat Duong, 252
Harold S. Margolis and Sirenda Vong, "Cost of dengue and other febrile 
illnesses to households in rural Cambodia: a prospective community-based 
case-control study," BMC Public Health 9, no. 155 (2009): 4.
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intertwined: "Given the strong associations between helminthic and 
other NTDs and mental, physical, and economic human 
development, vulnerable and excluded populations, and HDI, in the 
coming months and years it may become essential to give due 
consideration to eliminating helminth infections as a means to 
achieve SDGs".  Unfortunately, "The countries with the highest 253
worm indices have an HDI less than 0.400".  This means that 254
those countries fare badly in human development, because any 
country with a rating lower than 0.549 in HDI is considered low.

	 One success story concerns lymphatic filariasis: after the 
establishment of a programme by the World Health Organization to 
defeat lymphatic filariasis in 2000, it is estimated that mass drug 
administration and other interventions have succeeded in preventing 
97 million cases and more than $100 billion in economic losses.  255
The total investments necessary to wipe out neglected tropical 
diseases is estimated to be US$34 billion between 2015-2030.  256
The required amount is much less than the global annual military 
spending, and they can be addressed by a very tiny portion of illicit 
financial flows.

	 Neglected tropical diseases do not kill most people they 
infect, but rather impede their economic potential and thus 
exacerbate extreme poverty. There is strong evidence that there is a 
	Peter J. Hotez and Jennifer R. Herricks, "Helminth Elimination in the Pursuit of 253
Sustainable Development Goals: A 'Worm Index' for Human Development," 
PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases 9, no. 4 (2015): 4.
	Hotez and Herricks, 2.254
	World Health Organization, The neglected tropical diseases: a rags-to-riches 255
story (World Health Organization, 2017), 79.
	World Health Organization, Investing to overcome the global impact of neg256 -
lected tropical diseases: third WHO report on neglected diseases 2015 (World 
Health Organization, 2015), xii.
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vicious cycle of being among the extremely poor and catching 
neglected tropical diseases.  In other words, neglected tropical 257
diseases emerge due to poverty which obstructs access to health 
services and proper infrastructure. However, there is a loop here: 
while neglected tropical diseases almost entirely exist in low-income 
countries because of extreme poverty, they also cause extreme 
poverty by considerably reducing economic productivity and hence 
future earnings. Getting rid of neglected tropical diseases is 
indispensable to the alleviation of extreme poverty.






	 Research suggests that there are different causes of extreme 
poverty which has sprung from various social conditions and 
historical inequalities. What is called the systemic causes of extreme 
poverty (illicit financial flows, foreign debt, war and military 
spending, inheritance laws, and colonialism) seem to be much more 
serious than the symptoms of extreme poverty (malaria and 
neglected tropical diseases).

	 Why are they more "serious"? The reasons for this are 
twofold. The first is that the total harm that has been historically and 
currently brought about by systemic causes far surpass the total 
harm brought about by the symptoms of extreme poverty. For 
instance, foreign debt prevents necessary investments to 
healthcare, education, government agencies, welfare funds and 
	Mathieu Bangert, David H. Molyneux, Steve W. Lindsay, Christopher 257
Fitzpatrick and Dirk Engels, "The cross-cutting contribution of the end of 
neglected tropical diseases to the sustainable development goals," Infectious 
Diseases of Poverty 6, no. 73 (2017): 15-16.
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savings for the extremely poor. War makes low-income countries 
even poorer. Inheritance laws based on kinship prevents trillions to 
be distributed fairly among the extremely poor, and leads to the 
monopolisation of resources. Colonialism has killed millions, and its 
after-effects on the political stage are prevalent. This means that 
hundreds of millions of people were, are and will be deprived of 
basic infrastructure investments which would benefit them 
immensely. Millions of them have suffered from and will suffer from 
premature death. While malaria and neglected tropical diseases as 
the symptoms of extreme poverty have also very negative 
consequences on the extremely poor, the physical, economic and 
the social harms brought about by the systemic causes of extreme 
poverty are cumulatively greater than the physical, economic and 
the social harms brought about by symptoms of extreme poverty. 
Such harms arising from the lack of attention to systemic causes of 
extreme poverty inevitably lead to the advancement of the 
symptoms of extreme poverty—for instance, if low-income countries 
have to pay their foreign debt with high interest rates, then they have 
fewer resources to combat malaria and neglected tropical diseases.

	 Relatedly, the second is that if we can successfully tackle 
systemic causes of extreme poverty, we can also successfully 
prevent the symptoms of extreme poverty. For instance, as 
explained above, trillions are lost because of illicit financial flows. If 
only a tiny portion of that loss had been prevented through systemic 
change and used to address the symptoms of extreme poverty, then 
malaria could have easily been eradicated (as referred before, it is 
estimated that $101.8 billion is needed over 15 years to cut malaria 




	 In the next section, in light of the empirical research 
presented above, I assess the systemic change objection against 
effective altruism, which challenges Premise 4.

4.4	 The systemic change objection

	 In the previous section of this chapter, I showed that the 
systemic causes of extreme poverty such as illicit financial flows, 
foreign debt, war and military spending, inheritance laws, and 
colonialism put a greater burden on extreme poverty than malaria 
and neglected tropical diseases. Such a fact signifies that systemic 
change which aims to eliminate the systemic causes of extreme 
poverty is of pivotal significance in the struggle against extreme 
poverty. Due to this reason, we have to take the systemic change 
objection against effective altruism seriously.

	 In this part, I present the systemic change objection which 
accuses effective altruism of unjustifiably distracting individuals from 
systemic change. The systemic change objection leaves us with 
three alternative propositions concerning how much of their spare 
resources individuals should allocate to systemic change. Through 
comparing low-risk actions with high-risk actions, I argue that 
individuals should neither allocate all of their spare resources to 
systemic change nor to effective charities. However uncomplicated 
it appears to be, such a conclusion depends highly on one's moral 
preferences and set of moral values in general in a world plagued by 
risk. In the end, I review the lessons which effective altruism could 
learn and should take from the systemic change objection with 
respect to Premise 4.
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	 Currently, GiveWell does not recommend any organisation 
aiming to challenge global economic exploitation, corruption or 
discrimination. Nor does it promote any organisation focusing on the 
systemic causes of extreme poverty, and the development of 
grassroots movements. As leading effective altruists predominantly 
rely on GiveWell's recommendations and primarily stress the 
benefits of donating to charities that aim to alleviate extreme 
poverty, and rarely write on structural reforms and institutional 
improvements, the claim that effective altruism puts donating at the 
centre stage and lacks sufficient discussion of systemic change is 
not unwarranted.

	 Focusing only on donating is not always well-received. The 
literature is abundant with criticisms against philanthropy in the form 
of donating where effective altruism is either directly or indirectly 
criticised. For instance, Paul Gomberg states that "Philanthropic 
responses detract from a revolutionary political response that might 
end poverty".  In other words, philanthropic responses such as 258
calling for donations could be detrimental to the solution of poverty. 
According to Gomberg,

[I]f the forces creating hunger can be stopped, then to 
limit ourselves to addressing their effects without 
addressing these forces themselves is like trying to bail 
the boat without fixing the leak. The fallacy of 
	Paul Gomberg, "The Fallacy Of Philanthropy," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 258
32, no. 1 (2002): 30.
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philanthropy is one reason (among many) for the one-
sidedness of philosophical discussion of hunger. 
Focusing our attention on immediate help, the analogy 
tends to obscure that the ordinary workings of 
capitalist markets create and exacerbate poverty. So 
the fallacy of philanthropy narrows the discourse about 




	 Gomberg is also concerned that helping others through 
donations results in embracing the status quo which takes poverty 
for granted and amplifies "political quietism". 
260
	 For some, working towards systemic change as opposed to 
donating to charities is a process which empowers institutions. In 
that respect, Theodore M. Lechterman argues that offering malaria 
nets and implementing deworming programs do not address the 
problems caused by "dysfunctional public health infrastructure" as 
they "distract from the urgent but thorny process of institution-
building".  Similarly, while cash transfers offer some improvements 261
for individuals, they "appear to reduce pressure on the state to 
regulate the economy in ways that serve its least advantaged 
citizens, to develop its own assistance programs, and to demand 
sacrifices from local economic elites".  The concern is that 262
donating to charities instead of working towards systemic change 





	Theodore M. Lechterman, "The Effective Altruist's Political Problem", 52.261
	Lechterman, 93.262
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	 Another concern is that donating will frustrate the creation of 
a global ethic which fosters the collective participation of individuals 
in the political systems that they are in. For instance, Anthony 
Langlois states that systemic change is desirable because of its 
"creation and maintenance of political cultures that prioritise citizen 
participation in and accountability for the political order of which 
they are a part".  In contrast, the assumption that "monthly bank 263
balance deductions in the direction of voluntary foreign aid 
donation" could ensure that people are going to construct and 
believe in a global ethic has no basis.  Again, donations are said to 264
have an obstructing effect in the struggle against extreme poverty 
because of a false belief.

	 Likewise, Lisa Herzog accuses effective altruism of 
"focus[ing] on the 'rational choices' of individuals within the current 
system".  Saying that effective altruism has an "individualistic 265
bias", Herzog states that effective altruism "doesn't demand 
enough".  The concern here is the behaviour of "picking and 266
choosing charities from an armchair" which may result in missing the 
importance of "creat[ing] institutions and practices in line with our 
moral values and ideals". 
267
	 The points made by different philosophers intersect at the 
claim that systemic change is something which promises immense 
	Anthony J. Langlois, "Charity and Justice in Global Poverty Relief," Australian 263
Journal of Political Science 43, no. 4, (2008): 695.
	Langlois, 695.264
	Lisa Herzog, "Can 'effective altruism' really change the world?", Open 265
Democracy, February 22, 2016, opendemocracy.net/en/transformation/can-
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social, economic and political utility whereas donating is regarded as 
something which significantly delays or completely halts systemic 
change. All of these lead us to the systemic change objection 
against effective altruism.

The systemic change objection. Effective altruism 
unjustifiably distracts individuals from allocating their 
spare resources to systemic change.

	 As the systemic change object ion rel ies on the 
indispensability of addressing the systemic causes of extreme 
poverty through systemic change, we can broadly draw three 
different variants of it, expressed in these propositions:

1. Individuals should allocate all of their spare 
resources to systemic change.

2. Individuals should allocate most of their spare 
resources to systemic change.

3. Individuals should allocate some of their spare 
resources to systemic change.

	 The first proposition rules out allocating spare resources to 
causes which are unrelated to systemic change. In that case, we are 
not permitted to donate to charities which provide people with 
fortified food, offer energy subsidies in winter, and organise training 
for employment. Instead, we are asked to allocate all of our spare 
resources to mobilising, policy-making, changing politics, 
challenging current laws, and even triggering a revolution. The first 
proposition reflects Paul Gomberg's train of thought as Gomberg 
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believes that not even a tiny portion of spare resources should be 
used for interventions unrelated to systemic change. Gomberg 
argues that:

Whatever money we devote to relief of famine or 
hunger is money that we do not devote to putting an 
end to the social relations that create hunger; whatever 
time we spend in activities of famine or hunger relief is 
time taken away from addressing large scale causes. 
That is, both projects, relief and prevention, are so 
huge that in doing more of one we do less of the other. 
In addressing poverty these are competing ways of 
using our time, energy, and other resources. So the 
proposal do both is not a viable way to defend 
philanthropist duties of rescue. Only under the most 
unusual circumstances (where the optimal response to 
poverty was to give some aid but not to devote all 
one's efforts to giving aid) would it be the case that the 
best response would be to balance giving aid with 
addressing the causes of poverty. 
268
	 By appealing to the scarcity of resources and opportunity 
costs of our actions, Gomberg concludes that individuals should 
allocate all of their spare resources to systemic change unless some 
unusual circumstances arise.

	 The second proposition opts for allocating most of our spare 
resources to addressing the systemic causes of extreme poverty. At 
the same time, we can support causes which are unrelated to 
	Gomberg, "The Fallacy Of Philanthropy," 64.268
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systemic change as well. Nevertheless, the amount of spare 
resources allocated to the interventions unrelated to systemic 
change should not exceed the amount of spare resources allocated 
to the interventions related to systemic change. For instance, as 
Elizabeth Ashford argues, "[D]uties to donate to effective aid 
agencies should be seen as backup duties to aid those who have 
been unjustly deprived of their economic entitlements. Affluent 
agents are under both primary duties of justice to reform the 
structures that underpin severe poverty and backup duties to aid 
those suffering severe poverty".  Ashford's view is about the 269
primacy of the obligations, and not necessarily the amount of 
spending one ought to devote to systemic change. But a hierarchy 
made between primary duties and backup duties can inform the 
discussion of how much we should devote to systemic change and 
charities. If we are close to Ashford's view, then we may be likely to 
defend devoting more spare resources to systemic change. This 
train of thought entails that we should use the greater amount of our 
spare resources to fulfil our primary duties of justice, and the rest 
should be allocated to donating to fulfil backup duties. The second 
proposition appeals to those who have strong credence in systemic 
change and at the same time have a willingness to explore other 
interventions unrelated to systemic change in alleviating extreme 
poverty. In that respect, it attracts those who believe that supporting 
the interventions unrelated to systemic change is compatible with 
supporting the interventions related to systemic change. Evidently, 
the second proposition is weaker than the first proposition.

	Elizabeth Ashford, "Severe Poverty as an Unjust Emergency," in The Ethics of 269
Giving: Philosophers' Perspectives on Philanthropy, ed. Paul Woodruff (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2018): 108.
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	 The third proposition permits us to take action which is 
unrelated to systemic change in alleviating extreme poverty but we 
are still asked to support systemic change with some of our spare 
resources. We could allocate most of our spare resources to 
GiveWell's recommended charities which are thought to be effective, 
however, allocating all of our spare resources to them is prohibited. 
The third proposition provides us with a comfort zone but its 
uncertainty about the ratio of allocation propels us to be careful in 
our decision-making process.

	 As I have already stated, the empirical research on the causes 
of extreme poverty demonstrates that we have to address the 
systemic causes of extreme poverty if we want to alleviate extreme 
poverty. Nevertheless, that does not rule out the possibility that 
there could be cases made against allocating all our spare resources 
to systemic change at the individual level.  In the following, I make 270
a case for not allocating all of our spare resources to systemic 
change via the comparison of low-risk actions and high-risk actions. 
I explain what it entails for allocating most and some of our 
resources to systemic change. At the end of the chapter, I clarify 
what the comparison of low-risk actions and high-risk actions 
means for effective altruism.

4.5	 Low-risk actions versus high-risk actions

	 Low-risk actions have a greater chance of success with 
regards to their intended outcomes, in contrast to high-risk actions 
which have a lower chance of success with regards to their intended 
	The following cases made against allocating our spare resources to systemic 270
change are intended to bind individuals and are not institutions and 
governments.
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outcomes. In the case of extreme poverty, I argue that donating to 
charities qualifies as a low-risk action and working towards systemic 
change qualifies as a high-risk action. If that is true, then a case 
could be made for preferring low-risk action (donating) over high-risk 
action (working towards systemic change), which unavoidably 
weakens the systemic change objection.

	 Why is donating is a low-risk action and working towards 
systemic change a high-risk action? Via donating, individuals target 
a specific problem such as the lack of food, shelter or access to 
health and education. Since the problem is usually material 
deprivation or inability to receive institutional support, donations try 
to empower people by providing them with what they need. All over 
the world, charities ensure the distribution of vitamin tablets, the 
building of houses, increases in access to health services and 
schooling. If we choose charities which are transparent and are 
effective, then it is likely that the potential recipients will indeed 
receive and benefit from donations. Moreover, donors are 
increasingly able to track and assess the impact of their donations 
and decide which causes and interventions to support. As there are 
many charities that regularly publish their budgets and impact 
reports, individuals can review them and come to a conclusion 
about their performance. Some charities even keep individuals 
updated about how donations are transferred, where they are in the 
transfer chain, and they send information about how their donations 
have affected the lives of the recipients. If the chosen charity has 
proven itself, the risk of the resources being misused, lost or stolen 
is quite low. In that respect, donating to charities, especially time-
tested ones, could be deemed as a low-risk action.
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	 This does not mean that donating to charities does not carry 
risks: the new administration of a highly-respected charity could be 
corrupt, donations may be seized by outlaws while being 
transferred, the country where the donations are sent could block 
them, donations may be misused without the knowledge of donors 
or the charity, or they may simply not benefit their recipients. A good 
example of failure comes directly from a programme previously 
recommended by GiveWell called No Lean Season. No Lean 
Season, which was run by the charity Evidence Action, targeted the 
rural poor by fostering labour mobility which increases incomes. 
They offered travel subsidies to the rural poor to find a job between 
planting and harvesting periods. No Lean Season was promoted as 
one of the top programmes in 2017 due to randomised controlled 
trials done in 2008 and 2014 where it was recognised to be 
exceptionally cost-effective. One exception was a randomised 
controlled trial done in 2013 where "the researchers consider the 
study in that year to have failed, possibly due to political factors in 
Bangladesh in 2013" in which migration has been adversely 
affected.  Nonetheless, by "weighing the evidence, the cost of the 271
program, and the potential impacts", GiveWell decided to name it as 
one of the top programmes in November 2017.  When the 272
operating scale increased in 2017 and No Lean Season started 
reaching 158,155 households as opposed to 16,268 households in 
2016, a randomised controlled trial whose preliminary results were 
shared with GiveWell in September 2018 found that No Lean Season 
	"Conditional Subsidies for Seasonal Labor Migration in Northern Bangladesh," 271
GiveWell, November 2018, https://www.givewell.org/international/technical/
programs/conditional-subsidies-seasonal-labor-migration-Bangladesh.
	Catherine Hollander, "Update on No Lean Season's Top Charity Status," 272
GiveWell, November 19, 2018, blog.givewell.org/2018/11/19/update-on-no-
lean-seasons-top-charity-status.
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did not induce migration. Subsequently, GiveWell removed No Lean 
Season from its recommendations. More importantly, Evidence 
Action decided to shut down No Lean Season.  The decision was 273
taken not only because of this specific failure but also because of 
the local Bangladeshi organization that Evidence Action contracted 
to implement the No Lean Season program allegedly tried to bribe 
an agency. There was no evidence found concerning the latter but 
investigators from Evidence Action found that its policies and 
procedures were not followed in one instance. This example shows 
that charities, even those who are regularly checked, could fail.

	 Nevertheless, given that charities worldwide successfully 
improve the lives of hundreds of millions of people each year, 
various problems potentially affecting charities are not sufficient to 
make donating to charities a high-risk action. If charities are 
transparent about their governance and budgets, assessed by 
independent organisations and present impact reports, then serious 
problems are not likely to emerge or be prevented in the initial 
stages. If serious problems emerge, as in the case of No Lean 
Season, then they can be detected rather quickly. Given that they 
are continuously being assessed by GiveWell and others, we have 
more reasons to trust to GiveWell recommended charities and 
programmes than some other small and local charities. In that 
respect, donating in general is a low-risk action and in particular 
donating to effective charities is a low-risk action since they are 
tested by many researchers, collaborate with time-tested 
organisations (such as Against Malaria Foundation collaborating with 
International Red Cross), publish their research materials, and are 
	Kanika Bahl, "We're Shutting Down No Lean Season, Our Seasonal Migration 273
Program: Here's Why", Evidence Action, June 6, 2019, https://
www.evidenceaction.org/blog-full/why-we-are-shutting-down-no-lean-season.
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finally checked by GiveWell which openly lists its past mistakes.  274
Moreover, GiveWell has been evaluated internally and externally in 
the past, which makes GiveWell recommended charities even less of 
a risk than other charities which are rarely being checked. 
275
	 As donating to the most effective charities is a low-risk 
action, why is working towards systemic change a high-risk action?

	 Since systemic change demands a lot of people focusing on 
the same goal, lots of resources, and the neutralisation of other 
parties attempting to prevent systemic change, it is normally a long-
term investment. Abolition of slavery in Europe and North America 
needed almost three centuries to be successful, feminists have been 
struggling to ensure suffrage and reproductive rights for at least a 
hundred years, and LGBT+ individuals have been fighting for their 
recognition for more than fifty years. Many of the successful social 
movements have experienced setbacks from time to time and they 
have demanded additional resources to maintain their momentum. 
With donating we need relatively few people to cooperate, but with 
systemic change, we need mass cooperation which makes 
achieving systemic change much more risky.

	 Even if we gather enough people on our side, manage to 
garner vast resources and counteract the opponents of systemic 
change somehow, we may still be required to wait for our policies to 
be brought to maturity. We may need to wait years to properly 
understand and adequately review the effects of our decisions, and 
we may want to alter the policies in the meantime. For instance, 
even if we force countries to curb carbon emissions with strict laws, 
	"Our Mistakes," GiveWell, March 2019, https://www.givewell.org/about/our-274
mistakes.
	"Evaluat ions of GiveWel l ," GiveWel l , November 2019, https://275
www.givewell.org/how-we-work/self-evaluation.
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increase workplace democracy in the multinational companies, 
revolt against a militaristic administration, then it is certain that its 
effects will not be short-lived. In that respect, we not only require a 
serious amount of time to initiate and develop systemic change, but 
also require a serious amount of time to understand its effects which 
are large-scale. Put simply, working towards systemic change is like 
a relay race. Some individuals prepare the base for systemic change 
and others follow the lead of the early adopters. Once the cause 
gains a critical mass, striking changes unfold in the society. As it is a 
time-consuming process, individuals in their lifetimes could see the 
fruits of their efforts but they often do not witness a systemic change 
from its beginning to its end. Instead, they contribute to some 
fragment of this prolonged process.

	 Moreover, pursuing systemic change may come with the risk 
of turbulence, trauma, disturbance, interruption and unintended and 
unpredicted trouble. The harms may be justified on utilitarian 
grounds or counterbalanced one way or another in the end but the 
costs may still be highly undesirable. For instance, the desire for or 
the preparation of systemic change may cause a civil war or an 
economic upheaval. Likewise, systemic change may sometimes 
undergo a metamorphosis in which there is a subversion of initial 
goals and intentions. Innocence may not be sustained against the 
fragility of will: power drunkenness and a counterrevolution could 
even subvert the promised systemic change. For instance, 
according to Trotskyites, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was 
one of them: many people contributed to and died for the promise of 
increased liberties and equality but the gradual centralisation of 
power and the cult of personality under Joseph Stalin's 
administration ended the hopes of systemic change. This is not to 
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say that we should be discouraged from taking part in social 
movements which require systemic change: it is just that collective 
action and political change naturally trigger a conflict between 
different parties and different positions.

	 In the circle of those who defend systemic change, there is a 
relative inattention to the comparison of donating and working 
towards systemic change with respect to their risks. They rather 
refer to the requirements of systemic change which cannot be easily 
satisfied. For instance, Andrew Kuper as a fierce supporter of 
systemic change acknowledges that "[Systemic change] requires a 
nuanced awareness that politics is ineradicably about scale and 
connectedness, and thus the coordinated action of multiple 
interdependent roles".  The view that systemic change is a high-276
risk action has also been shared by scholars who are sympathetic to 
the alleviation of poverty through donating and effective altruism. 
For instance, Brian Berkey states that "Achieving meaningful and 
positive institutional change is difficult, resource intensive, and 
requires substantial participation and cooperation among those 
committed to bringing it about. Proponents of the institutional 
critique know this, and insist, in no uncertain terms, that we must 
strive to achieve it nonetheless."  In reply to the critics of effective 277
altruism, Jeff McMahan states that

I can, of course, decide to concentrate my individual 
efforts on changing my state's institutions, or indeed 
on trying to change global economic institutions, 
	Andrew Kuper, "More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the 'Singer 276
Solution'," Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 2 (2007): 120.
	Brian Berkey, "The Institutional Critique of Effective Altruism," Utilitas 30, no. 2 277
(2017): 170.
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though the probability of my making a difference to the 
l ives of badly impoverished people may be 
substantially lower if I adopt this course than if I 
undertake more direct action, unmediated by the 
state. 
278
	 Likewise, in a response to Gomberg, Søren Sofus Wichmann 
and Thomas Søbirk Petersen, who defend poverty relief, believe that 
systemic change "is likely to be both lengthy and uncertain".  All of 279
these points show that with donating we need relatively few people 
to cooperate in order for our money to get to the intended 
recipients, but, with systemic change we need mass cooperation 
which makes it much less certain.

	 Even though donating to the most effective charities is a low-
risk action and working towards systemic change is a high-risk 
action, the latter promises to bring about greater utility if it is 
achieved. This is because the laws, institutions and the global order 
would be positively changed, the changes would become solidified, 
and the number of people who would be affected by it is vast. In a 
similar vein, stabilised utility is emphasised to offset the high-risk of 
working towards systemic change. Thomas Syme argues that even if 
donations help many of the extremely poor and ameliorate their lives 
by offering them necessities and more, it does not address the 
	Jeff McMahan, "Philosophical Critiques of Effective Altruism," manuscript, 278
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:61cb62d7-13d2-49b8-a6c0-a1bf63c2ecda/




	Søren Sofus Wichmann and Thomas Søbirk Petersen, "Poverty relief: 279
philanthropy versus changing the system: a critical discussion of some 
objections to the 'Singer Solution'," Journal of Global Ethics 9, no. 1 (2013): 7.
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global complications which keep extreme poverty alive, and, without 
systemic change, poverty will reproduce itself over and over.  280
Perhaps additional donations would be required to eradicate 
extreme poverty but systemic change "can be stable over decades 
or centuries".  In that case, systemic change as opposed to 281
donating would be preferred because of its efficiency, or in other 
words, routineness and easiness. 
282
	 However, before we praise systemic change because of its 
capacity to produce stabilised utility and choose to allocate all of our 
spare resources to it, even though we believe that it has a relatively 
low chance of success, we should bear in mind the lesson of 
Pascal’s mugging.  Pascal's mugging is a thought experiment 283
where Blaise Pascal encounters a mugger who is unarmed. The 
mugger presents a deal: if the philosopher gives the mugger the 
wallet, the mugger will return twice the money. Pascal does not 
accept it because it is not clear whether Pascal can trust the mugger 
to bring back double the money. The mugger repeatedly increases 
the amount promised to bring back, and states that there should be 
a point where it gradually becomes rational to accept the huge 
expected utility of the deal, despite the extremely low chance that 
Pascal will see a penny. The mugger promises Pascal 1,000 
quadrillion happy days of life and Pascal concedes by giving the 
wallet. Despite Pascal's doubts, the amount of expected utility 
seems to trump them. The story represents the fallacious reasoning 
	Timothy Syme, "Charity vs. Revolution: Effective Altruism and the Systemic 280
Change Objection," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2019): 96.
	Syme, 96.281
	Syme, 96.282
	Nick Bostrom, "Pascal's mugging," Analysis 69, no. 3, (2009): 443-445.283
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of expected utility maximisation, which requires us to pursue vast 
utilities with tiny probabilities. In the case of systemic change, a 
similar narrative can be found in some Marxist beliefs: for instance, 
there is a belief that through a global proletarian revolution not only 
economic exploitation but also gender and race inequality would 
cease to exist in the world. Even if the promises might come into 
being one day in the future, neither the promise of these vast utilities 
nor the promise of stabilised utility could mask the fact that working 
towards systemic change is a high-risk action. Perhaps the most 
seductive aspect of working towards systemic change in contrast to 
donating is the excitement it stimulates because of its greater utility, 
especially among those who hope for a radical and permanent 
change in the global structure.

	 Now, I present four cases through which we can compare 
choosing to donate and choosing to allocate our spare resources to 
systemic change. While these cases are hypothetical, they should 
illustrate the trade-off between effective charities and systemic 
change. In these cases, we will see that donating to charities 
represents low-risk low-reward scenarios, and allocating spare 
resources to systemic change represents high-risk high-reward 
scenarios. Hence, the question we will ask is whether we should 
prefer low-risk low-reward scenarios or high-risk high-reward 
scenarios.

First Case. Suppose that I have £100 to distribute. I 
have visited some remote villages where the lack of 
hygiene materials is an immense problem for the 
welfare of current and future generations. I am very 
much affected by the scenes and become sympathetic 
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to a charity which distributes hygiene materials to 
those in need. I am also sympathetic to an organisation 
which supports political candidates who are promising 
to back policies which will ensure a fairer distribution 
of resources, including increasing hygiene material 
distribution.

	 I review the accomplishments of the charity which I deem to 
be successful and trustworthy. The impact report states that for 
each £10 donated, 1 person gets access to the hygiene materials 
they need for a year. Let me translate it to 1 Utility (1 U). It means 
that by donating £100, I could cover the hygiene materials for 10 
people for a year and create 10 U. But there can be organisational 
and social problems along the way that might impede the transfer 
chain and the welfare gain. Assume that each donation has a 90% 
chance of success. The expected utility of the donation becomes 9 
EU. 
284
	 I also review the accomplishments of an organisation that 
builds the infrastructure of systemic change. They invest their 
resources to mass mobilisation, build networks between people, 
organisations and policy-makers to bring about changes in laws 
which would guarantee health improvements. According to the 
impact predictions, their new project to support political candidates 
who promise to improve the hygiene conditions in a run-down 
village will affect the entire community of 90 people if the political 
candidates manage to get elected. I notice that the chance of 
political candidates that they support is not low but they are likely to 
face various bureaucratic barriers. Many of the past projects of the 
	 (10)×(90/100).284
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organisation were also hindered in similar ways and there have been 
crucial mishaps along the way. I calculate that the success chance 
of the organisation in this particular project is 10%. Thus, the 
expected utility is equal to 9 EU. 
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Second Case. Suppose that everything is the same as 
in First Case, except the number of people affected if 
the political organisation is successful. Let me assume 
that 900 people are positively affected once the policy 
change happens. It means that the expected utility of 
the organisation is 90 EU against the expected utility of 
charity which is 9 EU. 
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	 Inevitably, how we decide between donating to charity and 
working towards systemic change boils down to the deeper issue of 
risk-keenness and risk-averseness. For instance, in First Case, 
expected utility is the same, but risk-keen individuals would be likely 
to choose systemic change over charity because the number of 
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averse individuals would opt for charity. Moreover in Second Case, 
risk-keen individuals would be likely to opt for systemic change 
because there is a 10-fold difference in expected utility. Risk-averse 
individuals would be likely to do the opposite. As far as systemic 
change is concerned in First Case and Second Case, the term itself 
refers to some modest change in a narrow context like a local 
institutional improvement. With the number of people affected and 
the vastness of the impact, the discussion regarding extreme 
poverty with respect to donating and working towards systemic 
change is more likely to be associated with Third Case and Fourth 
Case rather than First Case and Second Case.

Third Case. Suppose that I am a respected public 
intellectual who has a massive power to change the 
direction of resources. I could have an impact on the 
ordinary folk, politicians, and the rich. By publicly 
supporting a cause, I can initiate a chain to raise £1 
billion for that cause. I face the dilemma: I either 
publicly support the vaccination of 100 million people 
or I publicly support an unarmed rebel group with the 
ideals of equality and freedom to overthrow an 
oppressive government under which 900 million 
people are living.

	 I examine the works of the charity responsible for vaccination. 
The charity works globally under the close supervision of many 
states and other international organisations, and has successfully 
vaccinated hundreds of millions of people in the past decades. I 
calculate that it has 90% of being successful in vaccinating 100 
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million people, and the expected utility is 90 million utility (90 
MEU). 
287
	 I also inspect the activities, values, and the links of the 
unarmed rebel group. I am sympathetic to it as it does not aim to 
use any violence but it is planning to trigger peaceful mass 
demonstrations to force the government to step down. 900 million 
people are living under the oppressive government, and 
overthrowing it means that 900 million people are going to receive a 
higher quality of health and education services, and they are going 
to have more political rights and personal liberties. After doing the 
calculation, I discern that the rebel group has a 10% chance of 
being successful which again creates 90 MEU.  In this case, 288
overthrowing the oppressive government enables an improvement in 
the lives of 900 million people equal to vaccination of 100 million 
people because the expected utility between two is equal. 
289
Fourth Case. Suppose that everything is the same as in 
the Third Case but the number of people being 
affected by the systemic change that the unarmed 
rebel group affects is different. If the oppressive 
government is overthrown, it will trigger a chain of 
peaceful mass demonstrations in other regions as well, 
which would result in 9 billion people having drastic 
improvements to their lives. It provides 900 MU against 
	 (100,000,000)×(90/100).287
	 (900,000,000)×(10/100).288
	For the sake of the argument, suppose that the vaccine creates the same 289
benefit per person as being freed from oppression.
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90 MU which can be created by vaccinating 100 
million people. 
290
	 As opposed to First Case and Second Case, the systemic 
change referred to in Third Case and in Fourth Case are analogous 
to the systemic change discussed in relation to effective altruism. 
Whereas First Case and Second Case are significant to understand 
risk-keenness and risk-averseness, Third Case and Fourth Case 
highlight the variable of scale in choosing between charity and 
systemic change. As the number of people I could affect becomes 
greater, risk-keenness appears to become less and less plausible 
because the expected loss would be immense. For instance, it is 
somewhat bewildering and daring to choose systemic change over 
charity in Third Case, even though it is much easier to choose 
systemic change over charity in First Case in which the chance of 
systemic change being successful is the same in both cases, but the 
number of people affected and expected utility are incredibly 
different. After all, even though the risk of failure is the same, failing 
90 people in First Case through a failed investment in systemic 
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certainty) and failing 9 billion people in Third Case through systemic 
change (where we could otherwise have helped 100 million people 
with 90% certainty) result in outstandingly different potentials 
missed. In First Case, our failure to help 90 people because of our 
risk-keenness (accepting a 10% chance of success) means that we 
have missed the opportunity to help 10 people with 90% certainty. 
Some may understandably choose it. But in Third Case, our failure 
to help 900 million people because of our risk-keenness (accepting 
10% chance of success) signifies that we have missed the 
opportunity to help 100 million people with 90% certainty. Choosing 
systemic change over charity in Third Case is less convincing than 
choosing systemic change over charity in First Case. There is 
something similar at work in the comparison of Second Case and 
Fourth Case: those who are risk-keen by choosing to allocate their 
spare resources to systemic change in Second Case would probably 
be less comfortable to allocate their spare resources to systemic 
change in Fourth Case.

	 Arguably, in the wake of enormous risks and immense yet 
doubtful promises, it seems understandable to opt for allocating 
spare resources to relatively modest aims with very high success 
chances. In fact, this is what effective altruists do: they focus on 
donating to charities which have modest aims relative to the 
promises of systemic change. This is also what Pascal's mugging 
tells us: being attracted to vast utilities with tiny probabilities could 
deceive us badly. In Pascal's mugging, the mugger is evil, but in the 
case of systemic change, deception does not necessarily find its 
origins in evil. Many proponents of systemic change act in good 
faith to change the world radically. But a global reform or revolution 
requires enormous resources and cooperation that it produces a 
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great risk of failure. To avoid it, effective altruists avoid opting for 
systemic change, and they instead accept modest aims. That seems 
to some degree reasonable.

	 It could be concluded that we should not allocate all of our 
spare resources to systemic change because of its high-risk nature. 
But if we should not allocate all of our spare resources to systemic 
change because of its high-risk nature, then should we allocate all of 
our spare resources to donating? Possibly, the collective obligations 
problem rules it out. As discussed by Allan F. Gibbard and Donald 
Regan, and adapted to effective altruism by Alexander Dietz, the 
collective obligations problem emerges where maximising individual 
utility does not always correspond to maximising overall utility. 
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	 Dietz explains the collective obligations problem via a thought 
experiment:

For each of us who donates to GiveDirectly, one 
person will ultimately be able to rise out of poverty. On 
the other hand, if we both donate to the advocacy 
group, the group will muster enough support to remove 
the immigration restrictions, which will have the effect 
of lifting millions of people out of poverty. But if only 
one of us donates to the advocacy group, this 
donation will accomplish nothing, and someone will 
remain in poverty whom we could otherwise have 
benefited. In this case, if we both donate to 
GiveDirectly, each of us will do the most good we can, 
given what the other is doing. Thus, we will succeed at 
	Alexander Dietz, "Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations," Utilitas 31, no. 291
1 (2009): 109.
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doing what EA tells us to do. But again, we will 
together have failed to make the outcome as good as it 
could have been if we had acted differently. 
292
	 There are three scenarios at work in Dietz's thought 
experiment. The first scenario is where each of the two people 
donating to GiveDirectly maximises individual utility but falls short of 
maximising overall utility. The reason why it falls short of maximising 
overall utility is the existence of an alternative scenario, that is, the 
second scenario where each of the two people allocates their spare 
resources to an advocacy group which maximises overall utility. In 
other words, by donating to GiveDirectly, "[W]e will be making things 
less good than we could have, since we could have made the 
outcome better if we had both [allocated our spare resources to the 
advocacy group]".  The third scenario is where only one of the two 293
people allocating their spare resources to the advocacy group. 
Those resources happen to be insufficient both for helping a person 
in poverty and for initiating systemic change. Hence, this scenario 
neither maximises individual utility nor overall utility. The following 
table summarises the scenarios. 
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	 Dietz's thought experiment is useful in helping us to 
understand why we should not prefer donating all of our spare 
resources the most effective charities in the wake of our decision to 
not allocate all of our spare resources to systemic change. In the 
previous part, we have recognised that the systemic causes of 
extreme poverty put enormous burdens on the lives of the extremely 
poor and interventions through systemic change could produce vast 
benefits for them. In that respect, if collectively allocating our 
resources to systemic change produces a greater overall utility 
compared to collectively donating to the effective charities, then 
should we not try to increase the success chance of systemic 
change so that our collective efforts would lead to producing more 
utility? If that is true, perhaps merely taking into account the current 
low success chance of systemic change is not reasonable, and we 
should organise ourselves to increase its success chance to the 
point where its success chance becomes greater than donating. 
After all, by increasing our efforts for systemic change, it may be 
viable to increase its success chance and also reach the greater 
expected utility it promises. Indubitably, there is a serious 
uncertainty whether increasing the number of people allocating their 
spare resources to systemic change increases its success chance 
but it should not be something next to impossible given the 
promising records of social movements. 

	 This point discourages us from allocating all of our spare 
resources to donating. But, it is not strong enough to convince us to 
allocate all of our resources to systemic change either, since doing 
that still carries a much greater risk of failure as opposed to 
donating. While the collective obligations problem as presented by 
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Dietz may have a point in supporting systemic change, it remains 
hypothetical when the relative risks of donating and systemic 
change are not factored in. However, the collective obligations 
problem applied to a chaotic world -our world- should encourage us 
to divide our spare resources between effective charities and 
systemic change.

	 Despite the danger of failing to maximise overall utility when 
all parties donate all of their spare resources to effective charities, 
the question of why effective altruists are relatively satisfied with 
GiveWell's recommendations and do not attempt to assess systemic 
change is a curious one. After all, effective altruism is a movement 
which assesses many different causes and problems including those 
which are highly controversial, such as existential risk from artificial 
intelligence. Given that advocating systemic change is among the 
most known and most popular approaches in alleviating extreme 
poverty, how come effective altruism misses assessing systemic 
change?

	 One response may be that some effective altruists are 
concerned about the political orientation of systemic change. 
Systemic change evokes the policies of the left, especially the 
radical left, and those who are uncomfortable with them may have a 
resistance to assessing systemic change in alleviating extreme 
poverty. From this perspective, assessing systemic change is 
identical with politicising or unnecessarily politicising effective 
altruism. We can call it the image problem of systemic change. If we 
partly credit the image problem of systemic change to the failure of 
effective altruism to pay enough attention to systemic change, then 




	 The inclination to avoid carrying out research on systemic 
change could be intentional or unintentional, but it has to be 
resisted. Regardless of what the political orientation of systemic 
change is deemed to be, effective altruism has to conduct research 
to find the best ways to alleviate extreme poverty. If systemic 
change arises to be one of the eligible cause areas to be scrutinised, 
then effective altruism should be neutral to the deemed political 
orientation of systemic change, provided that effective altruism aims 
to be consistent with its principles. In that manner, being inclined to 
avoid carrying out research on systemic change in alleviating 
extreme poverty means that we are putting a cause off the table for 
no meaningful reason. It goes counter to the quest of effective 
altruists to find ways to do the most good they can—it violates one 
of the core commitments of effective altruism, namely, cause 
neutrality. Moreover, the concern related to the political orientation 
of systemic change fails to realise that solely focusing on donating 
to effective charities is also a political choice. Having a charity-
oriented mind does not render one politically neutral. It becomes 
political not only by preferring one solution over another but also by 
excluding other political choices such as the struggle against 
exploitation, corruption, colonialism and capitalism. Ultimately, it is 
as political as other options since it is a decision made across other 
options which all have political implications, and one is not 
necessarily more political than others.

	 One way to by-pass or at least weaken the image problem of 
systemic change could be to translate the perceived sharp political 
aspects of systemic change into philosophical doctrines. This could 
be read along the lines of Rubenstein. In criticising effective altruism 
in some respects but at the same time showing that effective 
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altruism could overcome the anti-political sensibility that it has been 
accused of, Rubenstein argues that "explicitly incorporat[ing] other 
values in addition to increasing individual welfare, such as justice, 
fairness, and inclusion" would be beneficial.  After all, effective 295
altruism would not support assessing systemic change because it is 
political, but because it would have a good chance in alleviating 
extreme poverty. In that respect, we have to resist the image 
problem of systemic change to prevent individuals from being 
inclined to avoid conducting research on systemic change.

	 Another explanation as to why effective altruism does not 
focus on systemic change may be that effective altruism is still in its 
infancy phase in which a diverse enough discussion of conflicting 
approaches has not yet taken place. As a movement which was 
scarcely known a decade ago, effective altruism has perhaps not 
reached the level where a sufficient number of opposing approaches 
have been suggested and thoroughly discussed for alleviating 
extreme poverty. If that is the case, rather than accusing effective 
altruism of immaturity and halt a possible exchange of views, we 
could encourage it to pay more attention to systemic change so that 
there could be more people willing to conduct research on systemic 
change and more research funding allocated for it.

	 So far, I have defended the idea that the best thing to do is 
neither allocating all of our spare resources to effective charities nor 
allocating them all to systemic change: it is dividing our spare 
resources between them. There are several advantages of dividing 
our spare resources between effective charities and systemic 
change.

	Jennifer Rubenstein, "The Lessons of Effective Altruism", 519.295
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	 One advantage of dividing our spare resources between 
effective charities and systemic change is keeping option value 
intact. Briefly, option value can be defined as "'The value something 
has because it provides an alternative way of promoting something 
else that has instrumental and/or end value.'"  In some cases 296
where reversibility and irreversibility of a decision is a concern, it 
"represents the flexibility to adapt later decisions to the received 
information."  Option value revolves around our willingness to pay 297
for preserving an option. For instance, even though people do not 
use conservation areas, their money is channelled into them by 
governments due to their actual and prospective benefits in 
biological diversity, the overall health of the society, and slowing 
down climate change.

	 In the context of extreme poverty, option value represents the 
opportunities not coming from the option which we deem the best 
but from the options which we deem relatively subordinate but still 
promising. If we allocate all of our spare resources to effective 
charities, we may miss supporting a new and a fairer economic 
model which has been gradually made available by current eco-
technological advancements in due course. But if we had allocated 
at least some of our resources to that, then we would have 
supported the development process of it which could bring about 
the utility it promised earlier. Likewise, if we choose to allocate all of 
our spare resources to systemic change, then we may miss making 
the eradication process of preventable diseases by effective 
	Erik Persson, "Option Value, Substitutable Species, and Ecosystem Services," 296
Environmental Ethics 38, no. 2 (2016): 165-181.
	Noël Pauwels, Bartel van de Walle, Frank Hardeman and Karel Soudan, "The 297
Implications of Irreversibility in Emergency Response Decisions," Theory and 
Decision 49 (2000): 26.
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charities sustainable. Allocating at least some of our resources to 
effective charities could contribute to render that work 
uninterrupted. Given that what we call "the best estimate" today to 
alleviate extreme poverty could change tomorrow in the face of a 
chaotic world, keeping option value intact leads us to diversify our 
allocation of resources, that is, to abstain from allocating all of our 
resources to our best estimate. Solely relying on our best estimate 
(may it be allocating all of our spare resources to effective charities 
or systemic change) obstructs the realisation of benefits arising from 
the option value which we could have invested in. Moreover, as we 
are in the era of rapid social changes including political and 
institutional shifts, keeping option value intact seems even more 
significant.

	 Similar points on option value are made by Holden Karnofsky, 
a member of the Board of Managers at the Open Philanthropy 
Project, and a co-founder and Vice Chair of GiveWell, who supports 
worldview diversification. According to worldview diversification, we 
are "putting significant resources behind each worldview that we 
find highly plausible".  This rules out allocating all of our spare 298
resources to one cause or a very narrow policy within a cause area. 
One of the arguments for worldview diversification that Karnofsky 
puts forth is option value:

Over time, we expect that our thinking on which 
worldviews are most appealing will evolve. For 
example, I recently discussed three key issues I've 
changed my mind about over the last several years, 
	Holden Karnofsky, "Worldview Diversification," last modified December 13, 298
2016, https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/worldview-diversification.
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with major implications for how promising I find 
different causes. It's very possible that ten years from 
now, some particular worldview (and its associated 
causes) will look much stronger to us than the others - 
and that it won't match our current best guess. If this 
happens, we'll be glad to have invested in years of 
capacity building so we can quickly and significantly 
ramp up our support.

Another long-term benefit is that we can be useful to 
donors with diverse worldviews. If we worked 
exclusively in causes matching our "best guess" 
worldview, we'd primarily be useful to donors with the 
same best guess; if we do work corresponding to all of 
the worldviews we find highly compelling, we'll be 
useful to any donor whose values and approach are 
broadly similar to ours. That's a big difference: I believe 
there are many people with fundamentally similar 
values to ours, but different best guesses on some 
highly uncertain but fundamental questions - for 
example, how to value reducing global catastrophic 
risks vs. accelerating scientific research vs. improving 
policy. 
299
	 If we keep the option value intact, then our marginal impact 
on a problem like extreme poverty could be higher than otherwise 
would be the case. Suppose that we think that some form of 
systemic change is valuable to allocate some of our spare 
	Holden Karnofsky, "Worldview Diversification".299
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resources, like pushing the government to limit its borrowing. If we 
could succeed to limit its borrowing, there would be a larger pool of 
spare resources for interventions against extreme poverty. We think 
that it would considerably increase the welfare of the extremely poor 
in that country. It is currently not the best option because of some 
political uncertainty, but it is still promising. So we continue to 
support the relevant organisation. In a year or two, the political 
uncertainty has resolved and it is much easier to affect the decision-
making process. Sustaining the momentum to limit borrowing is now 
our best option to alleviate extreme poverty, surpassing its 
alternatives. If we had not supported the relevant organisation and 
thus had not preserved option value, the organisation would not 
have lived up to this date or its capacity would have been much 
weaker—and our marginal impact would have been much lower than 
it is now, forcing us to allocate most of our spare resources to our 
second-best estimate.

	 We are all vulnerable in making mistakes when striving to find 
the best response against extreme poverty: individuals who choose 
to donate to charity and not work towards systemic change could 
be misguided even though they calculate, analyse and compare the 
options to the best of their ability. Obsessing with our best estimate 
may deceive us as the situation regarding extreme poverty is 
complex. It seems that preserving option value and thus aiming for 
capacity building both for effective charities and systemic change 
has its advantages of lessening the possible impediments of risk 
and uncertainty, decreasing the likelihood of wrong best guesses 
which waste resources, and being flexible enough to attract people 
with different values. Effective altruists could benefit from the 
reasoning process behind preserving the option value.
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	 Another advantage of dividing our spare resources between 
effective charities and systemic change is being able to alter our 
decisions in response to the changes in diminishing marginal 
returns. Suppose that we have decided to allocate most of our spare 
resources to a form of systemic change, namely, the fight against 
corruption in a country which accommodates a significant number 
of the extremely poor. Thanks to the advocacy organisations, 
lobbying, and the pressure from the bottom, the country becomes 
more and more democratic and transparent. As a result, the 
corruption rate dramatically dwindles to the point where the positive 
effect of allocating additional resources to fight corruption on the 
welfare of the extremely poor is relatively small as opposed to the 
positive effect stemming from the interventions of effective charities. 
In that case, we may want to decrease our spare resources 
allocated to the fight against corruption and allocate most of them to 
the charity interventions which bring about more welfare. We may 
still want to keep some of our spare resources allocated to the fight 
against corruption to prevent corruption to be prevalent again.

	 Effective altruists are eager to refer to diminishing marginal 
returns and use it as a basis for which causes we should allocate 
our resources to. Understanding diminishing marginal returns is also 
important to constantly check whether a charity, intervention or 
organisation is still cost-effective. 

I understand that 15 or 20 years ago, mass 
vaccinations were extremely cost-effective and 
probably the best thing to be doing. Then the Gates 
Foundation has come in and funded a lot of the mass 
vaccination interventions. Now, the most cost-effective 
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intervention is less cost-effective than mass 
vaccinations [than it was in 15 or 20 years ago]. That is 
great because we have taken those low hanging 
fruit. 
300
	 Owen Cotton-Barratt, who worked as a Director of Research 
at the Centre for Effective Altruism, draws attention to the difference 
in cost-effectiveness of mass vaccination. Since the cost-
effectiveness has changed, the marginal impact of one's spare 
resources has also changed. The presence of diminishing marginal 
returns makes a case for being prepared to rationally switch 
interventions, and it also discourages us to be fixated on any of the 
interventions against extreme poverty since it signifies the ever-
changing marginal impact of additional resources. We always have 
to consider the change, uncertainty and the possible outcomes of 
interventions.

	 Moreover, Karnofsky emphasises the relationship between 
diminishing marginal returns and expected utility:

When accounting for strong uncertainty and 
diminishing marginal returns, worldview diversification 
can maximize expected value even when one 
worldview looks 'better' than the others in expectation. 
One way of putting this is that if we were choosing 
between 10 worldviews, and one were 5x as good as 
the other nine, investing all our resources in that one 
would - at the relevant margin, due to the 'diminishing 
	Owen Cotton-Barratt, "Prospecting for Gold," in Effective Altruism Handbook: 300
2nd Edition (The Centre for Effective Altruism, 2016), 26.
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returns' point - be worse than spreading across the 
ten. 
301
	 This is another strong point for recognising the diminishing 
marginal returns and not allocating all of our spare resources solely 
to one side. Even if we had thought there is some best option to 
alleviate extreme poverty, which begs for enormous resources, 
dividing our resources between it and relatively subordinate options 
may bring about a greater expected utility. Consider a case where 
allocating £A of our resources to mass vaccination is 3-fold effective 
in combatting extreme poverty than allocating our resources to its 
alternatives. Suppose that allocating £A only to mass vaccination 
brings about 3X good, only to election reform brings about X good, 
only to education reform brings about X good, only to land reform 
brings about X good, and only to bureaucracy reform brings about X 
good. Further suppose that we are very close to the point of 
diminishing marginal returns and allocating £5A would bring about 
only 2-fold as much good if we had chosen to allocate all of our 
resources to mass vaccination. This means that allocating our £5A 
to only mass vaccination would bring about 6X (3X*2), whereas 
allocating our £5A to all causes equally would bring about 7X 
(3X+X+X+X+X). Dividing our resources between causes brings about 
more expected utility, and thus becomes ~14% (1-[6X/7X]) more 
effective.

	 Another point about diminishing marginal returns is that it 
may be harder to calculate the point of diminishing marginal returns 
of systemic change as opposed to calculating the point of 
diminishing marginal returns of charities. This is again because of 
	Holden Karnofsky, "Worldview Diversification".301
244
uncertainty, the hardship of tracking the long-term effects of 
systemic change, and its complexity. Effective altruists may have a 
greater uncertainty about the size of their marginal impact when they 
allocate their spare resources to systemic change in contrast to 
donating. Since they could understand the effects of their donations 
more easily and since there is a lower risk of things going bad, they 
could also calculate their marginal impact more easily. For instance, 
in evaluating charities, GiveWell always include "the room for more 
funding" as a criterion: "If a charity's core program is outstanding, is 
this enough reason to donate to it? We say no. There is still the 
question: how will the charity's activities be influenced by additional 
donations?"  By calculating how the charity's activities are going 302
to be influenced by additional donations, one could also calculate 
one's influence by donating, or, in other words, one's marginal 
impact. In contrast, it is rather difficult to calculate it in the case 
where one allocates spare resources to systemic change. There 
could also be a metric to calculate it for a given form of systemic 
change, so that it should not be impossible, but it should be way 
harder than calculating it for effective charities. Perhaps this is an 
additional task for the proponents of systemic change by which we 
could more comfortably compare donating with working towards 
systemic change. Nevertheless, recognising diminishing marginal 
returns provide us with a tool to be responsive—either by giving 
more to effective charities or by giving more to systemic change, 
depending on the points of diminishing marginal returns.

	 Some may still insist on allocating all of our resources to the 
cost-effective option which still has a long way to go before it hits 
 "Room for More Funding," GiveWell, https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/302
criteria/room-for-more-funding.
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the diminishing marginal returns as opposed to other options. But 
this disregards the importance of uncertainty and option value. 
Furthermore, whenever there are multiple cost-effective options 
which are comparable in terms of their point of diminishing marginal 
returns, allocating all of our spare resources is not likely to be the 





	 There are three concluding points.

	 The first concluding point is that effective altruists can 
justifiably not allocate all of their spare resources to systemic 
change because their decision to opt for low-risk action, namely, 
donating to the most effective charities is understandable. Put 
differently, the case for risk-averseness in the case of choosing 
between allocating spare resources to effective charities and 
allocating spare resources to systemic change is to some degree 
compelling. Nevertheless, as shown, even an effective charity, 
Evidence Action, could fail and close one of its programmes which 
was once considered to be effective. Moreover, as a result of the 
spare resources allocated to systemic change, there are historical 
victories of social movements which turn the system upside down 
for good. In that respect, allocating all of our spare resources to 
effective charities could be suboptimal as well.

	 The second concluding point is that effective altruism as a 
movement has to be very cautious about universally promoting 
charity over systemic change. As effective altruism tries to find the 
effective options to do the most good, promoting or hinting at 
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donating as the blanket solution would render it dangerously 
conservative. In that respect, effective altruism should be open to 
assessing systemic change, and at the same time demonstrate that 
it is open to assessing systemic change.

	 The third concluding point is that the decision of how much to 
allocate our spare resources to systemic change is still relevant. 
Since I have rejected the first proposition that individuals should 
allocate all of their spare resources to systemic change and also the 
contrary thought that individuals should donate all of their spare 
resources to effective charities, I have to choose either the second 
or the third proposition. The second proposition urges us to allocate 
most of our resources to systemic change and the third proposition 
urges us to allocate some of our resources to systemic change. 
Admittedly, the answer is not predetermined. The calculation of 
risks, the methodology of the calculation of risks, the credence in 
systemic change, the credence in a specific intervention leading to 
systemic change, the level of trust we have in the organisations 
advocating systemic change are all subject to discussion. They 
cannot be known once and for all either, as they may undergo 
fundamental changes over time. Our best shot is to consider all of 
the variables in a given context and decide to embrace the second 
or the third proposition, and reconsider our decision whenever 
necessary.

	 In the next chapter, I will assess the systemic change 





The Systemic Change Objection: 
The Future Extremely Poor and the 
Non-Identity Problem 
Premise 4 
Donating to effective charities is one 




	 Knowing that systemic change is mostly a long-term 
endeavour, the majority of agents who will be affected by it are 
future people. There is a growing interest in the questions pertaining 
to future people such as whether they have moral standing, whether 
existing people have moral obligations towards them, and whether 
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the political representation of future people is necessary.  303
However, surprisingly, the moral standing of future people has not 
received enough attention in discussions concerning systemic 
change and effective altruism. In fact, we cannot sufficiently assess 
the systemic change objection against effective altruism without 
thinking on the question of whether future people have moral 
standing. For instance, if we think that future people have interests 
to which we owe care and protection, then we would find effective 
altruism questionable when it is negligent about systemic change. If 
we think otherwise, then we may be satisfied with a form of effective 
altruism which exclusively focuses on existing people through 
donations to charity.

	 In assessing the systemic change objection, I focus on a 
small subset of future people, namely, the future extremely poor. As 
shown in the previous chapter, philosophers who subscribe to the 
systemic change objection emphasise the corrupt global order 
whose alteration, reversal or destruction could bring about a greater 
utility than a "chipping in" approach such as donating—it is mostly 
on that ground that the systemic change objection has arisen. The 
utility which would be gained from systemic change is most likely 
not to be exclusively received by the existing extremely poor. It 
would be either shared between the existing extremely poor and the 
future extremely poor or received solely by the future extremely poor. 
For instance, if we contribute to an institutional change which would 
require twenty years to put an end to cheap labour exploitation, both 
	Especially refer to Tim Mulgan, Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist 303
Account of Our Obligations to Future Generations (New York: Clarendon, 
2006); Marcus Düwell, Gerhard Bos and Naomi van Steenbergen, eds., 
Towards the Ethics of a Green Future: The Theory and Practice of Human 
Rights for Future People (New York: Routledge, 2018); Simon Caney, "Justice 
and Future Generations," Annual Review of Political Science 21, no. 1 (2018): 
475-493.
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some of the existing extremely poor and the future extremely poor 
would be saved from it. An opposite example can be the case of 
breaking the oligopolies in the pharmaceutical industry which would 
require two hundred years. The positive consequences of the 
defeated oligopolies and the removal of the overly restricting patent 
rights would not be experienced before the tipping point, that is, two 
hundred years of accumulated resistance. In that case, the future 
extremely poor would receive all of the utility. Given what we know 
of past and present systemic change movements around rights, 
liberties, peace, distribution of resources and institutional 
improvements, we could predict that most examples of systemic 
change will be long-term projects of which future people will be the 
primary potential beneficiaries. The fact that systemic change is a 
marathon reveals a surprise element in the systemic change 
objection: it naturally triggers a discussion regarding the moral 
standing of the future extremely poor and how their interests should 
be weighed against the existing extremely poor. What we derive 
from it can provide us with reasons to support or reject the three 
propositions of systemic change, and the current position of 
effective altruism regarding systemic change.

	 Normally, donations collected by charities are used almost 
immediately for the existing extremely poor. In that respect, donating 
improves the lives of the existing extremely poor. Nevertheless, as 
explained earlier, systemic change is an arduous task and carrying it 
out is not as easy as donating. It requires harmonious parties, a 
myriad of resources, and sustained coordination. As the 
consequences of systemic change also need more time to 
materialise than donating, they will mostly be experienced by the 
future extremely poor. Nevertheless, despite having workers, 
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activists and public figures advocating systemic change, there is no 
charity which raises resources for the future extremely poor. For 
many people, if a charity had been raising donations for the future 
extremely poor, then it would be very controversial. Nevertheless, 
rather ironically, many do not find allocating spare resources to 
systemic change odd, even if it is mostly the future extremely poor 
who will benefit from it. Whereas convincing people to donate to a 
charity which raises resources for the future extremely poor would 
strike them as awkward, supporting systemic change through 
campaigns and revolutions whose maturity will not be witnessed by 
the existing extremely poor does not strike them as odd.

	 What does this imply for the systemic change objection? 
Considering the interests of the future extremely poor, how much 
should individuals allocate their spare resources to systemic change: 
All, most or some? These are the questions drawn from the three 
propositions of the systemic change objection.

	 In the previous chapter, I rejected the first proposition and 
thus argued that we should not allocate all of our resources to 
systemic change because it is a high-risk action. I have also 
excluded the possibility that we should only be focusing on donating 
to effective charities because the efforts for major social movements 
which have brought about radical benefits to the world have paid 
off. I have advocated a position in which individuals should either 
allocate most or some of their spare resources to systemic change 
after carefully considering risks. In the following, I defend the same 
position because the multivariate nature of the negotiation between 
effective charities and systemic change propels us to avoid any 
exclusive commitment to allocate all of our resources either to 
effective charities and systemic change. There are several factors 
251
which help us to understand which division of resources could be 
the best, including numbers and fairness, and the distribution of 
utility.

	 In the following, I start by explaining how I use the terms 
future people and the future extremely poor. By appealing to the 
time-insensitivity of the moral value of a given amount of welfare and 
the rights continuing ad infinitum, I argue that we have grounds to 
consider the interests of the future extremely poor as much as the 
existing extremely poor. Then, I list the above mentioned factors 
(numbers and fairness, and the distribution of utility) which help us 
to understand which division of resources could be the best when 
allocating our spare resources to effective charities and systemic 
change. These are very complex by nature and committing oneself 
to allocate all of one's spare resources to merely one option could 
be morally dangerous, and so I argue that effective altruism should 
support the second or the third proposition of the systemic change 
which asks individuals to allocate most or some of their spare 
resources to systemic change. After responding to the non-identity 
problem as a possible objection and showing that the non-identity 
problem cannot subvert the systemic change objection, I conclude 
that effective altruism should give more weight to systemic change 
than it does now.

5.2	 Future people and the future extremely poor

	 What we understand from the term future people can be 
ambiguous. Colloquially, we might use it to refer to the existing 
newborns, existing children and those who will immediately succeed 
us after our death. Here, I envisage it including anyone who will be 
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born henceforth.  Provided that our civilisation does not suffer 304
from early extinction, I acknowledge that almost all of the future 
people will exist in the far future rather than in the near future.

	 What about the future extremely poor? Some of the existing 
people who are not yet among the extremely poor will be driven to 
extreme poverty due to various adverse conditions. However, most 
of the future extremely poor have not been born yet. Presumably, 
there will be millions or billions of future people who will find 
themselves in extreme poverty over the coming decades, centuries 
or millennia.

	 There are two possible future worlds. In the first possible 
world, we do not work towards systemic change, and hence 
systemic change does not take place. There will be plenty of future 
extremely poor. In the second possible world, we work towards 
systemic change, and hence systemic change takes place. There 
could still be future extremely poor (if extreme poverty is not 
completely eliminated) but the number of the future extremely poor 
would be much lower than in the first world. Systemic change would 
ensure that there are either no or fewer future extremely poor. 
Moreover, some of those extremely poor living in the future could be 
collectively positively affected by the systemic change which has 
taken place. For instance, thanks to systemic change, they may 
have better mechanisms to help them to get out of extreme poverty.

	 Admittedly, considering the interests of the future extremely 
poor will strike many people as counterintuitive. After all, hundreds 
of millions of the existing extremely poor suffer from a myriad of 
negative conditions which lead to exploitation, discrimination and 
exclusion. In the following, I argue that the interests of the future 
	For the purpose of this thesis, I exclude non-human sentient beings.304
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extremely poor should matter as much as the existing extremely 
poor. I present two reasons why we should consider the interests of 
the future extremely poor as much as the existing extremely poor: 
the first concerns the time-insensitivity of the moral value of a given 
amount of welfare value of welfare and the second concerns rights 
continuing ad infinitum.

5.2.1	The time-insensitivity of the moral value of a given 

	 amount of welfare

	 The first reason why we should consider the interests of the 
future extremely poor as much as the existing extremely poor is the 
time-insensitivity of the moral value of a given amount of welfare.

	 There are two interconnected issues here: the first is the 
moral value of a given amount of welfare and the second is the time-
insensitivity of it. Welfare has moral value because the components 
of it such as happiness, pleasure, pain, suffering have a direct effect 
on one's experiences. One cannot escape from these experiences. 
They inextricably control one's life and one's actions hugely depend 
on them. All else being equal, the moral value of a given amount of 
welfare should be regarded as the same across time. In other words, 
whenever the amount of welfare is the same, the moral value of that 
amount of welfare should also be the same regardless of when one 
is living. If this is the case, then we can call the moral value of a 
given amount of welfare time-insensitive.

	 Accepting the claim that the moral value of a given amount of 
welfare is time-insensitive saves us from two potential moral 
mistakes. The first potential mistake is producing prejudices on the 
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basis of pure time preference.  According to the pure time 305
preference, present welfare matters more than near future welfare, 
and near future welfare matters more than far future welfare: welfare 
decreases in moral importance the further we move away from the 
present. If we give less weight to the welfare of someone living in the 
past or future because of pure time preference even if there are no 
morally relevant differences, then we favour or disfavour someone 
on an unreasonably arbitrary criterion. This can be linked to what 
Simon Caney calls "The moral equality argument". According to this 
argument, penalising someone merely because of their temporal 
location, or, more specifically, applying pure time discounting to 
future is wrong because it is inherently discriminative:

. . .someone’s temporal location seems on a par with 
their racial identity or gender or ethnicity; and in the 
same way that it is wrong to penalize or discriminate 
against someone because of their race or gender so it 
is also wrong to discriminate against someone 
because of their date of birth. 
306
	 The second potential mistake is that pure time discounting 
could bring about a repugnant conclusion—for instance, Robert 
Wiblin states that "If applied consistently to the past, a modest rate 
of time preference of just 1% per annum would imply that 
Tutankhamen was more important than all 7 billion humans alive 
	Pure time preference is a preference which entails that something is preferred 305
at some point in time only because it occurs at that time.
	Simon Caney, "Climate change, intergenerational equity and the social dis306 -
count rate," Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13, no. 4 (2014): 324.
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today. This seems both immoral and absurd".  We could make the 307
same mistake if we apply pure time discounting to future extremely 
poor—it would vastly undermine the moral value of welfare of a 
given amount of welfare they receive, even if the amount of welfare 
received by existing extremely poor and future extremely poor are 
the same. This seems absurd.

	 It is sometimes hard to empathise with future people. I believe 
that it would even be harder to empathise with the future extremely 
poor. But the future extremely poor are no different than the existing 
extremely poor with regards to their moral standing—whenever the 
moral value of a given amount of welfare is the same, we should not 
discount the benefits in the future on the basis of pure time 
preference. As stated, pure time discounting results in assuming that 
the moral value of a given amount of welfare differs over time, which 
produces prejudices and repugnant conclusions like Wiblin's 
example of Tutankhamun.

5.2.2	Rights continuing ad infinitum

	 Think of the deontological position that people have a right to 
adequate nutrition, safety, health and education, or in general, 
necessities. Such a right could in fact be recurring, or, in other 
words, be a right continuing ad infinitum. A right continuing ad 
infinitum means that it can be matched with any people including 
any future people. In that regard, if we think that existing people 
have a right to adequate nutrition, safety, health and education, or in 
general, necessities, then, all else being equal, that right should not 
	Robert Wiblin, "Was Tutankhamun A Billion Times More Important Than You?," 307
Giving What We Can, April 4, 2013, https://givingwhatwecan.org/post/
2013/04/was-tutankhamun-a-billion-times-more-important-than-you/.
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cease to exist for the future extremely poor because temporal 
distance is not sufficient to condemn them to starvation, low 
education and health prospects, and miserable life. In assigning 
rights, the question should not be when people exist (or will exist) 
but whether they exist (or will exist). In other words, not-yet-
existingness cannot be used to reject rights for any person who has 
moral standing.

	 If a right can continue ad infinitum, then the future extremely 
poor have rights just like the existing extremely poor have rights. 
Since the rights of any person have to be protected, the rights of the 
future extremely poor should also be protected. This is also valid for 
a specific subset of rights, namely, human rights. Following the lines 
of Beyleveld et al., "To deny that future humans have the same 
human rights as we do is to deny that there are human rights at 
all".  Put simply, if we argue that some members of humanity 308
-such as the future extremely poor- do not have human rights, then 
"human rights" becomes a misnomer. It either applies to all people 
or not—if it applies to only the existing people, then it is not human 
rights: it is existing humans' rights. If we are accepting that there are 
existing humans' rights instead of human rights, then either future 
people including the future extremely poor have no human rights or 
have different human rights. It would mean that people (or some 
subset of people, such as the extremely poor) who will be living 100 
hundred years from now have more human rights (or fewer human 
rights). Such an argument would mean that people living in the 
2000s have more (or fewer) human rights than people living in the 
1900s. But this is successfully refuted by Caney's rights-based 
	Deryck Beyleveld, Marcus Düwell and Andreas Spahn, "Why and How Should 308
We Represent Future Generations in Policymaking?," Jurisprudence 6, no. 3 
(2015): 550.
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approach: Caney states that protection of rights requires a zero 
discount rate.  The dominant deontological position regarding 309
human rights does not defend such a positive discount rate for 
future generations, and the moral irrelevance of temporal distance 
applies to human rights as well. In that case, the lives of the existing 
extremely poor and the lives of the future extremely poor should 
have equal moral value.

5.2.3	The importance of decision-making design for the 

	 future extremely poor

	 If the moral value of a given amount of welfare should be 
regarded as time-insensitive, and if rights protecting the interests of 
future people (including the future extremely poor) continue ad 
infinitum, then it is very important to adjust the political, economic 
and social decision-making processes accordingly so that the 
interests and the rights of future people can be taken into account. 
This may be done through in-government research institutions and 
the work of archivists, futures assemblies, posterity impact 
statements, and legislative houses for future generations. 
310
	 As the future extremely poor are unable to partake in the 
decision-making which will vastly affect them, they possess bad 
luck which makes them severely disadvantaged and vulnerable. This 
should be quite important for luck egalitarians, and they would tend 
to establish a decision-making mechanism which does not favour 
	Simon Caney, "Human rights, climate change, and discounting," Environment309 -
al Politics 17, no. 4 (2008): 540. 
	Tyler M. John and William MacAskill, "Longtermist Institutional Reform," in The 310
Long View, ed. Natalie Cargill (London, UK: FIRST), forthcoming.
258
the existing extremely poor. Such an idea is also compatible with 
care ethics. For instance, Thomas Randall states that "Given that 
future generations are in a perpetual condition of dependency on 
present-day people's actions, this is precisely the kind of relational 
structure that care theorists should be interested in morally 
evaluating".  The term dependency means that we are in a 311
relationally favourable position than the future extremely poor as we 
are the ones who partially decide their destiny. Nevertheless, there is 
no reciprocity as we are not dependent on them. In that respect, 
what we consider bad luck could be identified as the undesirable 
result of dependency and be linked to a "power asymmetry" of 
which we should be cognisant in our decision-making.  Departing 312
from similar concerns, Christopher Groves emphasises the 
importance of care in affecting the future:

Although [care] does not make the future any more 
predictable, it nevertheless provides us with 
opportunities for training ourselves to respond 
creatively, flexibly and (hopefully) consistently to its 
unpredictability, by recognising that we, no matter 
what we do, are inextricably linked to near and distant 
futures through the activities through which we realise 
our care and thereby make posterity. 
313
	Thomas Randall, "Care Ethics and Obligations to Future Generations," Hypatia 311
34, no. 3 (2019): 528.
	Karsten Klint Jensen, "Future Generations in Democracy: Representation or 312
Consideration?," Jurisprudence 6, no. 3 (2015): 545.
	Christopher Groves, "Future ethics: risk, care and non-reciprocal responsibil313 -
ity," Journal of Global Ethics 5, no. 1 (2009): 27.
259
	 As we make posterity by some means or the other, taking 
care of the future is essential in compensating for the bad luck of the 
future extremely poor. Such a thought also requires us to establish 
an appropriate decision-making design.

	 To better understand the importance of decision-making 
design, suppose that we are living in one of the several independent 
communities dispersed among archipelagos. No community has 
ever communicated with the other community but we acknowledge 
the existence of each other. A volcano on our island has erupted. As 
a community, we immigrate to an astonishing and resource-rich 
island called Yonca in which no one has never ever lived. We 
anticipate that there will be a volcanic eruption in a neighbouring 
island named Erik in a very short time and the community living 
there will have to immigrate to other islands including ours. We 
implement a law which ensures a fair distribution of resources to 
existing residents. Out of our intentional ignorance, the law bars 
future newcomers from benefiting from Yonca's resources which 
would render them impoverished. It means that because we arrived 
Yonca earlier than any other community, we grant ourselves the right 
to withhold resources from future newcomers. If the volcano in Erik 
had erupted earlier than the volcano erupted in our previous island 
which forced us to immigrate, then the community in Erik would 
have arrived Yonca earlier than anyone else which would not leave 
them in a situation where they have to withstand impoverishment. 
They possess bad luck because the volcano in Erik did not erupt 
earlier, they have to encounter with our selfish community, and they 




	 As our community in Yonca usurps all of the resources, it is 
not fair that the future newcomers will not receive any of the 
resources that we have been endowed with. We know that there will 
be a volcanic eruption in Erik soon, there will be people in need, and 
we have no moral right to accumulate such resources, and use them 
however we wish. We have to share the resources which we had 
luckily found when we arrived in Yonca. Our good luck and the unfair 
usage of it translate into the bad luck of future newcomers.

	 The carelessness and even the evilnesses of our community 
could be identified as what Stephen M. Gardiner calls "the tyranny 
of the contemporary".  According to Gardiner, "The tyranny of the 314
contemporary. . . [has] multiple roots. Perhaps the most obvious is 
ruthlessness: each generation, and especially the current generation 
in the more powerful countries, is committed to the single-minded 
pursuit of its own self-interest, understood in narrow, economic, and 
short-term ways".  While the term the tyranny of the contemporary 315
reminds us the potential impact of existing people over future 
people, it also reveals that what I have called the bad luck is not 
merely an issue of accidentally finding oneself in an undesirable 
situation. Rather, someone's bad luck could be created by others 
where its compensation becomes an issue of justice. For instance, 
by accumulating resources and prohibiting others from receiving 
them, our community in Yonca wrongs and harms future 
newcomers. The future newcomers in Yonca will experience their 
bad luck as impoverishment. But the truth is that their bad luck 
owes its existence to our unjust enrichment of ourselves and not to 
	Stephen M. Gardiner, "A Call for a Global Constitutional Convention Focused 314
on Future Generations," Ethics & International Affairs 28, no. 3 (2014): 300.
	Gardiner, 302.315
261
randomness. As their bad luck has been deliberately brought about 
by us in the first place, the compensation for their bad luck becomes 
a demand of justice.

	 The archipelagos analogy represents the conflict between 
existing people and future people in the distribution of resources. In 
the real world, the future extremely poor possess bad luck as they 
are unable to partake in decision-making although their welfare may 
be negatively affected by our unwise choices. Their bad luck is 
aggravated if existing people disregard the interests of the future 
extremely poor. Existing people have the advantage of acting prior 
to the future extremely poor but that advantage is used unfairly if the 
resources are allocated on the basis of the self-interest of existing 
people. The responsibility to consider the interests of the future 
extremely poor falls on us.

	 One objection to the archipelagos analogy may be that it is 
not an analogy at all. After all, the people living in Erik who will be 
the future newcomers to Yonca already exist. Even though they are 
among the existing people, their existence means nothing to our 
community in Yonca until we know that they are going to come to 
Yonca. It is the same for the future extremely poor: they do not 
matter to us until we know that they will be born. If we know that 
they will be born, we have to be careful regarding how we distribute 
the resources since each unwisely used unit of resource drains their 
potential.

	 One may not object to considering the interests of future 
newcomers but instead claim that those who have come earlier to 
Yonca could plausibly give some additional weight to their own 
interests just because they have come earlier to Yonca. This violates 
the importance of the time-insensitivity of the moral value of a given 
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amount of welfare and the importance of rights continuing ad 
infinitum, and is implausible. Moreover, it may be said that the 
existing residents of Yonca are entitled to most of the resources 
while future newcomers are entitled to the remaining. Such a 
thought buttresses the implausible "finders keepers" system. Here, I 
follow the lines of Dan Dennis, where natural resources are 
distinguished from objects mixed with natural resources and labour: 
"In contrast [to the latter], natural resources would have existed had 
no persons existed. As a result of this, there are no grounds for 
giving one person a smaller share of natural resources than 
another".  Dennis refers to Ronald Dworkin's example of 316
shipwrecked mariners where default position would be to share the 
resources equally if they do not have any morally relevant 
differences.  Dennis concludes that "The right-libertarian 'finders 317
keepers' system of initial acquisition is largely arbitrary – leaving 
largely down to chance who gets the opportunity to claim resources. 
This is not just. In particular, it treats unfairly subsequent generations 
because they have no chance of making the initial acquisition".  318
Then, Dennis calls the existing generation to compensate for the 
loss of resources of future generations once there has been 
destruction and degradation. 
319
	 Worse still, defending the proposition that the existing 
residents are entitled most of the resources on the basis of finders 
	Dan Dennis, "Property Rights, Future Generations and the Destruction and 316






keepers system has the potential to legitimatise a real-world 
problem: long-term foreign debt. As demonstrated in the empirical 
research on extreme poverty, foreign debt is a crushing problem for 
the extremely poor where interest rates often make the accumulated 
foreign debt unrepayable. A country suffering from a long-term 
foreign debt becomes even more impoverished, and the living 
standards of the future extremely poor are compromised. If a well-
planned foreign debt borrowing strategy is not implemented, and the 
rulers borrow money by giving weight to their own generations 
because of their greed, extravagancy or lack of rational 
understanding of the matter, then the future residents of that country 
including the future extremely poor will be adversely affected as they 
will be the ones who are actually repaying the foreign debt over the 
years. Even if the debt does not render the future residents 
impoverished, their welfare is stolen by the existing people just 
because they decide to give weight to their own. Such a fact evokes 
the importance of ensuring a well-planned foreign debt borrowing 
strategy where neither the rights nor the welfare of the future 
extremely poor is compromised. The case where our community in 
Yonca is asked to ensure a fair distribution of resources across 
existing residents and future newcomers is morally on a par with 
asking to implement a well-planned foreign debt borrowing strategy. 
In both cases, we have a responsibility towards future people who 
will be harmed if we wrong them with our decision. If we state that 
our community has no such a responsibility, then there is no reason 
why we should defend a sensible foreign debt borrowing strategy—
we could just borrow money as much as we can with a very long 
repayment scheme while increasing the quality of the lives of 
existing people and letting future people including the future 
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extremely poor suffer from our improvident decision to save the day. 
Nevertheless, if we think that this is implausible, then it 
demonstrates that we owe them a well-thought-out decision to the 
best of our ability in allocating our resources.

	 Another objection may be that we do not know how the future 
extremely poor would have decided for themselves if they had been 
given a chance to shape the course of the world. We do not know 
how they would have intervened in the political decision-making 
process, we lack sufficient knowledge regarding how they would 
have adjusted the healthcare, and our predictions on how they 
would have reformed the economic structure may fail. Nonetheless, 
the ambiguity regarding how they would have acted for their future 
does not cancel out the necessity that we do have to do our best to 
offset their bad luck. 

	 To make it plain, consider the following: we have two close 
relatives who have recently become coma patients after an accident. 
The doctor says that we have to choose one of the two drugs to 
recover from the coma: one paralyses a leg for two years, and the 
other paralyses an arm for two years. Since our relatives cannot 
decide for themselves, we have to make a decision. We try to 
remember their preferences and past experiences. We do not 
remember any instance where they said that legs could be preferred 
over arms, or vice versa. But we notice that our relatives have 
always liked long walks and it may be a tie-breaker. Upon thorough 
discussion and consensus among other relatives, we decide to 
instruct the injection of the drug which paralyses an arm for two 
years. When our relatives recover from the coma after the injection, 
one of them says that an arm paralysed is worse than a leg 
paralysed because it is harder to deal with everyday tasks. The other 
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relative disagrees, and expresses contentment due to the preserved 
ability to have long walks.

	 We could not know whether our relatives would disagree with 
us in the future and thus we could not take into account their future 
verdict. We could only take into account their possible future verdict. 
We behaved responsibly in the drug selection process by 
considering everything we possibly can, our intention was surely 
pure, and we chose the drug through rational decision-making. In 
that respect, we compensated for the bad luck of our relatives who 
at that time could not decide which drug was in their best interests. 
Here, the bad luck of our relatives was their inability to trigger a 
prudent decision-making process and their vulnerability in being 
subject to a careless decision-making process. Some may argue 
that if we had chosen the wrong drug we would not offset the bad 
luck of our relatives, but that was beyond our control because we 
were not omniscient. Likewise, the future extremely poor may 
disagree with the decisions that we make here and now regarding 
how to improve their lives. Provided that we consider every possible 
variable which may positively or negatively affect the lives of the 
future extremely poor via an evidence-backed methodology, we fulfil 
our responsibility to offset their bad luck, regardless of what they 
retrospectively think of our decisions.

5.2.4	Where does effective altruism stand?

	 If effective altruism has serious arguments against 
considering the interests of the future extremely poor, then the 
systemic change objection could weaken. Once the systemic 
change objection weakens, individuals could be permitted to focus 
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on donating to effective charities for extreme poverty alleviation. In 
that respect, the position of effective altruism has to be made clear 
regarding considering the interests of the future extremely poor.

	 The commitments of effective altruism include cause 
impartiality and using evidence to do the most good. In that respect, 
assessing actions from "the point of view of the universe" is 
important for many leading effective altruists.  According to them, 320
all else is being equal, a benefit or harm in Sierra Leone is morally 
equal to a benefit or harm in Liechtenstein. Again, according to 
them, all else being equal, a benefit or harm in antiquity is morally 
equal to a benefit or harm in a million years from now. Some 
effective altruists may disagree, but this is currently the position of 
the prominent figures in effective altruism.

	 Very much parallel to these considerations, an approach 
called the longtermism paradigm or in short, longtermism, has 
become popular in effective altruist circles.  In line with what the 321
point of view of the universe requires, longtermism states that we 
have to consider all consequences of our actions equally no matter 
when or where they happen. Naturally, those consequences need 
not be immediate. In contrast, they could be affecting the far future. 
The upshot is that we must value all pleasure and pain equally 
across time. As the number of people who will be living in the future 
will greatly outnumber the people currently living, most of the value 
	Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Singer extensively discuss the moral 320
importance of "the point of view of the universe" where they think that rational 
benevolence is based on it. Refer to Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter 
Singer, The Point of View of the Universe: Sigdwick and Contemporary Ethics, 
134.
	A recent development is the foundation of The Global Priorities Institute at the 321
University of Oxford where some philosophers of effective altruism do re-
search on the longtermism paradigm and its implications.
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lies at the future—hence, according to longtermism, the 
opportunities and challenges surrounding the future should be 
among our priorities.  Recently, effective altruism has recognised 322
the long-term future as one of its cause areas and has even started 
to collect funds for it. 
323
	 Longtermism stresses mitigating existential risks, preventing 
the negative outcomes of artificial intelligence, increasing the safety 
of high-risk high-reward biotechnological research, boosting the 
capacity-building and coordination of global institutions, and 
improving the values of our civilisation. Basically, anything which has 
the potential to affect the future of our civilisation in a profound way 
could be in the scope of longtermism. Likewise, systemic change 
could be one of the research areas within longtermism as it 
promises to bring about a very high utility for the future, may it be 
near future or far future. Given the moral and political progress that 
the world witnessed over the past few centuries regarding justice 
and equality, systemic change has the potential to correct many of 
the problems for future people including the future extremely poor, 
such as cheap labour exploitation, foreign debt, military invasions 
and illicit financial flows. Reforming political institutions, proposing 
alternative economic systems, and increasing transparency and 
accountability are vastly important for the interests of the future 
extremely poor.

	 All in all, due to impartiality and attaching importance to the 
point of view of the universe, effective altruism is compatible with 
	The Global Priorities Institute, "A Research Agenda for The Global Priorities 322
Institute," University of Oxford, February 2019, globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/gpi-research-agenda.pdf.
	"Long-Term Future Fund," The Centre for Effective Altruism, October 15, 2019, 323
app.effectivealtruism.org/funds/far-future.
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the idea that the future extremely poor matter as much as the 
existing extremely poor. In other words, effective altruism should 
have no problem in considering the interests of the future extremely 
poor. Moreover, effective altruism is theoretically open to regarding 
systemic change as a possible way to do the most good for the 
future extremely poor, and include it to its agenda within 
longtermism.

5.3	 Charity or systemic change? The case of the 

	 future extremely poor

Up to now, I have made a case for considering the interests 
of the future extremely poor as much as the existing extremely poor, 
and showed that effective altruism has been keen on considering 
the interests of future people. However, how this can inform our 
discussion of Premise 4, the systemic change objection, and the 
comparison between charity and systemic change is another 
question. In the following, I evaluate several factors which contribute 
to our decision on how to allocate our spare resources, including 
numbers and fairness, and the distribution of utility. I defend the 
same position: that we should not allocate all of our spare resources 




	 In Chapter 3, I argued that our decision regarding who to help 
should not only depend on the moral value of utility but also the 
moral value of fairness—and that there should be a negotiation 
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between saving the largest group and treating all parties (regardless 
of the size of the group they are in) fairly. Precisely because of this, I 
concluded that we should be responsive to group sizes: we should 
sometimes save the greatest number and sometimes act fairly, and 
there is no obligation for us to always save the greatest number or 
always act fairly. In Chapter 3, I assumed that we could either help 
one group or another. Although this is not the case here (because 
we can allocate our resources between the existing extremely poor 
and the future extremely poor however we like), understanding the 
level of unfairness is still important as we can include the badness of 
unfairness into our decision-making.

	 We can partly extend my train of thought in Chapter 3 to the 
discussion of systemic change. Recall the first proposition drawn 
from the systemic change objection: individuals should allocate all of 
their spare resources to systemic change. Think of a form of 
systemic change which never benefits the existing extremely poor 
but only the future extremely poor. Suppose that some proponents 
of systemic change have opened a bank account which saves 
money for the future extremely poor, and it will only be used for the 
future extremely poor. This means that there is an unfairness issue 
because this is done at the cost of the welfare of the existing 
extremely poor. The lives of the hundreds of millions of extremely 
poor are neglected. Related to that, Brian Berkey states that

[Proponents of systemic change] are instead 
advocating that we refrain from taking high probability 
steps to alleviate the suffering of today's global poor, in 
order to pursue low probability, potentially high reward 
efforts to improve global institutions, so that different 
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people, sometime in the future, are able to live under 
more just institutions than might otherwise exist. 
Whether or not we might be justified in prioritizing 
efforts to make global institutions more just for future 
people over improving welfare or quality of life for the 
current global poor, it seems clear that we cannot be 
required to do so as a matter of respect for the current 
global poor. 
324
	 We know some of the things we can do for the future 
extremely poor in the form of systemic change, such as a global 
reform of institutions, better accountability, preventing illicit financial 
flows, rethinking foreign debt, and combatting with the harsh after-
effects of colonialism. But we are not sure how many future 
extremely poor we could affect by these. After some point in the 
future (say in 100 or 200 years), we cannot confidently and 
meaningfully predict how many future extremely poor there will be. If 
we had known, we could have compared their group size with the 
group size of the existing extremely poor and understand the level of 
unfairness done to each group once we have decided to save the 
greatest number. Here, we may apply some sort of uncertainty 
discounting (which should respect the time-insensitivity of the moral 
value of a given amount of welfare, as opposed to pure time 
preference discounting). Here, uncertainty discounting means that 
we should find a point in time after which we cannot confidently and 
meaningfully predict the number of the future extremely poor. For 
instance, we may see that we cannot confidently and meaningfully 
predict the number of the future extremely poor living after the year 
	Brian Berkey, "The Institutional Critique of Effective Altruism," 164.324
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4000 (if they ever live). Admittedly, this may mean that we cannot 
include the future extremely poor who may be affected by systemic 
change in the far future to those who we will help and allocate 
resources for. We do not even know whether they will exist (as 
extreme poverty may be eliminated by then). 
325
	 Hence, we can only compare the number of the existing 
extremely poor and the number of the future extremely poor (who 
will be living in the future, after applying the uncertainty discounting). 
There is no current projection regarding the number of the future 
extremely poor, which states that they will vastly outweigh the 
number of the existing extremely poor or be vastly outweighed by 
the number of the existing extremely poor in the predictable future. It 
can be assumed that that the number of the existing extremely poor 
and the number of the future extremely poor will be relatively close 
in the predictable future. This brings about a direct objection to the 
first proposition of systemic change that we should allocate all of 
our spare resources to systemic change because it would be vastly 
unfair to the existing extremely poor. By the same token, we cannot 
be required to donate all of our spare resources to effective charities 
as a matter of respect for the future extremely poor. Donating all of 
our spare resources to effective charities unjustifiably neglects the 
interests of the future extremely poor who have the same interests 
as the existing extremely poor.

	 But there is a catch. There could be overlapping positive 
effects which affect both the existing extremely poor and the future 
	Note that uncertainty discounting is not the same with risk discounting. Risk 325
refers to contexts where an outcome's probability can be calculated. 
Nonetheless, when there is uncertainty, we cannot calculate an outcome's 
probability because we cannot know whether it will occur. Refer to Simon 
Caney, "Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth, and 
Risk," Journal of Social Philosophy 40, no. 2 (2009): 166.
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extremely poor. Overlapping positive effects occur when a specific 
intervention originally designed for the existing extremely poor also 
affects the future extremely poor, and vice versa. For instance, 
donating all of our spare resources to effective charities could (1) 
prevent some future extremely poor from being born by decreasing 
the number of families living in extreme poverty, and (2) prevent 
some suffering of the future extremely poor by bringing about 
positive genetic differences, slightly increasing the quality of social 
conditions, and forcing some institutions to reform themselves. In 
that case, an intervention targeting the existing extremely poor could 
also benefit the future extremely poor. Likewise, although systemic 
change is mostly relevant to the future extremely poor who have not 
been born yet, some of its tiny early-stage effects could change the 
lives of the existing extremely poor. For instance, if a new global 
clean energy system which can fully mitigate the impacts of climate 
change across the world over a hundred years is being adopted, 
some of the existing extremely poor can also benefit from it 
throughout its implementation. Therefore, one may argue that 
accepting the first proposition and thus allocating all of the spare 
resources to systemic change does not necessarily disregard the 
interests of the existing extremely poor as it inevitably affects some 
of the existing extremely poor.

	 Although it is true that allocating all of the spare resources to 
systemic change can be made through the motivation of improving 
the lives of the existing extremely poor, achieving a fair distribution 
of utility through it would be a sheer coincidence. A fair distribution 
of utility demands careful adjustments of resources contingent on 
the ever-changing number of the existing extremely poor and the 
future extremely poor, comparison of social conditions and risks, 
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and feasibility. The possibility that allocating all of our spare 
resources to systemic change benefits not only the future extremely 
poor but also the existing extremely poor does not necessarily 
satisfy a fair distribution of utility—what it is at stake here is not to 
whom the first proposition benefits but to whom and how much it 
benefits. Insisting on implementing the first proposition is quite 
unlikely to ensure a fair distribution of utility because there is no 
flexibility in it. Unlike the first proposition, the second and third 
propositions grant us the flexibility of changing the amount of spare 
resources allocated to systemic change or effective charities so that 
they can be responsive to the changing conditions above 
mentioned. 
326
	 Overlapping positive effects could also be discussed in 
accordance with the idea that donating all of our spare resources to 
effective charities would guarantee the prevention of some of the 
future extremely poor from coming into existence and bring 
advantage to the other future extremely poor who will exist by 
increasing their opportunities. By preventing the future extremely 
poor who would have lives not worth living from existing, it saves 
them from their potential misery.  By increasing the opportunities 327
of the other future extremely poor who will exist, they may be able to 
lift themselves out of extreme poverty a little bit easier than it would 
otherwise have been. In turn, some may claim that allocating all of 
our spare resources to effective charities may result in a fair 
	 There can be an exceptional case where the first proposition ensures a fair 326
distribution of utility: overlapping effects may grant an amount of utility to the 
existing extremely poor which can be morally equivalent to the amount of 
utility granted to the future extremely poor. If there is such a case, it would be 
a temporary instant. As the social conditions undergo a rapid change, we have 
to switch back either to the second or third proposition.
	 I will tackle the non-identity problem in the next section because, presumably, 327
there will be future extremely poor who will have lives worth living.
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distribution of utility. However, this claim fails: even though donating 
all of the spare resources to effective charities may prevent some of 
the future extremely poor from coming into existence and benefit 
some of the future extremely poor, a fair distribution of utility is 
context-dependent and allocating all of our resources does not 
make us flexible in responding to the complex conditions. Again, if 
we notice that there will be many ambiguities regarding the 
calculation of the fair distribution of utility, then it should discourage 
us from embracing an "all-or-nothing" option. Apart from that, even 
in the very optimistic scenarios, the benefits that the future 
extremely poor receive from donating all of the spare resources to 
the most effective charities are very likely to be topped by the harms 
arising from it since it means that systemic change is neglected. 
Referring back to the empirical research done on extreme poverty, it 
should be fairly obvious that donating all of our spare resources to 
effective charities would be harmful to the future extremely poor as 
well as some of the existing extremely poor, let alone it achieving a 
fair distribution of utility.

5.3.2	The distribution of utility

	 Recall the risk, expected utility analysis and one's marginal 
impact through systemic change I discussed in §4.5. Suppose that 
they are all equal, but the distribution of utility is not.

	 What do I mean by the distribution of utility? Sometimes a 
given amount of distributed utility may not help a party to 
significantly improve their lives. For instance, donating spare 
resources to provide vitamin A tablets may significantly improve the 
lives of the existing extremely poor. Suppose that for each pound, X 
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amount of welfare improvement for each existing extremely poor is 
brought about through providing vitamin A tablets. X amount per 
capita is sufficient to significantly improve the lives of the existing 
extremely poor. Further suppose that allocating spare resources to a 
form of systemic change, such as preventing illicit financial flows, 
trivially improves the lives of the future extremely poor due to the 
vast number of the future extremely poor. May the amount of utility 
per capita be X-1000. This could especially be relevant for the future 
extremely poor living in the far future rather than the future extremely 
poor living in the near future. The benefits distributed among a very 
large population could bring about tiny utility per capita.

	 A different version may also be the case: this time, systemic 
change may bring about massive per capita improvements to the 
lives of the future extremely poor because of the long-lasting and 
accumulative benefits of a certain form of systemic change. Even if 
donating to effective charities could still significantly improve the 
lives of the existing extremely poor, the per capita benefits received 
by the future extremely poor far surpasses the per capita benefits 
received by the existing extremely poor.

	 These all depend on (1) the type and the strength of 
interventions of effective charities and the forms of systemic change, 
(2) the number of the existing extremely poor and the future 
extremely poor, (3) whether there is any distribution of utility bringing 
about trivial benefits per capita and/or significant benefits per 
capita, and (4) the difference between benefits of effective charities 
and systemic change per capita. Once there are changes in these, 
our decision regarding how much to allocate to whom is also apt to 
change. Again, this should make us wary about choosing to allocate 
all of our spare resources to systemic change or charities, because 
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all of these variables are likely to change rapidly and we should be 
flexible in our allocation.

5.3.3	The non-identity problem: a challenge to the 

	 systemic change objection?

	 So far, I have argued that we have to consider the moral value 
of a given amount of welfare of the existing extremely poor and the 
future extremely poor equally. I have also demonstrated that 
allocating our spare resources to both effective charities and 
systemic change is likely the best option as long as we keep track of 
the factors we weigh. Such a conclusion pushes us to accept either 
the second or the third proposition and urge effective altruism to 
seriously consider supporting systemic change.

	 But this conclusion is challenged by the non-identity problem. 
The non-identity problem was famously raised by Derek Parfit and 
has produced a vast literature since then. It states that if purportedly 
harmful actions bring about situations where people have lives worth 
living and where the alternative was never being born, then those 
purportedly harmful actions cannot have made the people affected 
worse off. Since they make nobody worse off, and so cannot have 
harmed them. If they are harmful, they are not harmful because they 
have made someone worse off. Derek Parfit's original example is 
The 14-Year-Old Girl.

The 14-Year-Old Girl. This girl chooses to have a child. 
Because she is so young, she gives her child a bad 
start in life. Though this will have bad effects 
throughout this child's life, his life will, predictably, be 
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worth living. If this girl had waited for several years, 
she would have had a different child, to whom she 
would have given a better start in life. 
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	 Many would think that the girl's decision to give birth is 
harmful and that the decision has made the child worse off. 
Nonetheless, as Parfit puts it,

If she had waited, this particular child would never 
have existed. And, despite its bad start, his life is worth 
living. Suppose first that we do not believe that 
causing to exist can benefit. We should ask, 'If 
someone lives a life that is worth living, is this worse 
for this person than if he had never existed?' Our 
answer must be No. Suppose next that we believe that 
causing to exist can benefit. On this view, this girl's 
decision benefits her child. 
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	 Here, a purportedly harmful act does not seem to be harmful. 
It is either permissible, or, if not, it is not impermissible on the 
grounds that it is bad for the child.

	 In our context, the non-identity problem arises in the case 
where not allocating spare resources to systemic change brings 
about future extremely poor whose lives are nevertheless worth 
living. But because of its adverse effects on welfare, rights and 
social inclusion, not allocating spare resources to systemic change 
appears to be very harmful and wrong. On the other hand, if we had 
	Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 358.328
	Parfit, 359.329
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worked for, and achieved, systemic change, different people would 
have been born. Taken to its extreme, the non-identity problem may 
be claimed to subvert the systemic change objection at least in 
some of the cases where not allocating spare resources to systemic 
change bring about future extremely poor whose lives are 
nevertheless worth living where the alternative is never being born. It 
could also compel us to reject all of its propositions because we 
cannot make the future extremely poor worse off by not allocating 
spare resources to systemic change. Hence, the systemic change 
objection would become obsolete and effective altruism can 
justifiably ask individuals to donate all of their spare resources to 
effective charities.

	 Put simply, the non-identity problem is the inability of 
accepting the following at the same time (NIPP stands for the Non-
Identity Problem Premise):

NIPP 1. An act is wrongful only if it is harmful to 
someone.

NIPP 2. Not allocating spare resources to systemic 
change cannot be harmful to the future extremely poor 
who have lives worth living and thus cannot make 
them worse off, because they otherwise would have 
not existed at all (in other words, they owe their 





NIPP 3. Not allocating spare resources to systemic 
change wrongs the future extremely poor (who have 
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lives worth living and owe their existence to not 
allocating spare resources to systemic change).

	 Imagine a dilemma where we will either donate to a charity or 
allocate our spare resources to systemic change.

	 The first option is that we donate to a charity to cure the life-
threatening malnutrition of an existing 20-year-old extremely poor 
person. The life of the 20-year-old extremely poor person is 
extended to 50, preventing premature death. Our decision to donate 
to a charity triggers a causal chain where a future extremely poor is 
created who will live until the age of 20 and die by suffering from 
malnutrition, which is premature death. Both have lives worth living.

	 The second option is that we allocate our spare resources to 
systemic change. Because that we do not donate to a charity to 
extend the life of the 20-year-old extremely poor, that person dies at 
20 by suffering from malnutrition, which results in premature death. 
But our decision to allocate our spare resources to systemic change 
triggers another causal chain different from the causal chain created 
in the first option, where a different future extremely poor is created 
who will live until 50. Both have lives worth living.

	 In the first option, we extend the life of someone by 30 years 
and create someone with a lifetime of 20 years (allowing premature 
death). In the second option, we do not extend the life of someone 
(enabling premature death) and create someone with a lifetime of 50 
years.

	 According to NIPP 2, by not allocating our spare resources to 
systemic change, we cannot make the future extremely poor who 
will die at 20 worse off in the first option because that person 
otherwise would have not existed at all. In other words, we cannot 
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harm that person because the alternative of never being born is 
worse. Once we also accept NIPP 1, the person-affecting view, we 
cannot claim that not allocating spare resources to systemic change 
wrongs the future extremely poor who have lives worth living and 
who owe their existence to that act (NIPP 3). In contrast, by 
allocating our spare resources to systemic change in the second 
option, we harm someone because we let that already existing 
person die, which is supported by NIPP 1. This means that 
allocating spare resources to systemic change wrongs that existing 
extremely poor person who would otherwise have benefited from 
not allocating spare resources to systemic change—in contrast, if 
we had donated to charity, there would be no harm to anyone but 
only benefit. Some may claim that these all show that NIPP 3 is false
—put simply, not allocating spare resources to systemic change 
does not wrong the future extremely poor. Such a conclusion can 
force us to move our spare resources that we are prepared to 
allocate for systemic change to charity.

	 We either have to concede that NIPP 3 is false or find another 
argument to address the non-identity problem. My argument will be 
based on challenging NIPP 2, by introducing Punch and Amaya.

	 Even if there could be some future extremely poor who have 
lives worth living and owe their existence to not allocating spare 
resources to systemic change, not allocating spare resources to 
systemic change could harm and wrong them. To understand this, 
we need to subscribe to a specific interpretation of harm. On this 
account of harm, harm does not need to make someone overall 
worse off than one could have otherwise been. It can, but it is not a 
necessary condition. The necessary condition is that harm makes 
281
someone at least locally worse off than one could have otherwise 
been. Consider Punch.	 

Punch. Immediately after an argument, out of some 
weird feeling composed of grudge and enjoyment, I 
punch a friend of mine. My friend's teeth are broken 
and some of them are fractured. My friend feels severe 
pain and anxiety, and rushes to the dental hospital. 
Doctors soon discovered that my friend has been 
suffering from some asymptomatic oral disease for 
some time now. If I had not punched my friend, the 
diagnosis of my friend's oral disease would have been 
delayed, and it would have been at the advanced, 
dangerous stage—my friend would have been under 
tormenting pain for a significant amount of time and 
then would have died.

	 I certainly harmed my friend with my punch, breaking teeth 
and leave some of them fractured. But I also prevented massive 
harm by enabling the diagnosis of my friend's oral disease. In other 
words, via harming my friend with my punch, I significantly 
decreased the amount of overall harm that my friend would have 
otherwise been subject to if I had not punched my friend. My punch, 
albeit harm of its own, did not make my friend overall worse off. My 
friend would have been overall worse off if I had not punched them, 
because the overall harm would have been greater. But I harmed my 
friend by making my friend locally worse off, because I damaged my 
friend's teeth, which is local harm—I could have avoided punching 
my friend, but did not do so.

282
	 Some may argue that I did not harm my friend, because I 
decreased the amount of overall harm with my punch. I disagree. In 
that very moment that I punched my friend, there was harm to some 
degree, which is local harm. Whether or not I bring about lower 
overall harm at the end of the day does not change the fact that I 
brought about some harm in the beginning. Harm has been 
experienced, both physically and psychologically.

	 Local harms, and symmetrically, local benefits are 
components of one's welfare balance. Every existence-inducing 
action necessarily creates local harms and local benefits. When we 
add them up we understand whether that life is worth living. For 
instance, if local benefits outweigh local harms, then that person's 
welfare balance would be positive. In that case, that person would 
have a life worth living because that person has overall benefited 
from the life at stake. Likewise, if local harms outweigh local 
benefits, then that person's welfare balance would be negative. In 
that case, that person would not have a life worth living because 
that person has been overall harmed by the life at stake.

	 To understand how we could apply this sort of reasoning to 
the future extremely poor in the first and second options (charity 
versus systemic change), first consider a comparable example, 
failing to adequately tackle the residues of slavery. Let me introduce 
Amaya.

Amaya. Amaya's ancestors were enslaved for centuries 
until they gained their emancipation through an 
uprising. Amaya is a member of a post-slavery 
generation who enjoys legal equality with others and 
benefits from the political process which tries to 
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reverse the effects of slavery. However, even though 
they were able to do considerably more, previous post-
slavery governments acted rather slowly to combat the 
residues of slavery, as they allocated a very tiny portion 
of their resources to wipe out the residues of slavery. 
These resources were not enough to adequately tackle 
the social and institutional residues of slavery, and to 
meaningfully increase the accessibility of Amaya's 
ancestors to healthcare, education, employment 
opportunities, and family planning. If previous post-
slavery governments had allocated much more 
resources, Amaya would not have been born because 
Amaya's family would have acted differently in the light 
of family planning guidance they could have received. 
Therefore, Amaya's life is owed to the failure of post-
slavery governments to allocate more resources to 
combat the residues of slavery. 

	 Further suppose that Amaya has a life worth living as she 
enjoys free education and high-quality health services, an intimate 
family and a friend network, and has a passion for discovering the 
nature of the region she lives in. But because of the failure of the 
previous post-slavery governments, some people are still very 
hostile to those who come from minority backgrounds and aim to 
exclude them from the economic, social and political sphere. In fact, 
Amaya's job applications were many times rejected just because 
she is from a minority background where she had to accept a job 
with a lower salary and was forced to have lower welfare.
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	 Amaya is not subject to overall harm but is subject to local 
harm. Despite the fact that Amaya has a life worth living and was 
born due the failure of the previous post-slavery governments, she is 
being locally harmed by that failure as well. The type of local harm 
that she is subject to is linked to "identity-forming group 
attachments" where individuals are harmed by virtue of their 
belongings to certain groups.  According to Ori J. Herstein,
330
. . .certain harms to groups, which originate in past 
wrongs, are currently wrongful because they harm 
currently living individuals through those individuals' 
identity-forming attachments to the harmed group. In 
such cases, the historic wrongs continue to harm the 
group, since the identity of the group is maintained 
throughout the generations. In turn, in each generation 
the group harm, originating in the historic wrongs, 
constitutively harms those formatively attached to the 
group (who are usually the members of the group). 
Thus, even though the historic wrong functions as a 
'different-people act' in the case of the individual group 
members, the persisting harm to the group, grounded 
in the historic wrong, is ipso facto harmful to these 





	Ori J. Herstein, "Historic Injustice, Group Membership and Harm to 330
Individuals: Defending Claims for Historic Justice from the Non-Identity 
Problem," Harvard Journal of Racial and Ethnic Justice 25 (2009): 235.
	Herstein, 235.331
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	 Following Herstein's argument, we notice that the past 
wrongs originated from the failure of the previous post-slavery 
governments have resulted in continual harm to minorities. Even 
though Amaya has a life worth living, we cannot claim that the failure 
of the previous post-slavery governments did not locally harm 
Amaya. They indeed did by causing low welfare prospects, letting 
prejudices, and delaying the reforms needed. Even if they did not 
make Amaya overall worse off as the alternative of never having 
been born would be worse for Amaya, they nonetheless locally 
harmed Amaya. Just like I locally harmed my friend in Punch, Amaya 
is also locally harmed: not because Amaya is made overall worse off 
but because Amaya continually experiences different forms of local 
harms. NIPP 2 seems to be inadequate, because it neglects local 
harms and focuses exclusively on overall harms.

	 Now, recall the first and second options where we either 
allocate our spare resources to systemic change or donate to a 
charity. According to NIPP 2, by not allocating our spare resources 
to systemic change, we cannot be said to have harmed the future 
extremely poor in the first option who will live for 20 years because 
that future extremely poor has a life worth living and that future 
extremely poor owes their life to not allocating our spare resources 
to systemic change. But I disagree—we harm that person, not 
because we make that person overall worse off but because we 
make that person locally worse off. The local harm arises from 
causing premature death as a result of suffering from malnutrition, 
and we indeed triggered that local harm. We bring about a net 
benefit to that future extremely poor overall but we also harm that 
person locally because our action results in death by suffering from 
malnutrition. Hence, it seems that NIPP 2 is not as strong as it may 
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be thought at first glance because by not making any distinction 
between overall and local harms, it just assumes that we have to 
focus on overall harms—NIPP 2 misses the fact that there are local 
harms. When there are local harms, future people can be harmed 
locally, which challenges the non-identity problem in this example.

	 There may be a claim that the local harm that the future 
extremely poor (who have lives worth living) receive from not 
allocating spare resources to systemic change could be justified or 
pardoned because not allocating spare resources endows that 
person with a life worth living. Just because we do not harm them to 
the extent that we make their lives not worth living, we expect to be 
exempt from the moral blame that local harm assigns to the 
perpetrator. Although never having been born would be worse for 
the future extremely poor who will have lives worth living, it is not 
sufficient to justify or pardon the action of not allocating spare 
resources to systemic change solely on the basis that it has brought 
about lives worth living. It is not clear how it can be justified or 
pardoned or to what extent it can be justified or pardoned. For 
instance, suppose that, because of our action, we know that there 
will some future person who will have an extremely happy life for 40 
years, and then that person will have to suffer 4 years of 
excruciating pain. We also know that without that action that person 
would otherwise have not existed. That person may still have a life 
worth living, provided that that person's happiness outweighs 
suffering. But it is unclear whether the existence-inducing action 
which leads to excruciating pain can be justified solely on the basis 
that we have brought about a life worth living. Existence-inducing 
actions can still be wrong either because of the undesirable intensity 
of a specific local harm or the undesirable distribution of local 
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harms, or both. For instance, in the recently mentioned example, the 
presence of excruciating pain may mean that the existence-inducing 
action wrongs the person who has a life worth living because the 
intensity of that local harm is extremely high. Parallelly, we cannot 
straight away justify or pardon the decision of neglecting systemic 
change as it would continue to severely locally harm some of the 
future extremely poor even if they will have lives worth living. 
Presumably, many future extremely poor will suffer great local harms 
(even if they will have lives worth living) and the way that the local 
harms are distributed may be so undesirable that the mere fact that 
they will have lives worth living will not be sufficient to say that they 
are not wronged. 
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	 What does this say about our decision between the first and 
the second option? Should we donate to charity or should we 
allocate our spare resources to systemic change? First, consider the 








Giving 20 years by 
creating + local harm 
which leads to 
premature death
Second Option:  
Systemic Change
Local harm which 
leads to premature 
death
Giving 50 years by 
creating
	There can be at least two readings of wronging here. The first is that since all 332
existence-incuding acts bring about local harms, they all wrong the people 
they create (even if those people have lives worth living). The second is that 
existence-inducing acts which bring about local harms are wrong when those 
local harms brought about are undesirably intense and/or undesirably 




	 As I have shown that not allocating our spare resources to 
systemic change can harm the future extremely poor (even if they 
have lives worth living) by making a distinction between local and 
overall harms, I think that choosing the first option and choosing the 
second option are morally on a par. In the first option, we do not let 
a 20-year-old extremely poor suffer from malnutrition (local harm) 
and die, and make that person live until the age of 50. But this act 
creates a future extremely poor who will live until the age of 20 and 
suffer from malnutrition (local harm), and die. Hence, we save 
someone from the local harm and let the other suffer from the same 
local harm. In the second option, it is the same: we let the 20-year-
old extremely poor suffer from malnutrition (local harm) and die, 
while creating a future extremely poor person who will live until the 
age of 50. There is no difference in the amount of benefits and 
harms. We are morally permitted to choose either donating to charity 
or allocating our spare resources to systemic change. In this 
example, the non-identity problem cannot challenge the position 
that we should allocate our spare resources to systemic change.

	 One objection may be that while we benefit both the existing 
extremely poor and the future extremely poor by donating to a 
charity, we only benefit the future extremely poor by allocating our 
spare resources to systemic change. The objector might conclude 
that it is better to benefit two instead of one. Moreover, the objector 
might add that we both benefit and locally harm the future extremely 
poor when we donate, but only harm and do not benefit the existing 
extremely poor in any way when we allocate our spare resources to 
systemic change. The objector might conclude that it is better to 
both benefit and locally harm someone rather than only harm 
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another. I think we can reply to this by pointing out that we risk 
fetishising the number of people we benefit or harm. For instance, 
while it is true that we only harm and not in any way benefit the 
existing extremely poor when we allocate our resources to systemic 
change, we also benefit a future extremely poor by creating that 
person and giving a life of 50 years. Some might argue that rather 
than splitting the benefit of 50 years into two different benefits of 30 
years and 20 years (the first option, when we donate to charity), 
creating someone and giving 50 years (the second option, when we 
allocate spare resources to systemic change) is preferable. While 
these issues are connected to the non-identity problem, they heavily 
depend on normative positions we take, and the non-identity 
problem alone does not have a sufficient force to address these 
issues in this example.

	 Note that all of the above examples are formulated on the 
assumption that not allocating spare resources to systemic change 
will create lives worth living. But it is unreasonable to believe that all 
of the future extremely poor will have lives worth starting. Most 
probably, the vast majority of the future extremely poor will have 
lives not worth starting due to the harsh conditions of malnutrition, 
diseases and oppression.  Amplified by neglecting systemic 333
change, the systemic causes of extreme poverty will be even more 
pervasive: weaker rights protection, increased exploitation, relaxed 
legal standards, recurring long-term foreign debt, untreated 
corruption, etc. Not allocating spare resources to systemic change 
will wrong the future extremely poor because neglecting systemic 
change will create immense harms: current lack of attention to 
	There is a difference between lives worth starting and lives worth continuing. 333
Refer to David Benatar, Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming into 
Existence (New York: Clarendon, 2006), 22.
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systemic change will decrease the resources allocated to the future 
extremely poor. The alternative, never having been born, is better. 
Viewed in this way, not allocating spare resources to systemic 
change could be said to make some of the future extremely poor 
overall worse off than they would have otherwise been. As the non-
identity problem is dependent on the existence of the lives worth 
living and the alternative being worse, it is not applicable for the 
future extremely poor who will have lives not worth starting. Avoiding 
bringing lives not worth starting into existence requires allocating 
spare resources to systemic change.

	 In summary, the distinction between overall and local harms 
(and thus, the distinction between making someone overall worse off 
and making someone locally worse off) explains why the non-
identity problem does not subvert the need to allocate spare 
resources in the case where some future extremely poor will have 
lives worth living. Moreover, when we move our attention to the 
other case where there will many future extremely poor who will 
have lives not worth starting, the non-identity problem fades away. 
Rather than basing our decision to not allocate spare resources to 
systemic change on the non-identity problem, we can think about 
how we could further enhance our moral thinking and behaviour 
towards the future extremely poor. Referring to the non-identity 
problem, Makoff and Read note that "The central moral question 
becomes, . . .'what kinds of future lives and circumstances should 
we facilitate in coming to be?'. Or, again: 'what kinds of future are 
we leaving to the beings, whoever precisely they will turn out to be, 
who will constitute our posterity?'"  These questions point us the 334
	Ruth Makoff and Rupert Read, "Beyond Just Justice – Creating Space for a 334
Future-Care Ethic," Philosophical Investigations 40, no. 3 (2017): 234.
291
right direction in considering the interests of the future extremely 
poor. Apart from other reasons, neglecting systemic change would 
be wrong because we would fail to comply with a motivation which 
is oriented towards creating ideal circumstances for the future 
extremely poor. Self-inquiry on our moral progress could prevent us 
from committing wrongs such as carelessness, imprudence and 




	 Firstly, there are reasons to consider the interests the future 
extremely poor as much as the existing extremely poor. In my 
evaluation, I have drawn attention to the time-insensitivity of the 
moral value of a given amount of welfare, and the rights continuing 
ad infinitum. I have also described the importance of decision-
making design for the future extremely poor via analysing their bad 
luck. These reasons can be attractive both for consequentialists and 
deontologists. Given that there are reasons to consider the interests 
of the future extremely poor as much as the existing extremely poor, 
the systemic change objection becomes even more irresistible: the 
need for systemic change is a need for alleviating extreme poverty 
and at the same time not creating some of the future extremely poor, 
or paving the way for lifting out of extreme poverty with less effort if 
the future extremely poor ever exist.

	 Secondly, it is very hard to decide how to divide our spare 
resources between effective charities and systemic change. 
However, by appealing to numbers and fairness, and the distribution 
of utility, we notice that allocating all of our spare resources either to 
effective charities or systemic change would be misleading due to 
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the complex features of decision-making. Moreover, the decision 
how much to distribute to effective charities and systemic change is 
essentially an ever-evolving process, where we have to avoid 
universally sticking to one option. Alongside the above factors, I 
have already considered risk and expected utility in Chapter 4, and 
they all apply to the future extremely poor. The probability of 
success chance of systemic change affecting the future extremely 
poor, its respective expected utility and one's marginal impact in 
affecting the lives of the future extremely poor all contribute to one's 
review of these factors. All of these factors present us a combined 
tool of decision-making. We cannot categorically state that the 
second proposition is superior to the third proposition, or vice versa 
because we do not know how these factors would work out in 
specific contexts. But what is more plausible is that donating all of 
our resources to effective charities or allocating all of our resources 
to systemic change is very much likely to miss the importance of at 
least some of the factors. The conclusion is that although we should 
treat the existing extremely poor and the future extremely poor as 
equally deserving where no one should be given more weight, we 
could justifiably allocate more spare resources either to effective 
charities or systemic change after reviewing the factors discussed. 
These factors do not result in discounting the moral value of a given 
amount of welfare. But these factors could result in allocating an 
unequal amount of resources because of the relative importance of 
factors discussed. Given the complex nature of the impact brought 
about by effective charities and systemic change on the lives, and 
the plurality of factors that we should consider, it is unlikely that we 
end up with either donating all of our spare resources to effective 
charities or allocating all of our spare resources to systemic change. 
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It is very likely that we will find ourselves witnessing a negotiation 
between the second and the third proposition.

	 Thirdly, the non-identity problem is not a threat to the 
systemic change objection. Nor it is a threat to effective altruism 
supporting systemic change. The non-identity problem only focuses 
on overall harms and misses to recognise local harms—the 
presence of local harms, especially in the case of extreme poverty, 
challenges the non-identity problem. In the case of extreme poverty, 
local harms may be immense (although still not enough to render the 
lives of the future extremely poor not worth living) and it is not 
always clear that we should justify or pardon local harms just 
because they do not render the lives of the future extremely poor not 
worth living. In that case, the non-identity problem loses its strength. 
Moreover, some of the future extremely poor who will have born as a 
result of not allocating spare resources to systemic change will have 
lives not worth starting, and they will be immune to the non-identity 
problem.

	 Lastly, effective altruism is compatible with considering the 
interests of the future extremely poor: after all, effective altruism is 
cause-impartial. Moreover, given the increasing popularity of the 
longtermism among the philosophers of effective altruism, the 
issues surrounding the future will become more and more attractive 
and causes related to systemic change are likely to gain 
prominence. Therefore, effective altruism is also compatible with 
asking individuals to allocate most or some of their spare resources 
to systemic change if the proposed form of systemic change is 




	 In the thesis, I have assessed this argument for effective 
altruism, which is broadly indicative of popular arguments for the 
obligation to donate to charities which alleviate extreme poverty:

Premise 1. Extreme poverty is very bad.

Premise 2. If it is in our power to prevent something 
very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to 
do it.

Premise 3. Individuals ought to choose the effective 
option in preventing very bad things.

Premise 4. Donating to effective charities is one of the 
best ways to alleviate extreme poverty.

Conclusion. Individuals ought to donate to effective 
charities working towards extreme poverty alleviation 
where doing so does not require them to give up 
anything of moral significance.

	 I have analysed the four premises of effective altruism, the 
first three of which constituted a chapter each, and the last premise 
constituted two chapters.	 

	 In Chapter 1, which analyses the premise "Extreme poverty is 
very bad", I claim that while the premise is uncontroversial, effective 
altruists should not approach extreme poverty through the lens of 
hedonistic utilitarianism because it is far too limited and brings 
about two repugnant conclusions. Since hedonistic utilitarianism 
only focuses on suffering in explaining the badness of things 
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including extreme poverty, it would not find extreme poverty as very 
bad if one day extreme poverty no longer produces suffering. 
Moreover, it would justify the secret killing of those who perpetually 
suffer under extreme poverty. That is why effective altruists should 
not solely use the concept of suffering in explaining the badness of 
extreme poverty. Likewise, effective altruism as a movement should 
be cautious about using the discourse of hedonistic utilitarianism.

	 Chapter 2 explored the premise "If it is in our power to 
prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do 
it". This is Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. First, I delineated 
several different variants of the principle, based on different 
understandings of "moral significance". I then focused on a 
particular interpretation of moral significance. I argued that while this 
principle could be a commonly accepted principle which assigns a 
moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty, it has several 
problems. One problem is that it is overpermissive, it may ask too 
little from certain individuals. Another problem is that it is negligent 
about several sources of responsibility and only appeals to mere 
ability as a source of responsibility. An additional problem is that it 
does not mention the moral rights of the extremely poor, although it 
is centred around the moral obligation of individuals. I argued that by 
supporting Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice through additional 
principles, we could make it a plausible one.

	 In Chapter 3, I scrutinised the premise "Individuals ought to 
choose the effective option in preventing very bad things". I first 
showed that Singer's argument, first presented in "Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality", required an additional principle, which is 
commonly taken to be the inspiration for effective altruism, does not 
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lead us to effective altruism. Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice 
only requires us to prevent very bad things from happening. When 
there is more than one very bad thing that can be prevented, it does 
not direct us on which to prevent. Therefore, I showed, the Weaker 
Principle of Sacrifice must be accompanied by an effectiveness 
principle.

	 I argued that effectiveness, for the most part, is acceptable. I 
show that we could justify effectiveness through both an outcome-
based principle and an obligation-based principle. However, it has 
its limits. Always endorsing effectiveness could severely violate 
fairness, which may result in unjustly favouring the well-off, 
preferring tiny improvements in the lives of a large number of well-off 
as opposed to massive improvements in the small number of worst-
off, and perpetuating the unequal luck distribution across the worst-
off (especially in the case of donating). Since effectiveness is at the 
core of effective altruism, effective altruists should be wary of the 
limits of effectiveness, and should pay attention to the moral value of 
fairness as well.

	 In Chapter 4, which focused on the premise "Donating to 
effective charities is one of the best ways to alleviate extreme 
poverty", I claimed that the premise is indeed true. Effective charities 
do impressive work and they improve the lives of the extremely poor 
much more than other charities. However, the premise has to be 
defended against the systemic change objection. The systemic 
change objection states that effective altruism unjustifiably distracts 
individuals from allocating their spare resources to systemic change. 
After looking at empirical research on extreme poverty, I observed 
that addressing extreme poverty certainly needs systemic, 
institutional and large-scale reforms. But it is a high-risk action, and 
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some effective altruists may plausibly not want to allocate all of our 
spare resources to systemic change. However, they should also not 
allocate all of their spare resources to effective charities because of 
the potential of systemic change.

	 In Chapter 5, which continued to focus on Premise 4, I stated 
that there are reasons for thinking that the interests of the extremely 
poor are morally equivalent to the interests of the future extremely 
poor. I also stated that primary beneficiaries of donating are the 
existing extremely poor, and the primary beneficiaries of allocating 
spare resources to systemic change are the future extremely poor. 
These are other reasons to divide spare resources between effective 
charities and systemic change, because allocating all of the spare 
resources to either effective charities or systemic change neglect 
either the existing extremely poor or the future extremely poor, 
although they should be treated as morally equal. But this reasoning 
is challenged by the non-identity problem, which implies that there 
might be no reason to allocate spare resources to systemic change. 
I demonstrate that the non-identity problem is not a problem for 
one's decision to allocate one's spare resources to systemic 
change. I conclude that we should neither allocate all of our spare 
resources to systemic change nor to effective charities, and this 
conclusion implies that, alongside systemic change, donating to 
effective charities is one of the best ways to improve the lives of the 
extremely poor.

	 Effective altruism is an ever-evolving philosophical approach 
and social movement. This movement has the potential to live on 
through the upcoming decades, perhaps centuries. Since it is a very 
young movement, it has to be very careful in determining, evaluating 
and choosing its principles. Even for the seemingly obvious 
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premises, there have been objections to which effective altruism has 
owed responses. Through facing those objections and giving 
responses, I hope to have contributed to strengthening the 
underlying moral commitments of effective altruism.

	 Albeit their limitations, all of the premises of effective altruism 
are true. This brings us to the conclusion that individuals ought to 
donate to effective charities working towards extreme poverty 
alleviation where doing so does not require them to give up anything 
of moral significance. For many reasons scrutinised in this thesis, 
individuals are morally linked to the extremely poor and they owe 
some portion of their wealth to the extremely poor. In an increasingly 
globalised world, moral relations between parties are more and more 
emphasised. It is very important to be cognisant of these moral 
relations so that individuals would not forget their relatively 
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